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PREFACE 
 
 
The Glucksman Institute for Research in Securities Markets awards fellowships each year to 
outstanding second year Stern MBA students to work on independent research projects under a 
faculty member's supervision. Five research projects completed by the Glucksman Fellows of 
2006-2007 are included in this special issue of the Finance Department Working Paper Series. 
These papers focus on important topics in empirical financial economics.  
Harsh Nanda, under the supervision of David Yermack, examines the difference in premiums 
paid in US Management Buyouts versus the UK. Narendra Chokshi, under the direction of Kose 
John examines the regulatory, legal, and structuring challenges faced by financial investors in 
executing leveraged buyouts in India. Andrew MacNamara, under the supervision of Stephen 
Brown, examines a non-traditional method for constructing risk measures for a company based 
on industry composition. Andrew Verdasca, under the direction of Yakov Amihud, examines the 
factors behind common stock PIPE (Private Investments in Public Equity) issuers’ discounts and 
their long-term performance. Jeven Dew, under the direction of Richard Levich, evaluates 
whether futures contracts linked to terrorism would be successful as widely-traded hedging 
instruments. These papers, reflecting the research effort of five outstanding Stern MBA students, 
are summarized in more detail in the Table of Contents on the next two pages. 
  
       William L. Silber, Director   
       Glucksman Institute     
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Control Premiums” and “Synergies” help justify most discrepancies between the 
market price of an asset and the price a buyer actually pays to acquire the asset. 
That is not necessarily the case in Leveraged Buyouts (LBOs) and more 
specifically Management Buyouts (MBOs). For the purpose of this research we 
define MBOs as transactions where a public company goes private and the 
management of the company is part of the buying consortium. 
MBOs do not have synergies in most cases. Unlike an acquisition, the company 
continues to run as it was doing before going private. No two assets are being put 
together to generate synergies. Control premium theory also does not provide 
enough justification for the ~35% premium on average (over all MBO 
transactions since 1st Jan 2000) that MBOs require. In most MBOs the 
management’s share in the company does not change significantly before and 
after the transaction. The control does change hands, from shareholders to the new 
equity holders (PE players etc.) but that does not explain why management would 
be willing to pay a premium. 
MBOs and LBOs share a common characteristic, benefit from leverage, that 
partially drives their premiums. In this paper we have attempted to develop a 
better understanding of the drivers of MBO premiums through a specific 
observation: significant difference in premiums paid in US MBOs and UK MBOs 
when no such difference exists between US and UK for LBOs and for general 
acquisitions. 
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In Section II of the paper we talk about the minimal previous research that has 
been done in this area, Section III outlines the data source and attributes that we 
have used in our research. In Section IV we establish the existence of a 
statistically significant difference between MBO premiums in US and UK and 
that no such difference exists for LBOs and general acquisitions. In Section V we 
analyze the transactions with respect to the various hypothesis that could 
potentially support our observations and demonstrate why none of them seem to 
be valid and finally in Section VI we provide our conclusion and some 
suggestions for future research. 
II. PREVIOUS WORK 
Not much systematic research has been done on the drivers of MBO premiums or 
on identifying or understanding differences in MBO premiums in different parts 
of the world. Renneboog, Simons and Wright[2] have done some research on the 
sources of shareholder wealth gains of UK going-private transactions, but nothing 
specific to MBOs and nothing to differentiate MBOs from LBOs. 
III. DATA 
i. Data Description 
We are analyzing Premiums paid in Management Buyouts. We define 
Management Buyouts as Leverage Buyouts where Management was part of one 
of the bidder groups who eventually won the transaction. Specifically, we are 
looking at transactions from Jan-2000 to Oct-2006 with Transaction Size > $50 
million. We have 47 MBO transactions with UK targets and 52 MBO transactions 
with US targets that meet the above criteria. 
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The key quantitative aspects of the transactions which we collected and have used 
in our analysis are: 
• Target nation. Target industry 
• Final premiums, 1-day, 1-week and 4-weeks prior to the announcement date 
• Initial premiums, 1-day, 1-week and 4-weeks prior to the announcement date 
• Increase in premium between initial and final offer 
• % ownership of the acquirer (management team in case of an MBO) prior to 
the transaction 
• Number of bidders 
ii. Data Source 
We are using SDC to get data described above. SDC has flags that allows the user 
to choose: 1) Date range of transaction, 2) Leveraged Buyouts, 3) Management 
Involvement, 4) Transaction value range, hence allowing us to get exactly the data 
that we require. We further used Factiva to do a detailed analysis of a small subset 
of the transactions by going through relevant news articles around the dates of the 
transaction. This analysis helped us understand in further detail the nuances of the 
transactions and verify some of the data we obtained through SDC database. 
IV. PREMIUM ANALYSIS 
A detailed analysis was performed on the premiums paid during transactions 
involving US and UK targets that were announced between 1st January, 2000 and 
31st October, 2006. The summary of the same is given below: 
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Table 1: Summary of Average Premiums Paid for US and UK targets during various 
transactions 
# of 
Transactions 1-Day 1-Week 4-Weeks
LBO-US 168 28.25% 31.25% 34.21%
LBO-UK 86 26.38% 31.19% 31.29%
Difference 1.87% 0.06% 2.92%
MBO-US 52 36.27% 42.08% 44.69%
MBO-UK 47 26.39% 31.19% 32.48%
Difference 9.88% 10.89% 12.20%
All-US 2250 28.40% 32.25% 36.77%
ALL-UK 491 27.21% 31.24% 32.86%
Difference 1.19% 1.01% 3.92%  
As can be seen above, Premiums paid for US targets are significantly higher than 
the premiums paid for UK-targets for Management Buyouts, while the difference 
is negligible for LBOs (a super set1 of MBOs) and All-transactions (a super set of 
LBOs). Further, the difference – 9.88% for 1-Day prior to announcement 
premium, 10.89% for 1-Week prior to announcement premium and 12.20% for 4-
Weeks prior to announcement premium is statistically significant as demonstrated 
by the t-value tests. t Statistic for the 1-Day prior premium is 1.85, for the 1-Week 
prior premium is 1.89 and the 4-Weeks prior premium is 2.34. 
Further detail of the distribution of the premiums paid during Management 
Buyouts of US and UK targets (histograms) are provided in Exhibits 1, 2 & 3. 
The histogram for US MBO transactions are skewed right. To verify that it was 
not just a few blockbuster deals in US that was causing the right skew and our 
                                                 
1 Set A is a super set of set of set B if all transactions in set B are also in set A. By definition given in Section III, 
LBO transactions is a super set of MBO transactions and All-Transactions is a super set of LBO transactions. 
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higher mean premium, we analyzed the distribution more carefully. We looked at 
the medians, 75th percentile and 90th percentile premium values for US and UK. 
The data demonstrates that even the median premium value for the 4-Weeks prior 
premium between US and UK MBOs differs by around 10.5%. Further the 
difference increases as we go to higher percentiles (19.7% for 75th Percentile and 
17.56% for 90th Percentile). To verify that the difference in the means of the two 
distributions is statistically significant, we performed the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum 
test. The Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test confirms that the US MBO 4-weeks prior 
premiums are greater than the UK MBO 4-weeks prior premium with alpha = 
0.05 and US MBO 1-Week prior premiums are higher than the corresponding UK 
premiums for alpha = 0.1.  
We believe that the 4-Week prior premium is the most reliable metric strongly 
confirming our hypothesis that US MBO premiums are significantly higher than 
UK MBO premiums. 
V. TRANSACTION ANALYSIS 
Having established the significance of the difference in premiums paid in MBOs 
of US targets vs. UK targets, we looked at the various transactions in further 
detail in order to find possible reason for the difference. 
Number of Transactions: The number of MBO transactions is US and UK is 
very similar – 52 vs. 47, hence this probably does not help in explaining the 
discrepancy.  
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Size of Transactions: UK Transactions in general are of a smaller size than US 
transactions (almost 1/3rd on average). It is not clear intuitively whether smaller 
transactions should get a higher premium than larger transactions or lower. 
Correlation between Enterprise Value of the deals and premium compared to 4-
Weeks prior is -0.26 for UK MBO transactions and -0.17 for US MBO 
transactions. Both the values are small and negative probably implying that 
smaller deals get higher premiums which runs counter to what we observe 
between US and UK where UK has smaller deals but have lower premiums. 
Competition: MBO transactions in US seem to be more competitive than UK 
MBO transactions. Couple of data points that help understand this further are 
given below: 
1. Almost all UK MBO transactions had a single bidder. Only 1 transaction had 
2 bidders leading to an average of 1.02 bidders per transaction. On the other 
hand, for US MBO transactions the equivalent number is 1.1. 5 out of 52 
transactions had more than 1 bidder. 
2. An interesting (though unexpected) related observation is that the final 
premiums paid for transactions with more than 1 bidders are not significantly 
different (one would expect them to be higher) than the overall average. For 
example, the average premium paid for the 5 US MBOs which had more than 
1 bidder is 38.72%, 44.81% and 41.14% for 1-Day prior, 1 Week prior and 4 
Weeks prior to announcement respectively. This is very similar to the average 
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premiums paid for all US MBOs – 36.27%, 42.08% and 44.69% for 1-Day 
prior, 1 Week prior and 4 Weeks prior to announcement respectively. 
3. On the other hand, quite contrary to our expectations, the initial premium 
offered for transactions with more than 1 bidder is 18.61%, 23.92% and 
22.37% for 1-Day prior, 1 Week prior and 4 Weeks prior to announcement 
respectively which is around 10% lower than the average initial premium paid 
for all US MBOs. 
4. A more drastic data point is the % change in Final Price offered as compared 
to the Initial Price offered. For UK MBOs this number is only 0.68% implying 
that for most deals, the initial offer is accepted as-is, or that the negotiations 
result in very little change from the initial offer. On the other hand for US 
MBO transactions, the equivalent number is 7.70%! This implies that the final 
offer for the MBO transactions on an average is 7.70% higher than the initial 
offer indicating that the bidding and negotiation process was intense and quite 
competitive. 
Table 2: Comparison of Initial & Final Premiums Paid for US and UK targets during MBOs 
1-Day 1-Week 4-Weeks
MBO-US-Final 36.27% 42.08% 44.69%
MBO-UK-Final 26.39% 31.19% 32.48%
Difference 9.88% 10.89% 12.20%
MBO-US-Initial 27.76% 32.43% 35.50%
MBO-UK-Initial 24.40% 28.98% 30.19%
Difference 3.36% 3.45% 5.31%  
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5. Finally, a very interesting observation is that the difference in the initial 
premium (i.e. premiums calculated based on the initial offer) between US 
MBOs and UK MBOs is significantly smaller than the difference in the final 
premiums (Table 2). 
Based on 1, 2 & 3 above, we can conclude that although there is a slight 
difference between the number of bidders in US MBOs and UK MBOs (US 
MBOs having slightly higher number of bidders on average), that does not by 
itself explain the higher final premium paid in US MBOs. In fact, we observe that 
transactions which have multiple bidders have lower initial offer premiums 
probably implying that low initial offer premiums attract other bidders driving the 
bids up to a high final premiums. This points towards a more competitive bidding 
environment in US and highlights one probable reason why even transactions 
with single bidders have final premiums close to the final premiums of 
transactions with multiple bidders; the fear of multiple bidders. 
4 & 5 above clearly demonstrate that although the US environment requires a 
higher premium upfront as part of the initial offer, a key difference arises between 
the announcement date and the completion date, probably due to the way the 
process is conducted even when there is a single bidder. 
Ownership Structure: Another possible hypothesis was the difference in 
ownership structure causing the difference in premiums i.e. higher % ownership 
of acquirer in UK prior to the transaction causing a reduced competition and 
lower premiums paid. Interestingly the average % of company owned by the 
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management led team prior to the transaction in UK is around 9% and is lower 
than % held prior to transaction in US which is around 18.5%. Hence this does 
not support the hypothesis that larger pre-transaction ownerships in UK leads to 
lower premiums. Even for the cases where pre-transaction ownership by MBO 
team is non-zero, ownership in UK (38%) is lower than ownership in US (42.5%). 
Further, the correlation between % ownership prior to transaction and premium 4 
weeks prior for UK is 0.067, hence almost no correlation. For US the equivalent 
number is 0.10324. Hence the correlation is extremely low and probably not 
significant enough for us to make any conclusion about the relation between pre-
transaction ownership structure and premiums paid. 
Detailed UK Transaction Analysis: To further understand the UK transactions, 
we randomly sampled 7 UK deals and followed the transactions through various 
Factiva articles. Our key observations are: 
1. In all the cases the deal was not awarded directly to the management led team. 
In all cases the independent board rejected the original offer (in some form or 
shape) and opened it up for competitive bidding.  
2. In spite of the existence of competitors in some cases who kept increasing 
their stake in the company, in no case did that translate into a counter offer. 
Hence, in all the cases management led team was the only party to officially 
make an offer to the board. This could have been because of other factors such 
as “the need of approval from RBS” to make a bid for Macdonald hotels when 
RBS was supporting the management led team. 
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Hence, although procedurally boards in UK do open up the process for 
competitive bidding, there are probably other not so obvious factors that keep the 
process from being truly competitive. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this article we started with a discussion about the factors that drive 
Management Buyouts and how that is significantly more complicated than 
explaining premiums of general acquisitions. We further focused on the 
differences on premiums paid in Management Buyouts in UK and US, first 
demonstrating that the difference is statistically significant and then exploring the 
various obvious hypothesis of why the differences could exist. In our research we 
have demonstrated that none of the most obvious hypothesis e.g. higher number 
of transactions in US, higher management ownership in UK, difference in 
transaction size in US and UK, seem to be consistent with our observations of the 
premiums in US and UK MBOs.  
We did find indications of US MBO environment being more competitive than in 
the UK with noticeable differences in premiums arising between the first offer 
and the final offer. This is probably due to way MBOs are conducted in US vs. 
UK but our research is inconclusive about what exactly in the US process leads to 
higher premiums or what in the UK process keeps the premiums low on a general 
basis. 
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As part of our research we have identified two key areas which warrant further 
investigation and might bring us closer to understanding the driving factors of the 
premium differences between US and UK MBOs.  
First is the difference in leverage ratios in US and UK. US transactions seem to be 
much more levered as compared to the UK transactions[2]. If UK markets in 
general allow lower leverage this might help explain why acquirers might be able 
to extract a lesser value with a LBO type structure in UK as compared to US 
which might translate into lower premiums paid in UK LBO and MBO 
transactions. It is still not clear if this will help explain why the difference exists 
between US and UK only for MBOs and not for LBOs. 
Another issue worth further exploration is the issue of “irrevocable commitments” 
in UK transactions[1]. In general, a bidder in US can withdraw his bid at any 
time, at least prior to the execution of the merger agreement. If the bids in the UK 
cannot be withdrawn as easily, it would not be surprising for managers to bid 
lower price, since their risk in the deal is not diversified across many deals. 
Further research into the structure of “irrevocable commitments” in UK might 
help clarify the impact of those on the premiums paid. Again it needs to be seen 
why the impact is seen primarily for MBOs and not for LBOs in the two 
countries. 
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EXHIBITS 
Exhibit 1: 1-Day Prior Premium Histogram comparison of MBOs of US and UK targets  
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Exhibit 3: 4-Weeks Prior Premium Histogram comparison of MBOs of US and UK targets 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Merger and acquisition (‘M&A’) activity in India, though currently at its peak, is not as 
vibrant as that in the U.S. or Europe.  M&A transactions tend to be financed largely by equity 
and / or cash.  While debt-financed deals are a handful, financing of acquisitions using high-yield 
bonds is non-existent in India.  Though the corporate debt market in India has been in existence 
since Independence, state-owned public sector undertakings account for nearly 80% of the 
primary market for debt issuances. 
Commercial banks are among the most important players in the capital markets, 
especially in respect of debt financing.  The dominance of the commercial banking system can be 
gauged from the fact that the proportion of bank loans to GDP is approximately 36%, while that 
of corporate debt to GDP is only 4%.  By the same measure, the government securities market is 
nine to ten times as large as the corporate debt market.  This is despite the fact that all major 
stock exchanges in India have trading platforms for debt securities.   
In the past, Indian commercial banks have lent money to Indian companies for 
acquisition of government-owned companies slated for privatization.  However, these 
transactions have been largely balance sheet financing, with Indian banks favoring the traditional 
asset-backed and balance sheet financing.   
It is important to note that India has a large private sector, which regularly taps the capital 
markets, in India as well in the U.S. and Europe, for its financing requirements.  There is a 
developed government securities market with a yield curve, which can provide a reliable 
benchmark for the pricing of leveraged debt and all major stock exchanges in India have trading 
platforms for debt securities.  The reasons for the under-development of the debt market and the 
relative lack of leveraged buyouts in India are much more profound than meets the eye.   
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This paper identifies and explains the reasons that make execution of leveraged buyouts 
in India difficult in the current environment. This paper also examines recent leveraged buyouts 
and explains how the factors identified affect leveraged buyouts in India.   
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II. LEVERAGED BUYOUTS 
 
A leverage buyout (‘LBO’) is the acquisition of a business, typically a mature company, 
by a financial investor whose objective is to exit the investment after 3-7 years realizing an 
Internal Rate of Return (‘IRR’) of in excess of 20% on its investment over the horizon. 
The term ‘Leveraged’ signifies a significant use of debt for financing the transaction.  
The purpose of a LBO is to allow an acquirer to make large acquisitions without having to 
commit a significant amount of capital.  A typically transaction involves the setup of an 
acquisition vehicle that is jointly funded by a financial investor and management of the target 
company.  Often the assets of the target company are used as collateral for the debt.  Typically, 
the debt capital comprises of a combination of highly structured debt instruments including 
prepayable bank facilities and / or publicly or private placed bonds commonly referred to as 
high-yield debt.   
Table 1: Typical financial instruments used for financing a LBO 
    
Components of capital % of total 
capital 
Tenure 
(years) 
Traditional suppliers of capital 
Senior debt    
Revolving 
Term 
30%-60% 5-8 Investment bank 
Commercial bank 
    
Subordinated debt    
Senior / subordinated notes 
Discount notes 
10%-25% 7-10 Investment bank 
Commercial bank 
Traditional mezzanine  9-10 Mezzanine fund 
    
Preferred stock / Mezzanine 
securities 
   
Preferred stock 0%-35% 7-10+ Investment bank 
Commercial bank 
Pay-In-Kind (‘PIK’) debt   Mezzanine fund 
Warrants    
    
Common equity    
Common equity 25%-40% 3-7 Private equity fund 
Vendor loan notes (deeply 
subordinated) 
 10-12 Vendor loan notes 
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The new debt in a LBO is not intended to be permanent.  LBO business plans call for 
generating extra cash by selling assets, shaving costs and improving profit margins.  The extra 
cash is used to pay down the LBO debt.  Managers are given greater stake in the business via 
stock options or direct ownership of shares.   
The term ‘Buyout’ suggests the gain of control of a majority of the target company’s 
equity.  The target company goes private after a LBO.  It is owned by a partnership of private 
investors who monitor performance and can act right away if something goes awry.  Again, the 
private ownership is not intended to be permanent.  The most successful LBOs go public again 
as soon as debt has been paid down sufficiently and improvements in operating performance 
have been demonstrated by the target company. 
Target companies that have the following operating and financial characteristics are 
considered ideal LBO targets: 
Table 2: Typical operating and financial characteristics of attractive LBO targets 
  
Operating characteristics Financial Characteristics 
Leading market position - proven demand for product Significant debt capacity 
Strong management team Steady cash flow 
Portfolio of strong brand names (if applicable) Availability of attractive price 
Strong relationships with key customers and suppliers Low capital intensity 
Favorable industry characteristics Potential operating improvement 
Fragmented industry Ideally low operating leverage 
Steady growth Management’s success in implementing substantial 
cost reduction programmes 
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III. MACRO FACTORS MAKING LEVERAGED BUYOUTS DIFFICULT IN INDIA 
 
This paper distinguishes between buyouts of Indian companies from those buyouts where 
an Indian company does a LBO of a foreign target company, with the intention of analyzing the 
former.  The reason for making this distinction and restricting the scope of this paper to buyouts 
of Indian companies is, in the case of LBOs where the target company is located in countries 
such as the United Kingdom or the United States, the acquiring Indian companies / financial 
investors are able to obtain financing for the leveraged buyouts from foreign banks and the 
buyout is governed largely by the laws and regulations of the target company’s country.   
On the other hand, a leveraged buyout of an Indian company by either an Indian or a 
foreign acquirer needs to comply with the legal framework in India and the scope of execution 
permissible in India.  This section of the paper examines the legal and regulatory hurdles to a 
successful LBO of an Indian company. 
India has experienced a number of buyouts and leveraged buyouts since Tata Tea’s LBO 
of UK heavyweight brand Tetley for ₤271 million in 2000, the first of its kind in India.   
Table 3: List of buyouts by Indian companies 
     
Target Company Country Indian Acquirer Value Type 
Tetley  United Kingdom Tata Tea ₤271 million LBO 
Whyte & Mackay  United Kingdom UB Group ₤550 million LBO 
Corus United Kingdom Tata Steel $11.3 billion LBO 
Hansen Transmissions Netherlands Suzlon Energy €465 million LBO 
American Axle1 United States Tata Motors $2 billion LBO 
Lombardini2 Italy Zoom Auto Ancillaries $225 million LBO 
     
1 Potential bid  2 Buyout attempt 
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Table 4: List of buyouts of Indian companies 
    
Company Financial investor Value Type 
Flextronics Software Systems1 Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. (‘KKR’) $900 million LBO 
GE Capital International 
Services (‘GECIS’) 
General Atlantic Partners, Oak Hill $600 million LBO 
Nitrex Chemicals Actis Capital $13.8 million MBO2 
Phoenix Lamps Actis Capital $28.9 million3 MBO 
Punjab Tractors4 Actis Capital $60 million5 MBO 
Nilgiris Dairy Farm Actis Capital $65 million6 MBO 
WNS Global Services Warburg Pincus $40 million7 BO 
RFCL 
(businesses of Ranbaxy) 
ICICI Venture $25 million LBO 
Infomedia India ICICI Venture $25 million LBO 
VA Tech WABAG India ICICI Venture $25 million MBO 
ACE Refractories 
(refractories business of ACC) 
ICICI Venture $60 million LBO 
Nirula’s Navis Capital Partners $20 million MBO 
    
1  Renamed Aricent.  Referred to as Flextronics Software Systems throughout this paper. 
2  Management Buyout (‘MBO’) 
3  Paid for 36.7% promoter stake.  Post the open offer, Actis’ stake will increase from 45% to 65%. 
4  Government privatization. 
5  Total controlling interest of 28.4%.  Punjab Tractors continues operating as a publicly listed company. 
6  Paid for 65% controlling stake.  Balance held by the promoter family. 
7  Purchase of an 85% stake from British Airways 
 
III.1 Restrictions on Foreign Investments in India 
 
There are 2 routes through which foreign investments may be directed into India – the 
Foreign Institutional Investor (“FII”) route and the Foreign Direct Investment (“FDI”) route.   
The FII route is generally used by foreign pension funds, mutual funds, investment trusts, 
endowment funds and the like to invest their proprietary funds or on behalf of other funds in 
equities or debt in India.  Private equity firms are known to use to FII route to make minority 
investments in Indian companies.  The FDI route is generally used by foreign companies for 
setting up operations in India or for making investments in publicly listed and unlisted 
companies in India where the investment horizon is longer than that of an FII and / or the intent 
is to exercise control.   
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III.1.A Limits on FII Investment 
The Government of India has laid down investment limits for FIIs of 10% based on 
certain requirements and the maximum FII investment in each publicly listed company, which 
may at times be lower than the sectoral cap for foreign investment in that company.  For 
example, the sectoral cap on foreign investment in the telecom sector is 100%.  However, 
cumulative FII investment in an Indian telecom company would be subject to a ceiling of 24% or 
49%, as the case may be, of the issued share capital of the said telecom company.   
III.1.B Restrictions and Caps and Foreign Investment Promotion Board (‘FIPB’) Approval 
Sectors where FDI is not permitted are Railways, Atomic Energy and Atomic Minerals, 
Postal Service, Gambling and Betting, Lottery and basic Agriculture or plantations with specified 
exceptions.  Further, the Government has placed sector caps on ownership by foreign corporate 
bodies and individuals in Indian companies and 100% foreign ownership is not allowed in a 
number of industry sub-sectors under the current FDI regime. 
Further, under the FDI route, FIPB approval is required for foreign investments where the 
proposed shareholding is above the prescribed sector cap or for investment in sectors where FDI 
is not permitted or where it is mandatory that proposals be routed through the FIPB [Refer 
Appendix I for industry-wise sector caps]. 
III.1.C Regulatory Developments in FDI 
Despite the detailed guidelines for foreign investment in India, regulations relating to 
foreign investment continue to get formulated as the country gradually opens its doors to global 
investors.  The evolving regulatory environment coupled with the lack of clarity about future 
regulatory developments create significant challenges for foreign investors.   
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For example, the Indian government lifted a ban on foreign ownership of Indian stock 
exchanges just three weeks before the NYSE Group, Goldman Sachs and other investors bought 
a 20% stake in the National Stock Exchange of India.  At the time of lifting the ban, the Indian 
Government allowed international investors to buy as much as a combined 49% (FDI up to 26% 
and FII investment of up to 23%) in any of the 22 Indian stock exchanges.  The limit for a single 
investor was set at 5% by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (‘SEBI’). 
III.1.D List of Sectors where FDI Limit is Less Than 100% 
The following table summarizes the list of sectors where the FDI limit is less than 100%. 
Table 5: List of sectors where the FDI limit is less than 100% (as of February 26, 2006) 
   
Sector Ownership Limit Entry Route 
Domestic Airlines 49% Automatic 
Petroleum refining-PSUs 26% FIPB 
PSU Banks 20%  
Insurance 26% Automatic 
Retail Trade 51% FIPB 
Trading (Export House, Super Trading House, Star Trading House)  51% Automatic 
Trading (Export, Cash and Carry Wholesale) 100% FIPB 
Hardware facilities - (Uplinking, HUB, etc.) 49%  
Cable network 49%  
Direct To Home 20%  
Terrestrial Broadcast FM 20%  
Terrestrial TV Broadcast Not Permitted  
Print Media - Other non-news/non-current affairs/specialty publications 74%  
Newspapers, Periodicals dealing with news and current affairs 26%  
Lottery, Betting and Gambling Not Permitted  
Defense and Strategic Industries 26% FIPB 
Agriculture (including contract farming) Not Permitted  
Plantations (except Tea) Not Permitted  
Other Manufacturing - Items reserved for Small Scale 24% Automatic 
Atomic Minerals 74% FIPB 
   
Source:  Investment Commission of India 
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III.1.E Key Advantages and Disadvantages of the Investment Routes 
The key advantages and disadvantages of investments made through these routes are 
summarized below: 
Table 6: Key advantages and disadvantages of the FDI and FII routes of investment 
  
FDI FII 
Advantages Advantages 
 FDI route used when foreign investment is in 
excess of 10%. 
 Allotment of shares on preferential basis as per 
the requirements of the Companies Act, 1956, 
possible.   
 Off-market / Non-stock exchange purchases may 
be executed. 
 FDI is the only route available for investing in 
unlisted companies in India. 
 Automatic approval for FDI for investments in 
specified sectors based on the FDI guidelines. 
 Ability to buy and sell securities freely on a stock 
exchange. 
 The total investments by FII and Sub-Accounts 
in any Indian Company cannot exceed 24% of its 
total paid up capital.  However, in certain 
companies, which have passed a Special 
Resolution in this regard, the total FII investment 
can be made upto 49% of the paid up capital. 
This limit of 24% / 49% is exclusively available 
for investments by FII only. 
Disadvantages Disadvantages 
 FDI sector caps as per the Government FDI 
policy. 
 FIPB approval required for investment in 
specified sectors. 
 SEBI acts as the nodal point in the registration of 
FIIs.  FII registration is a cumbersome process 
which involves registration with SEBI and 
approval from the Reserve Bank of India (‘RBI’). 
 FIIs are heavily regulated by SEBI through the 
Securities and Exchange Board of India (Foreign 
Institutional Investors) Regulations, 1995. 
 No FII can hold more than 10% of the share 
capital of any publicly listed company. 
 All non-stock exchange sales/purchases require 
RBI permission. 
  
 
Despite the various restrictions on foreign investment in Indian companies, the FDI route 
is the only feasible route for leveraged buyouts in India by foreign investors. 
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III.2 Limited Availability of Control Transactions and Professional Management 
 
Private equity firms face limited availability of control transactions in India.  The reason 
for this is the relative small pool of professional management in corporate India.  In a large 
number of Indian companies, the owners and managers are the same.  Management control of 
such target companies wrests with promoters / promoter families who may not want to divest 
their controlling stake for additional capital.  As a result, a large number of private equity 
transactions in India are minority transactions [Refer Appendix VI for recent minority private 
equity transactions in India].   
In management buyouts, the Indian model is different from that in the West.  Most of the 
MBOs in India are not of the classic variety wherein the company’s managements create the deal 
and then involve financial investors to fund the change of control.  In the Indian version, 
promoters have spun off or divested and private equity players have bought the businesses and 
then partnered with the existing management.  The managements themselves don’t have the 
resources to engineer such a buyout.   
In the absence of control, it may be difficult to finance a minority investment using 
leverage given the lack of control over the cash flows of the target company to service the debt.  
Further, a minority private equity investor will be unable to sell it’s holding to a strategic buyer, 
thereby limiting the exit options available for the investment. 
III.3 Underdeveloped Corporate Debt Market 
 
India is a developing country where the dependence on bank loans is substantial.  The 
country has a bank-dominated financial system.  The dominance of the banking system can be 
gauged from the fact that the proportion of bank loans to GDP is approximately 36%, while that 
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of corporate debt to GDP is only 4%.  As a result, the corporate bond market is small and 
marginal in comparison with corporate bond markets in developed countries. 
The corporate debt market in India has been in existence since Independence. Public 
limited companies have been raising capital by issuing debt securities in small amounts.  State-
owned public sector undertakings (‘PSU’) that started issuing bonds in financial year 1985-86 
account for nearly 80% of the primary market.  When compared with the government securities 
market, the growth of the corporate debt market has been less satisfactory.  In fact, it has lost 
share in relative terms. 
Table 7: Resources raised from the debt markets              INR billion 
    
Financial Year 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 
Total debt raised 1,850.56 2,040.69 2,350.96 2,509.09 2,050.81 
      
Of which: Corporate1 565.73 515.61 531.17 527.52 594.79 
 31% 25% 23% 21% 29% 
      
Of which: Government 1,284.83 1,525.08 1,819.79 1,981.57 1,456.02 
 69% 75% 77% 79% 71% 
      
1  Excludes euro issues 
Sources:  RBI, NSE, Prime Database 
 
Another noteworthy trend in the corporate debt market is that a bulk of the bulk of debt 
raised has been through private placements. During the five years 2000-01 to 2004-05, private 
placements, on average, have accounted for nearly 92% of the total corporate debt raised 
annually. The dominance of private placements has been attributed to several factors, including 
ease of issuance, cost efficiency and primarily institutional demand.  PSUs account for the bulk 
of private placements.  The corporate sector has accounted for less than 20% of total private 
placements in recent years, and of that total, issuance by private sector manufacturing/services 
companies has constituted only a very small part.  Large private placements limit transparency in 
the primary market. 
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Another interesting feature of the Indian corporate debt market is the preference for rated 
paper.  Ratings issued by the major rating agencies have proved to be a reliable source of 
information.  The data on ratings suggest that lower-quality credits have difficulty issuing bonds. 
The concentration of turnover in the secondary market also suggests that investors’ appetite is 
mainly for highly rated instruments, with nearly 84% of secondary market turnover in AAA-
rated securities. In addition, the pattern of debt mutual fund holdings on 30 June 2004 showed 
that nearly 53.3% of non-government security investments were held in AAA-rated securities, 
14.7% in AA-rated securities and 10.8% in P1+ rated securities. 
This is in sharp contrast to the use of high-yield bonds (also known as junk bonds) which 
became ubiquitous in the 1980s through the efforts of investment bankers like Michael Milken, 
as a financing mechanism in mergers and acquisitions.  High-yield bonds are non-investment 
grade bonds and have a higher risk of defaulting, but typically pay high yields in order to make 
them attractive to investors.  Unlike most bank debt or investment grade bonds, high-yield bonds 
lack ‘maintenance’ covenants  whereby default occurs if financial health of the borrower 
deteriorates beyond a set point.  Instead, they feature ‘incurrence’ covenants whereby default 
only occurs if the borrower undertakes a prohibited transaction, like borrowing more money 
when it lacks sufficient cash flow coverage to pay the interest. 
The following table compares the corporate bond spreads in the US those in India.  The 
bonds spreads for Indian companies in the low investment grade and non-investment grade 
bonds are clearly influenced by the limited number of such bonds in circulation and the lack of 
liquidity in those segments of the corporate debt market. 
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Table 8: Comparison of bond spreads of US Industrial companies with Indian companies 
         
 AAA AA A+ A A- BBB+ BBB BBB- 
US Industrial companies (Nov 30, 2006)                                                                                                basis points 
1 Year 27 33 37 41 53 61 72 77 
2 Years 34 41 42 46 55 63 72 91 
3 Years 48 53 55 59 67 73 81 100 
4 Years 59 64 67 70 77 83 93 112 
5 Years 60 67 69 70 79 87 101 131 
7 Years 49 56 64 68 78 87 106 144 
8 Years 62 65 69 72 82 87 104 140 
9 Years 73 77 83 87 97 102 110 146 
10 Years 61 65 72 75 87 107 126 152 
         
Indian companies (Oct 31, 2006)                                                                                                            basis points 
1 Year 85 113 143 161 181 211 247 287 
2 Years 94 120 149 167 186 214 252 292 
3 Years 93 121 153 175 193 223 265 308 
4 Years 95 124 155 177 195 224 267 311 
5 Years 97 128 158 179 197 226 270 314 
7 Years 104 131 163 185 203 238 285 332 
8 Years 106 134 166 189 207 241 289 337 
9 Years 108 137 170 192 212 244 293 341 
10 Years 110 140 173 196 216 247 297 346 
         
Source:  Bloomberg and Fixed Income Money Market and Derivatives Association of India 
 
The use of credit derivatives allows lenders to transfer an asset’s risk and returns from 
one counter party to another without transferring the ownership. The credit derivatives market is 
virtually non-existent in India due to the absence of participants on the sell-side for credit 
protection and the lack of liquidity in the bond market.   
Indian enterprises now have the ability to raise funds in foreign capital markets. Indeed, 
an underdeveloped domestic market pushes the better-quality issuers abroad, thereby 
accentuating the problems of developing the corporate debt market in India.  All these drawbacks 
of the Indian corporate debt market make the use of the domestic debt market for financing 
leveraged buyouts in India virtually impossible.   
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III.4 Reserve Bank of India (‘RBI’) Restrictions on Lending 
 
Domestic banks are prohibited by the RBI from providing loans for the purchase of 
shares in any company.  The underlying reason for the prohibition is to ensure the safety of 
domestic banks.  The RBI has issued a number of directives to domestic banks in regard to 
making advances against shares.  These guidelines have been compiled in the Master Circular 
Dir.BC.90/13.07.05/98 dated August 28, 1998.  As per these guidelines, domestic banks are not 
allowed to finance the promoters’ contribution towards equity capital of a company, the rationale 
being that such contributions should come from the promoters’ resources.   
The RBI Master Circular states that the question of granting advances against primary 
security of shares and debentures including promoters’ shares to industrial, corporate or other 
borrowers should not normally arise.  The RBI only allows accepting such securities as collateral 
for secured loans granted as working capital or for other ‘productive purposes’ from borrowers. 
[Refer Appendix IV for an extract of the Master Circular] 
The RBI has made an exception to this restriction.  With the view to increasing the 
international presence of Indian companies, with effect from June 7, 2005, the RBI has allowed 
domestic banks to lend to Indian companies for purchasing equity in foreign joint ventures, 
wholly owned subsidiaries and other companies as strategic investments.  Besides framing 
guidelines and safeguards for such lending, domestic banks are required to ensure that such 
acquisitions are beneficial to the borrowing company and the country.   
Besides raising financing from Indian banks, companies have the option of funding 
overseas acquisitions through External Commercial Borrowings (‘ECBs’).  The Indian policy on 
ECBs allow for overseas acquisitions within the overall limit of US$500 million per year under 
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the automatic route with the conditions that the overall remittances from India and non-funded 
exposures should not exceed 200% of the net worth of the company. 
The Reserve Bank of India has prescribed that a bank’s total exposure, including both 
fund based and non-fund based, to the capital market in all forms covering  
(a) direct investment in equity shares,  
(b) convertible bonds and debentures and units of equity oriented mutual funds;  
(c) advances against shared to individuals for investment in equity shares (including 
IPOs), bonds and debentures, units of equity-oriented mutual funds; and  
(d) secured and unsecured advances to stockbrokers and guarantees issued on behalf of 
stockbrokers and market makers  
should not exceed 5% of its total outstanding advances as on March 31 of the previous 
year (including Commercial Paper). Within the above ceiling, bank’s direct investment should 
not exceed 20% of its net worth.   
All these restrictions make it virtually impossible for a financial investor to finance a 
LBO of an Indian company using bank debt raised in India. 
 
III.5 Prohibition on Borrowing from Indian Banks – FIPB Press Note 9 
 
A somewhat arcane regulation, FIPB’s Press Note 9 dated April 12, 1999 bars a foreign 
investment company from borrowing from an Indian bank to buy into a company in India.   
Large banks – foreign as well as local – some multinational companies and a few private 
equity players have been lobbying with the Indian Government to change this rule.  While 
bankers in India believe that they should have the freedom to invest in a wider number of asset 
classes, foreign investors argue that dismantling the norm will not only raise the return on the 
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equity they contribute in, but also make it possible for them to pay a higher price for the shares 
of local companies they buy. 
The subject has assumed a deeper significance with the advent of a large number of 
private equity players - which are technically foreign investment companies, and thus cannot 
borrow from banks in India to invest in local firms.  Whatever the private equity players invest is 
either pure equity or FDI cleared by the FIPB.  This regulation clearly stands in the way of 
leveraged buyouts of Indian companies by foreign private equity firms.  The World Economic 
Forum is also understood to have drawn the Indian Government’s attention to Press Note 9.  
[Refer Appendix III for a copy of Press Note 9] 
 
III.6 Restrictions on Public Companies from Providing Assistance to Potential Acquirers 
 
Companies Act, 1956, Section 77(2) states that a public company (or a private company 
which is a subsidiary of a public company) may not provide either directly or indirectly through 
a loan, guarantee or provision of security or otherwise, any financial assistance for the purpose of 
or in connection with a purchase or subscription made or to be made by any person of or for any 
shares in the company or in its holding company.   
Under the Companies Act, 1956, a public company is different from a publicly listed 
company.  The restrictions placed by this section on public companies implies that prior to being 
acquired in a LBO, a public company, if it is listed, must delist and convert itself to a private 
company.  Delisting requires the Company to follow the Securities and Exchange Board of India 
(Delisting of Securities) Guidelines – 2003.  This section makes it impossible to obtain security 
of assets / firm financing arrangements for a publicly listed company until it delists itself and 
converts itself into a private company.   
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III.7 Restrictions Relating to Exit Through Public Listing 
 
The most successful LBOs go public as soon as debt has been paid down sufficiently and 
improvements in operating performance have been demonstrated by the LBO target. 
SEBI guidelines require mandatory listing of Indian companies on domestic exchange 
prior to a foreign listing.  Indian companies may list their securities in foreign markets through 
the Issue Of Foreign Currency Convertible Bonds And Ordinary Shares (Through Depositary 
Receipt Mechanism) Scheme, 1993.  Prior to the introduction of this scheme, Indian companies 
were not permitted to list on foreign bourses.   
In order to bring these guidelines in alignment with the SEBI’s guidelines on domestic 
capital issues, the Government incorporated changes to this scheme by requiring that an Indian 
company, which is not eligible to raise funds from the Indian capital markets including a 
company which has been restrained from accessing the securities market by the SEBI will not be 
eligible to issue ordinary shares through Global Depository Receipts (‘GDR’).  Unlisted 
companies, which have not yet accessed the GDR route for raising capital in the international 
market would require prior or simultaneous listing in the domestic market, while seeking to issue 
ordinary shares under the scheme.  Unlisted companies, which have already issued GDRs in the 
international market, would now require to list in the domestic market on making profit 
beginning financial year 2005-06 or within three years of such issue of GDRs, whichever is 
earlier.   
Thus, private equity players that execute a LBO of an Indian company and are looking at 
exiting their investment will require dual listing of the company – on a domestic stock exchange 
as well as a foreign stock exchange – if they intend to exit the investment through a foreign 
listing. 
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SEBI listing regulations require domestic companies to identify the promoters of the 
listing company for minimum contribution and promoter lock-in purposes.  In case of an IPO, 
the promoters have to necessarily offer at least 20% of the post-issue capital.  In case of public 
issues by listed companies, the promoters shall participate either to the extent of 20% of the 
proposed issue or ensure post-issue share holding to the extent of 20% of the post-issue capital.   
Further, SEBI guidelines have stipulated lock-in (freeze on the shares) requirements on 
shares of promoters primarily to ensure that the promoters, who are controlling the company, 
shall continue to hold some minimum percentage in the company after the public issue.  In case 
of any issue of capital to the public the minimum contribution of promoters shall be locked in for 
a period of three years, both for an IPO and public issue by listed companies.  In case of an IPO, 
if the promoters' contribution in the proposed issue exceeds the required minimum contribution, 
such excess contribution shall also be locked in for a period of one year.  In addition, the entire 
pre-issue share capital, or paid up share capital prior to IPO, and shares issued on a firm 
allotment basis along with issue shall be locked-in for a period of one year from the date of 
allotment in public issue. 
For a private equity investor in a LBO of an Indian company, the IPO route does not 
allow the investor a clean exit from its investment due to the minimum promoter contribution 
and lock-in requirements.   
Besides these drawbacks, there are other factors that play an important role in exiting a 
LBO in India.  Exit through the public markets depends upon the target company’s operations.  If 
the operations are located solely in India, sale in the domestic public markets is most lucrative.  
If the portfolio company has operations or an export presence in foreign markets, it may be more 
beneficial to list the company in foreign capital markets. 
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IV. STRUCTURING CONSIDERATIONS FOR LEVERAGED BUYOUTS IN INDIA 
 
The hurdles to executing a LBO in India, as discussed in the previous section, has given 
rise to two buyout structures, referred to in this paper as the Foreign Holding Company Structure 
and the Asset Buyout Structure, that may be used for effecting a LBO of an Indian company.  
However, both these structures are rife with their own set of challenges that are unique to the 
Indian environment.  The Holding Company and the Asset Buyout structures along with key 
considerations / drawbacks are discussed as follows. 
IV.1 Foreign Holding Company Structure 
 
The financial investor incorporates and finances (using debt and equity) a Foreign 
Holding Company.  Debt to finance the acquisition is raised entirely from foreign banks.  The 
proceeds of the equity and debt issue is used by the Foreign Holding Company to purchase 
equity in the Indian Operating Company in line with FIPB Press Note 9.  The amount being 
invested to purchase a stake in the India Operating Company is channeled into India as FDI.  The 
seller of the Indian Operating Company may participate in the LBO and receive securities in the 
Foreign Holding Company as part of the payment, such as rollover equity and seller notes. 
Figure 1: Illustrative Foreign Holding Company Structure 
Dividend 
tax
Foreign Holding Company
Indian Operating Company
Equity (FDI) Dividends / Buyback proceeds
Private Equity Firm Foreign Banks
Equity Debt Debt Service
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The operating assets of the purchased business are within the corporate entity of the 
Indian Operating Company.  As a result, cash flows are generated by the Indian Operating 
Company while principal and interest payment obligations reside in the Foreign Holding 
Company.  The Indian Operating Company makes dividend or share buyback payments to the 
Foreign Holding Company, which is used by the latter for servicing the debt.  Under the current 
FDI regime foreign investments, including dividends declared on foreign investments, are freely 
repatriable through an Authorized Dealer.  [Refer Appendix V for buyout structure of Flextronics 
Software Systems] 
IV.1.A Lien on Assets 
Based on the LBO structure above, the debt and the operating assets lie in two separate 
legal entities.  The Indian Operating Company is unable to provide collateral of its assets for 
securing the debt which resides in the Foreign Holding Company.  While this feature of the 
Foreign Holding Company Structure may be anathema for lenders looking at providing secured 
debt for the LBO, it may be of less significance when the LBO target is an asset-light business 
such as a business process outsourcing or a information technology services company.  Investing 
in a services company may be a rational strategy of using this LBO structure. 
Financial investors may consider legally placing certain assets of the business in the 
Foreign Holding Company, such as customer contracts of a business process outsourcing or 
information technology services company.  These assets may be used as collateral and generate 
operating income for the Foreign Holding Company.  Contracts between the Foreign Holding 
Company and the Indian Operating Company will have to satisfy India’s transfer pricing 
regulations. 
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IV.1.B Non-deductibility of Interest Payments 
Given that the debt and the operating assets reside in separate legal entities, there is no 
deduction of interest payments from operating income of the Indian Operating Company.  One of 
the financial justifications for a LBO is lost under this structure.  However, this factor assumes 
less significance for export-oriented companies which operate out of Special Economic Zones or 
Software Technology Parks (under the Software Technology Park scheme) in India and avail tax 
incentives which lowers their effective tax rate significantly.   
IV.1.C Foreign Currency Risk 
The Foreign Holding Company structure entails an exposure to foreign currency risk 
since revenues of the Indian Operating company are denominated in Indian Rupees and the debt 
in the Foreign Holding Company is denominated in foreign currency.  The foreign currency risk 
may be hedged in the financial markets at a cost, which increases the overall cost of the LBO.  
Alternatively, if the Indian Operating Company’s revenues are denominated primarily in foreign 
currency due to an export-focus, this risk is mitigated due to the natural hedge provided by 
foreign currency denominated revenues. 
IV.1.D Tax Leakage through Dividend Tax 
There is tax leakage under the Foreign Holding Company structure through mandatory 
dividend tax payments on dividends paid by the Indian Operating Company to service the debt of 
the Foreign Holding Company.  As per Budget 2007 introduced for the financial year 2007-2008, 
Dividend Distribution Tax rate has increased from 12.5% to 15%.   
IV.1.E Restrictions Relating to Share Buyback 
Often, the Indian Operating Company may make remittances to the Foreign Holding 
Company through share buybacks instead of dividends.  The number of shares and size of 
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buybacks are governed by the Companies Act, 1956.  Section 77A of the Act allows companies 
to buyback shares.  However, the provisions for the buyback of shares comes with certain 
conditions, which are detailed as follows: 
(a) A company may buyback share only out of free reserves, the securities premium 
account or from the proceeds of any different kind of shares or other specified 
securities.  This condition puts a restriction on the amount of the buyback based on 
the balance sheet of the target company. 
(b) No offer of buyback shall be made within a period of 365 days reckoned from the 
date of the last offer of buy-back.  As a result, companies may buyback its own 
shares only once every year. 
(c) The buyback of equity shares in any financial year cannot exceed 25% of its total 
paid-up (book) equity capital in that financial year.  Similar to (a) above, this 
condition puts a limit on the number of shares that can be bought back in each 
financial year. 
(d) The ratio of the debt owed by the company is not more than twice the (book) capital 
and free reserves after such buy-back.  This condition is critical to structuring the 
LBO.  In the Foreign Holding Company structure this condition puts a limit of the 
amount of debt that may be assumed by the Indian Operating Company.  The 
amount of debt in the Indian Operating Company puts a limit of the amount of 
shares that may be bought back.  Thus, there is a trade-off between the size of the 
buyback and the amount of debt that may be raised by the Indian Operating 
Company.   
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IV.1.F Facilitation of Exit Through Foreign Listing 
The Foreign Holding Company structure allows the financial investor to list the holding 
company domiciled in a foreign jurisdiction on a US / European stock exchange without listing 
the Indian Operating Company on the Indian stock exchange.  This provides the financial 
investor a clean exit from the investment. 
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IV.2 Asset Buyout Structure 
 
Under an Asset Buyout, the financial investor incorporates a Domestic Holding Company 
and finances it using debt and equity.  The debt is raised based on an purchase agreement to buy 
operating assets and is secured by those assets, since asset-backed, project loans and secured 
working capital loans is permissible for domestic banks in India.  The Domestic Holding 
Company then purchases the operating assets of the business on an asset-by-asset basis e.g. land, 
building, machinery etc.  Foreign investors may invest in the equity of the Domestic Holding 
Company through the FDI route. 
Figure 2: Illustrative Asset Buyout Structure 
Domestic Holding Company
Operating 
Assets
Private Equity Firm
Equity
Banks
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IV.2.A Stamp Duty Liability and Execution Risk 
In an Asset Buyout structure, the Domestic Holding Company which is buying the 
operating assets is liable to pay stamp duty on the assets purchased.  Stamp duty adds an 
additional 5-10% to the total transaction cost depending upon the assets purchased and Indian 
state in which stamp duty is assessed, since different states have different rates of stamp duty.  
Further, the purchase of assets requires the purchaser to identify and value each of the assets 
purchased separately for the purpose of assessment by the relevant authorities e.g. land, building, 
machinery etc as each such asset has a separate rate of stamp duty.  A LBO of an asset-intensive 
company may make the transaction unfeasible.   
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The identification and valuation of individual assets purchased along with assessment of 
the stamp duty by the relevant authorities involves complex structuring of the transaction making 
the execution of this structure complex and risky. 
IV.2.B Higher Tax Liability for Seller 
The purchase and sale of shares of a company (as envisaged by the Foreign Holding 
Company Structure) attracts Securities Transaction Tax (0.125%) for listed shares and Long 
Term Capital Gains Tax (10-20%).  However, sale of assets by the seller is treated as a revenue 
by the Income Tax Act, 1956 and such gain is assessed as business income on which the tax rate 
is 30% to be increased by a 10% surcharge and an education cess of 3% (34% effective tax rate).   
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V. HYPOTHETICAL FINANCIAL MODEL OF A LEVERAGED BUYOUT IN INDIA 
 
I have constructed a financial model of a leveraged buyout in India for a hypothetical 
business process outsourcing company.  The operating and financial characteristics of the 
company are loosely based on those of the LBO of Flextronics Software Systems by KKR using 
information available from public sources, to the extent available.  However, this model may not 
be considered representative of Flextronics Software Systems or its LBO given the limited 
availability of financial information since it went private in 2005. 
V.1 Key Inputs and Assumptions 
The key inputs used in the model are elaborated as follows: 
Table 9: Hypothetical Opening Balance Sheet 
($ in millions) Pre-
Consolidated Opening Balance Sheet Transaction
Accounts Receivable 25.0
Prepaid & Other Assets 20.0
   Total Current Assets $45.0
PP&E $25.0
   Total Assets $70.0
Current Liabilities & Provisions $30.0
Common Equity $2.0
Retained Earnings $38.0
Shareholders' Equity $40.0
  Total Liabilities & Shareholders' Equity $70.0
 
Table 10: Hypothetical Income Statement in Year 1 
($ in millions)
Income Statement Year 1
Total Revenues 100.0
Cost of Goods Sold (32.0)
Gross Profit $68.0
Operating Expenses ($20.0)
EBITDA 48.0
Depreciation & Amortization ($8.0)
Capital Expenditures (12.0)
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Table 11: Sources and Uses of Funds 
($ in millions)
Sources of Funds
Without 
Stamp Duty
With Stamp 
Duty Uses of Funds
Without 
Stamp Duty
With Stamp 
Duty
Revolving Credit Facility (1) $0.0 $0.0 Purchase Price $540.0 $540.0
Term Loan 155.0 155.0 Estimated Fees and Expenses 20.0 75.0
Seller Notes 130.0 130.0
Equity Contribution 275.0 330.0
Total Sources $560.0 $615.0 Total Uses $560.0 $615.0
(1) Total commitment of $30.0 million.  
Operating Assumptions for the projection period are as follows: 
 Revenue growth of 20% (Years 2 and 3), 15% (Years 4 to 6) and 10% (Year 7 to 8); 
 Gross margins of 60% (Years 1 to 3), 55% (Years 4 to 6) and 50% (Year 7 to 8); 
 EBITDA margins of 40% (Years 1 to 3), 35% (Years 4 to 6) and 30% (Year 7 to 8); 
 Depreciation and capital expenditures at 8% and 12% of total revenues respectively; 
 The Revolving Credit Facility and the Term Loan is priced at LIBOR + 300 basis points; 
 The Revolving Credit Facility commitment fee is 0.5%; 
 The Seller Notes carry a 11% Pay-In-Kind (‘PIK’) coupon; 
 Financing costs are written off over a period of 7 years; 
 Components of net working capital as a % of revenue / cost of goods sold are constant; 
 The effective tax rate for the Company is 10% through the projection period; 
 Dividend Distribution Tax is 15% based on the Budget for 2007; 
 Foreign currency risks and hedging costs have been ignored; 
 Stamp duty paid under the Asset Buyout Structure, assumed at 10% of the transaction cost, is 
funded by increased equity contribution, $330 million instead of $275 million, since debt 
capacity is fully utilized; and 
 We assume exit from the investment at the end of Year 6 at an exit multiple of 12x EBITDA. 
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V.2 Case 1:  Foreign Holding Company Structure with Dividend Payments 
Table 12: Output for Foreign Holding Company Structure with Dividends (and Dividend Tax) 
($ in millions) Year
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Total Revenues $100.0 $120.0 $144.0 $165.6 $190.4 $219.0 $240.9 $265.0
Growth % 20.0% 20.0% 15.0% 15.0% 15.0% 10.0% 10.0%
Gross Profit $60.0 $72.0 $86.4 $91.1 $104.7 $120.5 $120.5 $132.5
Margin % 60.0% 60.0% 60.0% 55.0% 55.0% 55.0% 50.0% 50.0%
EBITDA $40.0 $48.0 $57.6 $58.0 $66.7 $76.7 $72.3 $79.5
Margin % 40.0% 40.0% 40.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 30.0% 30.0%
EBITDA $40.0 $48.0 $57.6 $58.0 $66.7 $76.7 $72.3 $79.5
Less: Cash Interest Expense (12.6) (11.4) (9.9) (7.9) (5.6) (2.9) (0.6) 0.3
Less: Cash Taxes (0.2) (0.8) (1.5) (1.4) (2.0) (2.8) (2.2) (2.7)
Less: (Incr.)/Decr. in Working Capital 0.0 (3.0) (3.6) 3.0 (2.8) (3.2) 6.6 (1.8)
Less: Capital Expenditures (12.0) (14.4) (17.3) (19.9) (22.9) (26.3) (28.9) (31.8)
Free Cash Flow before Dividend Tax 15.2 18.4 25.3 31.8 33.4 41.4 47.1 43.4
Less: Dividend Tax (2.3) (2.8) (3.8) (4.8) (5.0) (6.2) (7.1) (6.5)
Free Cash Flow $12.9 $15.6 $21.5 $27.0 $28.4 $35.2 $40.1 $36.9
Cumulative Free Cash Flow 12.9 28.5 50.0 77.1 105.4 140.6 180.7 217.6
Capitalization:
Cash & Cash Equivalents $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $25.7 $62.6
Revolving Credit Facility $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0
Term Loan 142.1 126.5 105.0 77.9 49.6 14.4 0.0 0.0
Total Senior Debt 142.1 126.5 105.0 77.9 49.6 14.4 0.0 0.0
Seller Notes 144.7 161.0 179.2 199.5 222.1 247.2 275.1 306.2
Total Debt 286.8 287.5 284.2 277.5 271.6 261.5 275.1 306.2
Credit Statistics:
Senior Debt / EBITDA 3.55x 2.63x 1.82x 1.34x 0.74x 0.19x 0.00x 0.00x
Total Debt / EBITDA 7.17x 5.99x 4.93x 4.79x 4.08x 3.41x 3.81x 3.85x
EBITDA / Cash Int. Exp. 3.17x 4.20x 5.81x 7.32x 11.91x 26.49x 112.83x NA
(EBITDA - Capex) / Cash Int. Exp. 2.22x 2.94x 4.06x 4.81x 7.83x 17.41x 67.70x NA  
 
Table 13: Exit Valuation and Range of Values for IRR 
Exit Valuation $ millions
Exit Year 6
Exit Multiple 12.0x
Exit Year EBITDA $76.7
Exit Valuation (Total Firm Value) $919.8
Term Loan 14.4
Seller Notes 247.2
Less: Accumulated Cash 0.0
    Net Debt $261.5
Equity Value $658.3
 
IRR Calculation Exit Year
0.2 4 5 6 7 8
11.0x 7.0% 10.9% 13.3% 10.3% 10.9%
Exit 11.5x 9.1% 12.5% 14.5% 11.3% 11.8%
Multiple 12.0x 11.0% 13.9% 15.7% 12.3% 12.6%
12.5x 12.9% 15.3% 16.8% 13.2% 13.4%
13.0x 14.7% 16.7% 17.8% 14.0% 14.1%  
 
The term loan is fully repaid in Year 7.  The financial investor earns an IRR of 15.7% based on 
12.0x EBITDA exit valuation in Year 6. 
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V.3 Case 2:  Foreign Holding Company Structure with Share Buyback 
Table 14: Output for Foreign Holding Company Structure with Share Buyback 
($ in millions) Year
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Total Revenues $100.0 $120.0 $144.0 $165.6 $190.4 $219.0 $240.9 $265.0
Growth % 20.0% 20.0% 15.0% 15.0% 15.0% 10.0% 10.0%
Gross Profit $60.0 $72.0 $86.4 $91.1 $104.7 $120.5 $120.5 $132.5
Margin % 60.0% 60.0% 60.0% 55.0% 55.0% 55.0% 50.0% 50.0%
EBITDA $40.0 $48.0 $57.6 $58.0 $66.7 $76.7 $72.3 $79.5
Margin % 40.0% 40.0% 40.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 30.0% 30.0%
EBITDA $40.0 $48.0 $57.6 $58.0 $66.7 $76.7 $72.3 $79.5
Less: Cash Interest Expense (12.5) (11.1) (9.3) (6.8) (4.0) (1.3) 0.2 0.7
Less: Cash Taxes (0.2) (0.8) (1.6) (1.5) (2.2) (3.0) (2.2) (2.8)
Less: (Incr.)/Decr. in Working Capital 0.0 (3.0) (3.6) 3.0 (2.8) (3.2) 6.6 (1.8)
Less: Capital Expenditures (12.0) (14.4) (17.3) (19.9) (22.9) (26.3) (28.9) (31.8)
Free Cash Flow before Dividend Tax 15.3 18.7 25.9 32.7 34.8 42.9 47.9 43.8
Less: Dividend Tax 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Free Cash Flow $15.3 $18.7 $25.9 $32.7 $34.8 $42.9 $47.9 $43.8
Cumulative Free Cash Flow 15.3 34.0 59.8 92.6 127.4 170.3 218.2 262.0
Capitalization:
Cash & Cash Equivalents $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $15.3 $63.2 $107.0
Revolving Credit Facility $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0
Term Loan 139.7 121.0 95.2 62.4 27.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total Senior Debt 139.7 121.0 95.2 62.4 27.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
Seller Notes 144.7 161.0 179.2 199.5 222.1 247.2 275.1 306.2
Total Debt 284.4 282.1 274.4 261.9 249.7 247.2 275.1 306.2
Credit Statistics:
Senior Debt / EBITDA 3.49x 2.52x 1.65x 1.08x 0.41x 0.00x 0.00x 0.00x
Total Debt / EBITDA 7.11x 5.88x 4.76x 4.52x 3.75x 3.22x 3.81x 3.85x
EBITDA / Cash Int. Exp. 3.20x 4.32x 6.21x 8.47x 16.69x 60.94x NA NA
(EBITDA - Capex) / Cash Int. Exp. 2.24x 3.02x 4.35x 5.57x 10.97x 40.04x NA NA  
 
Table 15: Exit Valuation and Range of Values for IRR 
Exit Valuation $ millions
Exit Year 6
Exit Multiple 12.0x
Exit Year EBITDA $76.7
Exit Valuation (Total Firm Value) $919.8
Term Loan 0.0
Seller Notes 247.2
Less: Accumulated Cash (15.3)
    Net Debt $231.9
Equity Value $688.0
 
IRR Calculation Exit Year
0.2 4 5 6 7 8
11.0x 8.1% 11.9% 14.2% 11.3% 11.9%
Exit 11.5x 10.1% 13.5% 15.4% 12.3% 12.7%
Multiple 12.0x 12.1% 14.9% 16.5% 13.2% 13.5%
12.5x 13.9% 16.2% 17.6% 14.1% 14.2%
13.0x 15.6% 17.5% 18.6% 14.9% 14.9%  
 
The term loan is fully repaid in Year 6 instead of Year 7 as per the earlier scenario.  The 
financial investor earns a higher IRR of 16.5% based on 12.0x EBITDA exit valuation. 
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V.4 Case 3:  Asset Buyout Structure 
Table 16: Output for Asset Buyout Structure (including Stamp Duty) 
($ in millions) Year
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Total Revenues $100.0 $120.0 $144.0 $165.6 $190.4 $219.0 $240.9 $265.0
Growth % 20.0% 20.0% 15.0% 15.0% 15.0% 10.0% 10.0%
Gross Profit $60.0 $72.0 $86.4 $91.1 $104.7 $120.5 $120.5 $132.5
Margin % 60.0% 60.0% 60.0% 55.0% 55.0% 55.0% 50.0% 50.0%
EBITDA $40.0 $48.0 $57.6 $58.0 $66.7 $76.7 $72.3 $79.5
Margin % 40.0% 40.0% 40.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 30.0% 30.0%
EBITDA $40.0 $48.0 $57.6 $58.0 $66.7 $76.7 $72.3 $79.5
Less: Cash Interest Expense (12.5) (11.1) (9.2) (6.6) (3.7) (1.1) 0.3 0.8
Less: Cash Taxes 0.0 (0.0) (0.8) (0.7) (1.4) (2.2) (1.5) (2.8)
Less: (Incr.)/Decr. in Working Capital 0.0 (3.0) (3.6) 3.0 (2.8) (3.2) 6.6 (1.8)
Less: Capital Expenditures (12.0) (14.4) (17.3) (19.9) (22.9) (26.3) (28.9) (31.8)
Free Cash Flow before Dividend Tax 15.5 19.5 26.8 33.7 35.9 43.9 48.8 43.9
Less: Dividend Tax 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Free Cash Flow $15.5 $19.5 $26.8 $33.7 $35.9 $43.9 $48.8 $43.9
Cumulative Free Cash Flow 15.5 35.0 61.8 95.5 131.3 175.2 224.0 267.8
Capitalization:
Cash & Cash Equivalents $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $20.2 $69.0 $112.8
Revolving Credit Facility $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0
Term Loan 139.5 120.0 93.2 59.5 23.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total Senior Debt 139.5 120.0 93.2 59.5 23.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
Seller Notes 144.7 161.0 179.2 199.5 222.1 247.2 275.1 306.2
Total Debt 284.2 281.0 272.5 259.0 245.7 247.2 275.1 306.2
Credit Statistics:
Senior Debt / EBITDA 3.49x 2.50x 1.62x 1.03x 0.35x 0.00x 0.00x 0.00x
Total Debt / EBITDA 7.11x 5.86x 4.73x 4.47x 3.69x 3.22x 3.81x 3.85x
EBITDA / Cash Int. Exp. 3.20x 4.34x 6.29x 8.74x 18.01x 72.05x NA NA
(EBITDA - Capex) / Cash Int. Exp. 2.24x 3.04x 4.41x 5.74x 11.84x 47.35x NA NA  
 
Table 17: Exit Valuation and Range of Values for IRR 
Exit Valuation $ millions
Exit Year 6
Exit Multiple 12.0x
Exit Year EBITDA $76.7
Exit Valuation (Total Firm Value) $919.8
Term Loan 0.0
Seller Notes 247.2
Less: Accumulated Cash (20.2)
    Net Debt $226.9
Equity Value $692.9
 
IRR Calculation Exit Year
0.1 4 5 6 7 8
11.0x 3.5% 8.1% 11.0% 8.6% 9.5%
Exit 11.5x 5.4% 9.6% 12.1% 9.6% 10.3%
Multiple 12.0x 7.2% 10.9% 13.2% 10.4% 11.0%
12.5x 9.0% 12.2% 14.2% 11.3% 11.7%
13.0x 10.6% 13.5% 15.2% 12.1% 12.4%  
 
The term loan is fully paid off in Year 6.  The financial investor earns the lowest IRR among the 
3 scenarios – 13.2% based on 12.0x EBITDA exit valuation. 
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VI. FINDINGS OF LEVERAGED BUYOUTS IN INDIA 
 
VI.1 Industries of Focus 
 
Two of the largest LBOs in India were those of business process outsourcing companies 
– Flextronics Software Systems (renamed Aricent after the LBO) and GECIS (renamed 
Genpact).  Attractive industry sectors for LBOs in India would be outsourcing companies, 
service companies and high technology companies.  Companies in these industry sectors are 
labor intensive and their costs are globally competitive due to a low-cost, highly educated 
English speaking workforce in India.  The labor intensity of these businesses makes the target 
company scalable for achieving the high growth required to make the LBO successful.  Further 
these companies typically earn their revenues from exports denominated in foreign currency, 
which mitigates foreign currency risk when the LBO is financed using foreign currency 
denominated debt raised from foreign banks.  These companies also have low tax rates due to the 
tax incentives of operating from Special Economic Zones and Software Technology Parks.   
Outsourcing, service and technology companies form an important part of India’s 
exports, boast of a global customer base and have established a global reputation for service, 
quality and delivery.   
VI.2 Growth Critical to the Success of the LBO 
 
Standard & Poors expect the Indian economy to grow at a rate of 7.9 – 8.4% for the year 
2007-2008.  One of the key drivers of return in a LBO in India is growth.  India is in a growth 
stage and the markets are relatively young compared to those in developed countries.  Indian 
companies face large capital requirements and despite the ample availability of capital in the 
international markets and in India for portfolio investments, there is a shortage of capital for 
funding operations and growth.   
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Indian companies that are targets of buyouts are experiencing significant year-on-year 
growth, generally 15-20% every year and sometimes as high as 40-60%.  A joint report 
published by NASSCOM and McKinsey in December 2005 projected a 42.1% compound annual 
growth rate of the overall Indian offshore business process outsourcing industry for the period 
2003-2006.  The NASSCOM-McKinsey report estimates that the offshore business process 
outsourcing industry will grow at a 37.0% compound annual growth rate, from $11.4 billion in 
fiscal 2005 to $55.0 billion in fiscal 2010. The NASSCOM-McKinsey report estimates that 
India-based players accounted for 46% of offshore business process outsourcing revenue in fiscal 
2005 and India will retain its dominant position as the most favored offshore business process 
outsourcing destination for the foreseeable future. It forecasts that the Indian offshore business 
process outsourcing market will grow from $5.2 billion in revenue in fiscal 2005 to $25.0 billion 
in fiscal 2010, representing a compound annual growth rate of 36.9%. Additionally, it identifies 
retail banking, insurance, travel and hospitality and automobile manufacturing as the industries 
with the greatest potential for offshore outsourcing. 
Warburg Pincus purchased 85% of WNS Global Services, a business process outsourcing 
company, from British Airways for $40 million in 2002.  WNS Global Services offers a wide 
range of offshore support services to its global customers, particularly within the travel, 
insurance, financial, enterprise and knowledge industries. WNS Global Services completed its 
initial public offering on the NYSE in July 2006.  WNS Global Services has a market 
capitalization (as of March 2007) of $1.19 billion.  WNS Global Services was a young and 
growing company (instead of a mature company with steady cash flows as required for a typical 
LBO) when it was acquired by Warburg Pincus.  Given the size of the transaction, it was all 
equity financed as it may not have been possible to obtain debt for a transaction of that size. 
 49
The following table elaborates on the growth history / prospects of some of the 
companies that are buyouts / leveraged buyouts in India. 
Table 18: Growth History / Prospects of Target Companies 
  
Company Growth History / Prospects 
Flextronics Software 
Systems 
Revenues for the year ended March 31, 2005 amounted to $117.5 million as per 
reported US GAAP financial statements.  Based on an October 2006 interview, the 
company disclosed annual revenues to be ‘a bit more than $300 million’.  The 
company is targeting to achieve revenues of $1 billion by 2011-12. 
GE Capital 
International Services 
Annual revenues of $404 million and $493 million in 2004 and 2005 respectively.  
The Company has set a stiff target of achieving an annual revenue of $1 billion by 
December 2008.  Of this, the additional revenue growth of $500 million includes 
$350 million through organic growth and $150 million through acquisitions. 
WNS Global 
Services 
Reported revenues of $104 million, $162 million and $203 million for 2004, 2005 
and 2006 respectively.  Between fiscal 2003 and fiscal 2006, revenue grew at a 
compound annual growth rate of 54.9%. 
RFCL 
(businesses of 
Ranbaxy) 
 
Expected to double revenues in the financial year 2006-2007. 
Infomedia India Expected to show a very significant increase in revenue and profits in financial year 
2007, and is expected to double its profits in that year from that in the previous year. 
VA Tech WABAG 
India 
Revenues at VA Tech WABAG are expected to grow at a rate of 30% over financial 
year 2005-06. 
ACE Refractories 
(refractories business 
of ACC) 
Ace Refractories is expecting to grow revenues by more than 20%, with exports 
growing by about 40%. 
  
 
The high growth characteristics of the target company entails greater execution risk for 
the management of the target company and the financial investor.  Most of the equity returns are 
generated from growth by scaling and ramping up the operations of the portfolio company 
through hiring and training employees, expanding capacity and adding additional customer 
contracts.  This sort of rapid scaling up of operations requires high quality management talent, 
robust internal processes and a large pool of skilled human resources.  Executing the growth 
business plan and delivering the growth is key to return on the investment. 
The following table from the financial model illustrates the dramatic decline in 
profitability as a result of slower than planned growth of the target company. 
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Table 19: Output for Foreign Holding Company Structure with Share Buyback (Slow Growth Case) 
($ in millions) Year
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Total Revenues $100.0 $115.0 $128.8 $141.7 $155.8 $168.3 $181.8 $192.7
Growth % 15.0% 12.0% 10.0% 10.0% 8.0% 8.0% 6.0%
Gross Profit $60.0 $69.0 $77.3 $77.9 $85.7 $92.6 $90.9 $96.3
Margin % 60.0% 60.0% 60.0% 55.0% 55.0% 55.0% 50.0% 50.0%
EBITDA $40.0 $46.0 $51.5 $49.6 $54.5 $58.9 $54.5 $57.8
Margin % 40.0% 40.0% 40.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 30.0% 30.0%
EBITDA $40.0 $46.0 $51.5 $49.6 $54.5 $58.9 $54.5 $57.8
Less: Cash Interest Expense (12.5) (11.1) (9.4) (7.3) (4.9) (2.3) (0.4) 0.3
Less: Cash Taxes (0.2) (0.6) (1.1) (0.8) (1.2) (1.5) (0.9) (1.2)
Less: (Incr.)/Decr. in Working Capital 0.0 (2.3) (2.1) 3.4 (1.6) (1.4) 5.3 (0.8)
Less: Capital Expenditures (12.0) (13.8) (15.5) (17.0) (18.7) (20.2) (21.8) (23.1)
Free Cash Flow before Dividend Tax 15.3 18.2 23.5 27.9 28.1 33.5 36.8 33.0
Less: Dividend Tax 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Free Cash Flow $15.3 $18.2 $23.5 $27.9 $28.1 $33.5 $36.8 $33.0
Cumulative Free Cash Flow 15.3 33.5 57.0 84.9 113.0 146.5 183.2 216.2
Capitalization:
Cash & Cash Equivalents $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $28.2 $61.2
Revolving Credit Facility $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0
Term Loan 139.7 121.5 98.0 70.1 42.0 8.5 0.0 0.0
Total Senior Debt 139.7 121.5 98.0 70.1 42.0 8.5 0.0 0.0
Seller Notes 144.7 161.0 179.2 199.5 222.1 247.2 275.1 306.2
Total Debt 284.4 282.6 277.3 269.7 264.1 255.7 275.1 306.2
Credit Statistics:
Senior Debt / EBITDA 3.49x 2.64x 1.90x 1.41x 0.77x 0.14x 0.00x 0.00x
Total Debt / EBITDA 7.11x 6.14x 5.38x 5.44x 4.84x 4.34x 5.04x 5.30x
EBITDA / Cash Int. Exp. 3.20x 4.13x 5.47x 6.80x 11.05x 25.41x 144.78x NA
(EBITDA - Capex) / Cash Int. Exp. 2.24x 2.89x 3.83x 4.47x 7.26x 16.70x 86.87x NA  
 
Table 20: Exit Valuation and Range of Values for IRR (Slow Growth Case) 
Exit Valuation $ millions
Exit Year 6
Exit Multiple 12.0x
Exit Year EBITDA $58.9
Exit Valuation (Total Firm Value) $706.9
Term Loan 8.5
Seller Notes 247.2
Less: Accumulated Cash 0.0
    Net Debt $255.7
Equity Value $451.2
 
IRR Calculation Exit Year
0.1 4 5 6 7 8
11.0x 0.1% 4.1% 6.1% 3.6% 4.5%
Exit 11.5x 2.3% 5.7% 7.4% 4.7% 5.4%
Multiple 12.0x 4.3% 7.3% 8.6% 5.8% 6.3%
12.5x 6.2% 8.7% 9.8% 6.8% 7.1%
13.0x 8.1% 10.1% 10.8% 7.7% 7.9%  
 
Note that the growth assumptions in this case are far higher than those of LBOs in the US 
and in Europe. 
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VI.3 Growth Puts Structural Limitations on Leverage 
 
The internal operating cash flows generated by a target company which is growing in 
excess of 15-20% every year would be required to finance the growth through investment in 
capital expenditure and working capital.  As a result, a financial investor may not be able to gear 
a capital-intensive target company to the same level as that in international markets.  The 
hypothetical model in section V assume capital expenditure at 12% of revenues, which may be 
significantly understating reality for industrial companies. 
VI.4 Indian LBOs Favor The Use of Pay-In-Kind Securities with Bullet Repayment 
 
Since the debt servicing for a typical Indian LBO is through dividend payments / 
proceeds of share buyback and the Foreign Holding Company receives lump sum sale proceeds 
on divestiture of the portfolio company, the debt that most is most friendly to the LBO is a non-
amortizing loan with Pay-In-Kind (“PIK”) interest payments and a 5-8 year bullet repayment at 
maturity.  The debt is not required to be serviced through cash payments during the investment 
period, thus saving dividend tax and the requirement to remit proceeds through share buybacks.  
Further, the payment on divestiture of the operating company may be used to make the bullet 
repayment of the loan.  This is very similar to the Seller Note used as financing in the LBO of 
Flextronics Software Systems by KKR.  However, providing collateral to the lenders remains an 
issue that may be addressed through the pricing of such a security. 
VI.5 Ideal LBO Targets in India 
 
Diversified conglomerates operate in number of non-core business areas in India that they 
are constantly looking to divest.  These businesses make ideal LBO targets in India since they 
have established operations, business processes and professional management in place.  There is 
a large interest among private equity players to buy non-core businesses from conglomerates. 
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Table 21: List of Buyouts Carved out of Conglomerates 
   
Company Financial investor Seller 
Flextronics Software Systems KKR Flextronics International 
GE Capital International Services General Atlantic Partners, Oak Hill General Electric 
Nitrex Chemicals Actis Capital ICI India 
WNS Global Services Warburg Pincus British Airways 
RFCL ICICI Venture Ranbaxy 
Infomedia India ICICI Venture Tata Group 
VA Tech WABAG India ICICI Venture VA Tech 
ACE Refractories ICICI Venture ACC 
   
 
Other potential targets for LBOs in India include mid-cap second generation family run 
businesses looking at bringing in professional management (Phoenix Lamps, Nilgiris Dairy 
Farm, Nirula’s), distress sale of companies and privatization by the Government (Punjab 
Tractors).   
VI.6 Debt Raised in India 
 
Indian banks participate in providing working capital loans to companies that are buyout 
targets.  Further, Indian banks also tend to participate in the syndicate for bank debt of LBOs.   
Table 22: Details of Participation  
   
Company Debt Details of Participation 
GE Capital International Services $215 million ICICI Bank was one of 6 lead arrangers of the loan. 
ICICI Bank participated in the syndicate by holding 
8.6% of the loan. 
GE Capital International Services $250 million ICICI Bank was one of 6 co-arrangers of the loan. 
ICICI Bank participated in the syndicate by holding 
7.4% of the loan. 
AE Rotor Holding BV (subsidiary 
of Suzlon Energy) 
€450 million1 ICICI Bank and State Bank of India were among the 
lenders holding 33.33% and 25% of the debt 
respectively. 
UB Group INR 13.1 billion ICICI Bank – Mandated arranger 
   
Source:  Bloomberg Loan Syndication Data 
1  Raised for the LBO of Hansen Transmissions, Netherlands 
 
The list above does not include participation by Indian branches of foreign banks such as 
Citigroup, HSBC and Standard Chartered Bank.   
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VI.7 Exit Strategies for Private Equity Investments 
 
In the past, there have been 2 successful / partial exits from the list in Table 4.  WNS 
Global Services was taken public by Warburg Pincus on the New York Stock Exchange, while 
Actis has sold off the trading division of Nitrex Chemicals to a strategic player – Danish firm 
East Asiatic Co AS.  Exit opportunities for LBOs in India are similar to those available to 
existing private equity players who make equity / minority investments in companies in India.  
These include listing on the domestic stock exchanges, listing on a US stock exchange or a 
strategic sale.   
The following table lists some recent / notable private equity exist in India. 
Table 23: Recent Private Equity Exits in India 
    
Company Seller (Stake) Exit Year 
Suzlon Energy Citicorp, ChrysCapital Domestic IPO 2005 
Punj Lloyd Merlion, Stanchart, Temasek Domestic IPO 2005 
HT Media Henderson, CIFC Domestic IPO 2005 
YES Bank CVC International, ChrysCapital Domestic IPO 2005 
Shopper’s Stop ICICI Ventures, IL&FS 
Investment Managers 
Domestic IPO 2005 
IVRCL ChrysCapital Domestic IPO 2005 
PVR Cinemas ICICI Venture Domestic IPO 2005 
Bharti Tele-Ventures Warburg Pincus Sale on domestic stock exchange 2004 / 2005 
Gujarat Ambuja Warburg Pincus Sale on domestic stock exchange 2005 
WNS Global Services Warburg Pincus NYSE IPO 2006 
UTI Bank Actis Financial buyer – HSBC Global 
Investment Fund 
2004 
Baazee.com ChrysCapital Strategic buyer – eBay 2004 
Mphasis BFL Software Barings Private Equity Partners Strategic buyer – EDS 2006 
BPL Communications Actis, AIG Strategic buyer – Essar  2005 
Daksh e-Services Actis, General Atlantic Partners Strategic buyer – IBM 2004 
JobsAhead.com ChrysCapital Strategic buyer – Monster 2004 
Matrix Laboratories TPG Newbridge Strategic buyer – Mylan 
Laboratories 
2006 
i-flex CVC International Strategic buyer – Oracle 2005 
Spectramind e-Services ChrysCapital Strategic buyer – Wipro 2002 
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VI.8 The Advent of Global Private Equity Players in India 
 
India has witnessed a significant inflow of foreign capital including that from global 
private equity players that are setting up shop in India.  This trend is expected to continue and 
fuel the growth of buyout and leveraged buyout activity in India. 
European buyouts veteran Henderson Private Capital, which manages funds of $1.5 
billion, is investing in India out of its $210 million Henderson Asia Pacific Equity Partners I 
Fund.  It was set to create a $300-million fund for Asia, of which 40% will be invested in India. 
The Singapore government, the second largest foreign private equity investor in India has 
shifted focus from early-stage investments to growth and buyout capital.  Its direct investments 
company Temasek Holdings has teamed up with Standard Chartered Private Equity to set up the 
$100 million Merlion India Fund. 
Global private equity firm The Carlyle Group announced in mid-2005 that it had 
established a buyout team in India based out of Mumbai.  The Carlyle India buyout team is part 
of Carlyle’s Asia buyout group, which manages a $750 million Asia buyout fund.  Carlyle also 
has two dedicated Asia growth capital funds totaling $323 million.   
The Blackstone Group recently elevated India to one of its key strategic hubs in Asia. 
Blackstone hired several consulting firms, including McKinsey & Co., and looked at investing in 
various emerging markets.  It chose India as the place to set up its next in-country office and 
intends to invest $1 billion in local companies.   
London-based Actis is among the most experienced investors in India.  Actis’ Fund II is a 
$1.6 billion fund of which $325 million has been earmarked for investments in India.  Actis has 
been active in India since 1998 in private equity and since 1996 as a venture capital investor.  
Another experience global player, Warburg Pincus has been is active in India since 1995 and has 
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made several successful private equity investments and profitable exits in India such as the sale 
of a 19% stake in Bharti Tele-Ventures for $1.6 billion (cost $292 million).  General Atlantic 
Partners has an office in India since 2001 and has executed several successful private equity 
transactions including the sale of Daksh e-Services and the initial public offering of Patni 
Computers. 
With the presence of most major BO / LBO shops in India, a greater number of buyouts / 
leveraged buyouts are expected going forward.   
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Appendix I 
SECTOR CAPS AND ENTRY ROUTES (AS ON 26 FEBRUARY 2006) 
Source:  Investment Commission of India – www.investmentcommission.in  
 
A. Infrastructure Sectors Ownership Limit 
Entry 
Route Remarks 
Power 100% Automatic 
Includes generation (except nuclear power 
where FDI is prohibited), transmission and 
distribution of power  
Telecom 
Basic, cellular and value-added 
services 
ISP with gateways 
ISP without gateways 
Email, Voice mail 
Radio Paging 
End-to-End Bandwidth 
Infrastructure Providers 
providing Dark Fibre 
Telecom Manufacturing 
100% Automatic  
Roads 100% Automatic Includes construction and maintenance of roads, highways, bridges and tunnels 
Ports 100% Automatic Applies to construction and maintenance of ports 
Civil Aviation     
Airports 100% FIPB beyond 74% 
100% FDI under automatic route is 
permissible for greenfield airports. 
Domestic Airlines 49% Automatic 
Subject to no direct or indirect equity 
participation by foreign airlines. FDI up to 
100% allowed for NRIs 
Petroleum & Natural Gas     
Petroleum refining 100% Automatic   
Petroleum product pipelines 100% Automatic   
Petroleum product marketing 100% Automatic Subject to divestment of 26% equity in favour of the Indian partner / public within 5 years. 
Petroleum refining-PSUs 26% FIPB   
Others     
Mass Rapid Transport System 100% Automatic Includes associated real estate development in all metropolitan cities 
EOU/SEZ/Industrial park 
construction 100% Automatic 
Subject to SEZ Act 2005 and Foreign Trade 
Policy.  
Satellite establishment and 
operation 74% FIPB   
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 B. Services Sectors Ownership Limit 
Entry 
Route Remarks 
Banking     
Indian Private Banks 74% Automatic 
Foreign banks can take an equity stake of 
more than 5% (up to 74%) only in the private 
sector banks which have been identified by the 
RBI for restructuring 
PSU Banks 20%  Subject to compliance with RBI guidelines 
NBFCs 100% Automatic  
Includes 19 specified activities; Subject to 
minimum capitalisation norms and compliance 
with RBI guidelines  
Insurance 26% Automatic 
Includes both Life and Non-Life Insurance; 
Subject to licence from Insurance Regulatory 
& Development Authority 
Real estate and construction 
Townships 
Housing  
Construction – Development 
Projects 
Build-up Infrastructure 
100% Automatic 
Subject to minimum land area of 10 hectare 
for serviced housing plot and built-up area of 
50,000 sq. mts. for construction development 
projects. Also minimum capitalisation and 
completion norms 
Trading     
Retail Trade 51% FIPB Only for single brand products 
Trading (Export House, Super 
Trading House, Star Trading 
House)  
51% Automatic   
Trading (Export, Cash and Carry 
Wholesale) 100% FIPB   
Tourism     
Hotels, restaurants, beach resorts 100% Automatic Includes facilities for providing accommodation and food services 
Tour and travel agencies 100% Automatic   
Broadcasting     
TV software production 100%  Subject to maximum foreign equity up to 49% including FDI/NRI/FII 
Hardware facilities - (Uplinking, 
HUB, etc.) 49%  
Subject to maximum foreign equity up to 49% 
including FDI/NRI/FII; FDI in news and 
current affairs channels which uplink from 
India is capped at 26% 
Cable network 49%  Subject to maximum foreign equity up to 49% including FDI/NRI/FII 
DTH 20%  
Subject to maximum foreign equity upto 49% 
including FDI/NRI/FII. FDI not to exceed 
20% 
Terrestrial Broadcast FM 20%  Subject to licensee being a company registered in India under the Companies Act, 1956 
Terrestrial TV Broadcast Not Permitted    
Print Media     
Scientific/Technical journals 100%    
Other non-news/non-current 
affairs/specialty publications 74%    
Newspapers, Periodicals dealing 
with news and current affairs 26%    
Other Services     
Advertising and Film 100% Automatic Includes all film related activities 
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Courier services 100% FIPB Includes all postal services except the distribution of letters  
Lottery, Betting and Gambling Not Permitted —   
Defence and Strategic Industries 26% FIPB Subject to security and licensing requirement; to be sold primarily to the Ministry of Defence 
R&D activities 100% Automatic   
 
 
C. Manufacturing Sectors Ownership Limit 
Entry 
Route Remarks 
Metals  100% Automatic Includes manufacture of Steel, Aluminium etc. 
Textiles and Garments 100% Automatic   
Electronics Hardware  100% Automatic    
Chemicals and Plastics 100% Automatic Includes plastics  
Automobiles  100% Automatic Includes Two -wheelers, Cars and Commercial Vehicles 
Auto Components 100% Automatic   
Gems and Jewellery 100% Automatic   
Food and Agro Products     
Food Processing 100% Automatic   
Agriculture (including contract 
farming) Not Permitted -   
Plantations (except Tea) Not Permitted -   
Other Manufacturing     
Items reserved for Small Scale 24% Automatic 
100% FDI permitted through FIPB route 
subject to undertaking of export obligation of 
50% 
 
D. Resource Based 
Sectors 
Ownership 
Limit 
Entry 
Route Remarks 
Coal and Lignite      
Coal Processing 100% Automatic up to 50%   
Captive Coal mining 100% Automatic Subject to provision of Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act 1973. 
Other Mining and Quarrying     
Mineral Ores 100% Automatic Including Gold, Silver and other mineral ores 
Diamonds and precious stones 100% Automatic   
Atomic Minerals 74% FIPB Includes only mining, mineral separation and subsequent value addition 
Oil and Natural Gas 
Exploration 100% Automatic   
 
E. Knowledge Economy 
Sectors 
Ownership 
Limit 
Entry 
Route Remarks 
Pharma and Biotech 100% Automatic 
FIPB route is needed if industrial licence is 
required or involves recombinant DNA 
technology, cell/tissue formulations 
Healthcare 100% Automatic   
Information Technology 100% Automatic   
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Appendix II 
 
COMPANIES ACT, 1956 – SECTION 77 
 
Restrictions on purchase by company, or loans by company for purchase, of its own or its holding 
company's shares 
(1) No company limited by shares, and no company limited by guarantee and having a share capital, shall 
have power to buy its own shares, unless the consequent reduction of capital is effected and sanctioned in 
pursuance of sections 100 to 104 or of section 402. 
 
(2) No public company, and no private company which is a subsidiary of a public company, shall give, 
whether directly or indirectly, and whether by means of a loan, guarantee, the provision of security or 
otherwise, any financial assistance for the purpose of or in connection with a purchase or subscription 
made or to be made by any person of or for any shares in the company or in its holding company: 
 
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be taken to prohibit- 
(a) the lending of money by a banking company in the ordinary course of its business; or 
 
(b) the provision by a company, in accordance with any scheme for the time being in force, of money 
for the purchase of, or subscription for, fully paid shares in the company or its holding company, being 
a purchase or subscription by trustees of or for shares to be held by or for the benefit of employees of 
the company, including any director holding a salaried office or employment in the company; or 
 
(c) the making by a company of loans, within the limit laid down in sub-section (3) to persons (other 
than directors 1[***] or managers) bona fide in the employment of the company with a view to enabling 
those persons to purchase or subscribe for fully paid shares in the company or its holding company to 
be held by themselves by way of beneficial ownership. 
(3) No loan made to any person in pursuance of clause (c) of the foregoing shall exceed in amount his 
salary or wages at that time for a period of six months. 
 
(4) If a company acts in contravention of sub-sections (1) to (3), the company, and every officer of the 
company who is in default, shall be punishable with fine which may extend to 2[ten thousand rupees]. 
 
(5) Nothing in this section shall affect the right of a company to redeem any shares issued under section 
80 or under any corresponding provision in any previous companies law. 
 
1. The words "managing agent, secretaries and treasurers" omitted by Act 53 of 2000, sec. 33 (w.e.f. 
13-12-2000). 
 
2. Subs by Act 53 of 2000, sec. 33, for "one thousand rupees" (w.e.f. 13-12-2000). 
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Appendix III 
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA 
MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY 
DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND PROMOTION 
*** 
PRESS NOTE NO. 9 (1999 SERIES) 
 
SUBJECT: Policy relating to the standard conditions applicable to foreign owned Indian holding 
companies requiring prior and specific approval of FIPB/Government for downstream investment in 
Annexure III activities, which qualify for Automatic Approval. 
1. The Government have reviewed the existing policy relating to the standard conditions applicable 
to foreign owned Indian holding companies requiring prior and specific approval of 
FIPB/Government for downstream investment. On careful consideration of the matter and with a 
view to further simplifying the investment procedures for downstream investment, it has been 
decided to permit foreign owned Indian holding companies to make downstream investment in 
Annexure III activities, which qualify for Automatic Approval subject to the following 
conditions:-  
a. downstream investments may be made within foreign equity levels permitted for different 
activities under the automatic route;  
b. proposed/existing activities for the joint venture company being fully confined to 
Annexure III activities;  
c. increase in equity level resulting out of expansion of equity base of the existing/fresh 
equity of the new joint venture company;  
d. the downstream investment involving setting up of an EOU/STP/EHTP project or items 
involving compulsory licensing; SSI reserved items; acquisition of existing stake in an 
Indian company by way of transfer/ as also buyback shall not be eligible for automatic 
approval and shall require prior approval of FIPB/Government;  
e. the holding company to notify SIA of its downstream investment within 30 days of such 
investment even if shares have not been allotted alongwith the modality of investment in 
new/existing ventures (with/without expansion programme);  
f. proposals for downstream investment by way of induction of foreign equity in an existing 
Indian Company to be duly supported by a resolution of the Board of Directors 
supporting the said induction as also a shareholders= Agreement and consent letter of the 
Foreign Collaborator;  
g. issue/transfer/pricing/valuation of shares shall be in accordance with SEBI/RBI 
guidelines;  
h. foreign owned holding companies would have to bring in requisite funds from abroad and 
not leverage funds from domestic market for such investments. This would, however, not 
preclude downstream operating companies to raise debt in the domestic market.  
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2. The above procedure will form part of the FIPB Guidelines and paragraph 11 (a) of the 
Guidelines for the consideration of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) proposals by the Foreign 
Investment Promotion Board (FIPB)@ notified vide Press Note NO. 3(1997 Series) shall stand 
modified accordingly in respect of down stream investment by foreign owned Indian holding 
companies.  
3. All investors and entrepreneurs may please take note of the aforesaid revision in the policy. 
 
Sd/- 
(ASHOK KUMAR) 
JOINT SECRETARY 
  
F.No. 7(13)/99-IP  
New Delhi, the 12th April, 1999  
Forwarded to the Press Information Bureau for giving wide publicity to the contents of the above Press 
Note. 
Press information Officer, 
Press Information Bureau, 
New Delhi. 
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Appendix IV 
 
EXTRACTS OF THE MASTER CIRCULAR 
 
Date: Aug 28, 1998 
Dir.BC.90/13.07.05/98 
28 August 1998   
 
Advances against Shares, Units, Debentures and Public Sector Undertaking (PSU) Bonds 
7. Advances to other borrowers against shares/debentures/bonds   
The question of granting advances against primary security of shares and debentures including 
promoters shares to industrial, corporate or other borrowers should not normally arise. However, 
such securities can be accepted as collateral for secured loans granted as working capital or for 
other productive purposes from borrowers other than NBFCs. In such cases banks may 
increasingly accept shares in dematerialised form. Banks may accept shares of promoters only in 
dematerialised form wherever demat facility is available.   
In the course of setting up of new projects or expansion of existing business or for the purpose of 
raising additional working capital required by units other than NBFCs, there may be situations 
where such borrowers are not able to find the required funds towards margin, pending 
mobilisation of long term resources. In such cases, there would be no objection to the banks 
obtaining collateral security of shares and debentures by way of margin. Such arrangements 
would be of a temporary nature and may not be continued beyond a period of one year. Banks 
have to satisfy themselves regarding the capacity of the borrower to raise the required funds and 
to repay the advance within the stipulated period. 
8. Bank Loans for Financing Promoters contribution   
The promoters’ contribution towards the equity capital of a company should come from their own 
resources and the bank should not normally grant advances to take up shares of other companies. 
However, banks are permitted to extend loans to corporates against the security of shares (as far 
as possible in dematerialised form) held by them to meet the promoters’ contribution to the equity 
of new companies in anticipation of raising resources subject to the following terms and 
conditions, in addition to the general guidelines given in the Annexure:   
a. The margin and period of repayment of the loans may be determined by the banks.  
b. Loans sanctioned to corporates for meeting promoters’ contribution should be treated as 
banks’ investments in shares and would thus come under the ceiling of 5 per cent of the 
incremental deposits of the previous year prescribed for investments in shares/convertible 
debentures of PSUs, corporate bodies, units of mutual fund schemes and in equity of 
dedicated venture capital funds meant for information technology.  
c. With the approval of the Boards of Directors, the banks should formulate internal 
guidelines with appropriate safeguards for this purpose.  
d. Under the refinance scheme of Export-Import Bank of India, the banks may sanction term 
loans on merits to eligible Indian promoters for acquisition of equity in overseas joint 
ventures/wholly owned subsidiaries, provided the term loans have been approved by the 
EXIM Bank for refinance. 
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Appendix V 
 
Foreign Holding Company Structure of Flextronics Software Systems 
 
 
Equity (a)
85%
Software Development Systems
Cayman Islands
KKR / Sequio
Capital
Foreign 
Banks
$305 million Term 
Loan
Flextronics
International
SDC Mauritius
Mauritius
Kappa Investments Ltd
India
Flextronics Software Systems Ltd
India (with offices in Europe and US)
100%
$250 million 
Seller Note
10.5% PIK coupon
8 years maturity
100%
$200 million – Equity
$315 million – Pref. Shares (b)
(a) Total Equity = $345 million + Transaction fees and expenses not exceeding $37 million
(b) Redeemable optionally convertible preference shares with a non-cumulative coupon rate of 0.1 per cent per annum
Rollover Equity (a)
15%
Indian 
Banks
Revolver
 
 
 
Sources: 
Flextronics International Ltd Form 8-K filed on April 13, 2006 
“KKR of US to invest $515 m in Indian IT sector” – Business Line – Jul 14, 2006 
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Appendix VI 
 
MINORITY PRIVATE EQUITY TRANSACTIONS IN INDIA 
 
Announce 
Date 
Target Name Acquirer Name Announced 
Total Value 
(mil.) 
Deal Status Description 
Jul 2006 Allsec Technologies The Carlyle Group 16.86 Pending  Stake of 25% 
Feb 2006 Bajaj Auto Finance ChrysCapital 10.48 Complete Sale of 5% through private placement 
Apr 2006 Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Actis Capital LLP 25.00 Pending  Negotiations for an 11% stake 
Jun 2006 Diamond Cables Clearwater Capital Partners 5.17 Complete Private placement of 14.9% 
Feb 2006 DTDC Courier & Cargo Reliance Capital Limited 15.83 Complete Purchase of 44% 
Jul 2006 Emcure Pharmaceuticals Blackstone Group 50.00 Complete  
Aug 2006 EMI Transmission Reliance Power India Fund 11.00 Complete 23% stake 
Aug 2006 Endurance Group Standard Chartered PLC 33.00 Complete  
May 2006 Greenply Industries Aeneas Portfolio Co LP 5.89 Pending  13.81% stake 
Mar 2006 Hexaware Technologies General Atlantic LLC 67.57 Pending  Preferential allotment of 14.99% equity stake 
Jul 2006 Imimobile Pequot Capital Management 10.00 Complete  
Jun 2006 Indiabulls Buildcon  FIM Ltd 3.28 Complete 36% stake 
Jan 2006 Indiabulls Housing Finance Farallon Capital 25.43 Pending   
Jan 2006 Intas Pharmaceuticals ChrysCapital 10.77 Pending  12.5% stake purchased from ICICI Ventures 
Apr 2006 Jai Parabolic Springs Clear Water Capital Partners 3.46 Complete Private placement 
Mar 2006 Jindal Poly Films  Saif Partners Ltd 12.54 Complete 6.66% stake through an off-market transaction 
Nov 2005 JMT Auto  ChrysCapital 0.02 Complete 20% open offer along with Bach Ltd 
Mar 2006 Kopran Clearwater Capital Partners 5.80 Complete 14.95% stake new equity issue 
Apr 2006 Maxwell Industries Reliance Capital Partners 6.44 Pending  14.55% stake 
Nov 2005 Merittrac Services Hav2 Mauritius Ltd 3.61 Complete  
May 2006 Metropolis Health Services ICICI Bank Ltd 7.80 Complete  
Aug 2006 Microland Multiple Acquirers 11.00 Complete Funding from Cargill Ventures, Intel Capital, Trident 
Capital and JAFCO 
Nov 2005 Naturol Bioenergy APIDC Venture Capital Ltd 3.92 Complete Venture capital deal for setting up a plant in AP 
Announce 
Date 
Target Name Acquirer Name Announced 
Total Value 
(mil.) 
Deal Status Description 
Oct 2006 OCM India Wl Ross & Co 37.00 Complete The acquisition, billed as the first 100 per cent buyout 
by a global turnaround fund, was carried out by ARCIL, 
the company said. 
Mar 2006 People Interactive Pvt Ltd Westbridge Capital Partners 8.00 Complete  
Oct 2005 Prasad Corp Pvt Ltd IL&FS Investment Managers 6.66 Complete  
Mar 2006 Redington India Ltd ChrysCapital 15.09 Complete 11% stake 
Dec 2005 Sandhar Locking Devices 
Ltd 
Actis Capital LLP 23.00 Complete Actis has invested $23 million  
Nov 2005 Semantic Space Pvt Ltd UTI Ventures Ltd 2.00 Complete Venture capital investment 
Feb 2006 Shriram Holdings Madras Newbridge Capital LLC 108.00 Complete 49% purchase 
Nov 2005 Sify Ltd-Sponsored ADR Infinity Capital Ventures LP 62.60 Pending  31.61% sale by Satyam 
Oct 2005 Spentex Industries  Citigroup Inc 14.19 Complete  
Dec 2005 Spentex Industries  Citigroup Inc 9.21 Pending   
Sep 2006 Textrade International Reliance Capital Limited 10.00 Complete 26% acquisition 
Jan 2006 Unichem Laboratories Ltd New Vernon Private Equity 12.69 Complete 5% stake 
 
Source:  Bloomberg 
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I. Introduction 
According to standard financial theory, investors in financial assets are, on average, 
compensated for the risk of a particular asset by its distribution-inclusive return. Many 
equilibrium models attempt to capture and quantify this idea, from the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) to various incarnations of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT). 
In the CAPM, risk is measured by beta, a statistical construct designed to capture the 
amount by which a liquid financial asset’s returns change in relation to the returns on “the 
market.” The APT model takes this a step further, relating the return on a stock to a set of 
“factors” that represent macroeconomic effects, weighted by each stock’s exposure to each 
factor, or factor loadings. 
Much academic research has focused on testing these equilibrium models in an attempt to 
determine whether they adequately describe the markets and to determine which model describes 
markets best. Lintner1 used regressions to determine betas for a set of 301 stocks from 1954 to 
1963. Then he performed a cross-sectional regression to test the security market line, regressing 
each stock’s return over the period against its beta and its residual risk. He found evidence that 
the residual risk is priced, contradicting the CAPM’s predictions. In response, Miller and 
Scholes2 critiqued some of the statistical problems with Lintner’s model, and found that the 
misestimation of betas caused a significant problem. Black, Jensen, and Scholes3 attempted to 
                                                 
1 Douglas, George. Risk in the Equity Markets: An Empirical Appraisal of Market Efficiency. (Ann Arbor, Mich.: 
University Microfilms, Inc., 1968). 
2 Miller, M.H. and M. Scholes. “Rates of Return in Relation to Risk: A Re-Examination of Some Recent Findings,” 
in Jensen, M. (ed.). Studies in the Theory of Capital Markets (New York: Praeger, 1972). 
3 Black, F., M.C. Jensen, and M. Scholes. “The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Some Empirical Tests,” in Jensen, M. 
(ed.). Studies in the Theory of Capital Markets (New York: Praeger, 1972). 
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correct this by forming decile portfolios of stocks to reduce this misestimation; they found strong 
support of the two-factor or zero-beta form of the CAPM. Finally, Fama and MacBeth4 extended 
the second pass cross-sectional regression analysis, performing it for each month in their study 
rather than across the entire time period, and testing other implied hypotheses of the CAPM. 
Again, their tests provide support for the CAPM. 
While most of these tests focused on the U.S. markets, other studies were done 
internationally. It was found that the traditional equilibrium models did not fit the Japanese 
markets nearly as well as they fit the U.S. markets. In 1990, Brown & Otsuki performed a study 
of an APT model on the Japanese markets, but with a twist: they allowed the factor loadings for 
the Japanese stocks to be related to the industries to which the Japanese companies were 
exposed.5 Thus, the factor loadings for the stocks, rather than being estimated with a regression 
and being fixed for each company over the entire period of study, were allowed to vary as the 
Japanese companies changed their industry exposure through investment and divestment. Brown 
& Otsuki found that this modified equilibrium model fit the Japanese markets to a degree that 
was comparable with traditional studies of the U.S. markets. 
One presumption of the study is that the high degree to which Japanese companies 
changed their industry exposures over the period studied caused the traditional equilibrium 
models to “fail” and the modified model to “work.” In other words, it was not the fact that 
Japanese companies tended to be exposed to more industries than U.S. companies, but rather the 
fact that they changed those industry exposures so much more than U.S. companies. To see why, 
                                                 
4 Fama, Eugene, and J. MacBeth. “Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests.” Journal of Political Economy. 
71 (May/June 1973). pp. 607-636. 
5 Brown, Stephen J. and Toshiyuki Otsuki. “Macroeconomic Factors and the Japanese Equity Markets: The CAPMD 
Project.” Japanese Capital Markets. Ballinger Publishing Co. 1990. 
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consider a conglomerate firm. If it does not change its industry exposures much during a 
particular time period, a traditional regression of the firm’s returns on the market index or on a 
set of APT factors should capture the effect of diversification for that time period. However, if it 
changes those industry exposures, a traditional regression would estimate only an average of the 
effects of its industry exposures over time, and thus would be subject to significant error. 
This study relates to other types of research on equilibrium models. For example, many 
research papers have examined the proposition that companies’ risk changes over time. Cho and 
Engle have shown that CAPM betas vary predictably over time.6 Blume7 and Levy8 have shown 
that company betas tend to converge on the market beta of one as companies become more 
mature. This study allows the risk factors to change over time as well, and it might be interesting 
to revisit these other types of studies to see how much of the time-varying nature of betas is due 
to changing industry exposure and how much is due to other factors. 
Another related idea in finance is that of a “bottom-up” or fundamental beta. According 
to Aswath Damodaran, a company’s beta is related to whether the company’s products or 
services are discretionary or not and the degree of leverage, both operating and financial, with 
which the company operates.9 This study aims to show that a company’s risk is related to the 
industries in which it operates, taking care of one of these fundamental factors. 
                                                 
6 Cho, Young-Hye and Robert F. Engle. “Time-Varying Betas and Asymmetric Effects of News: Empirical Analysis 
of Blue Chip Stocks.” Under revision. February 2000. 
7 Blume, Marchall. “Betas and Their Regression Tendencies.” Journal of Finance. Vol. X, No. 3 (June 1975). pp. 
785 – 795. 
8 Levy, Robert. “On the Short-Term Stationarity of Beta Coefficients.” Financial Analysts Journal. Vol. 27, No. 5 
(Dec. 1971). pp. 55 – 62. 
9 Damodaran, Aswath. Investment Valuation. 2nd Edition. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 2002. p. 193. 
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Given the similarity to other concepts in finance, I believe that risk measures that vary 
with time in relation to a company’s industry exposure should, on average, improve the power of 
the equilibrium model under study to explain the market’s returns. 
II. Methodology 
The traditional way to calculate industry returns is to form portfolios of stocks based on 
the main reported line of business in which the relevant company operates. However, this 
methodology ignores the fact that many companies operate in several industries. In the U.S. 
markets, conglomerates like this have become much more rare, but in the Japanese markets 
studied by Brown & Otsuki, this was a major problem. 
Their solution was to impute the returns on the industries by a statistical method that 
considers all the public companies in the economy as well as each one’s reported industry 
exposures. These data were not publicly available at the time, but Brown & Otsuki were granted 
access to a dataset specially compiled to include just this information. Luckily, U.S. public 
companies are required to report segmentation in their regulatory filings.  
I decided that though U.S. companies tend not to be segmented as much as Japanese 
companies, including the reported segmentation for each company rather than just the main 
reported line of business is a more “correct” methodology and is more in line with the goals of 
the study, which aim to determine how the company’s risk changes with changes in industry 
exposure. Therefore, this was the method I used to compute industry returns in my study. 
Specifically, I assumed that on average, companies’ returns were a linear combination of 
industry returns, weighted by the companies’ exposures to those industries. The variable I used 
as a proxy for “exposure” was percentage of total sales reported by the company to have come 
from a particular industry. In other words: 
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  Ri = b1,i × I1 + b2,i × I2 +K + bN ,i × IN , where: 
• Ri is the return on a particular stock. 
• bj,i is the ith company’s exposure to the jth industry. 
• Ij is the return on the jth industry. 
This looks remarkably like a cross-sectional regression model, where we know the 
company returns and the company exposures and the regression coefficients would give us the 
industry returns. However, this model suffers from a problem: all the b variables add up to 
100%, a violation of the basic assumptions of ordinary least squares regression. Therefore, I 
transformed the model to correct this. 
Since we know the sum of the b variables is 100%, we can write 
. Substituting this back into the original model, we obtain:   bN ,i =1− b1,i − b2,i −L − bN−1,i
  Ri = b1,i × I1 + b2,i × I2 +K + bN−1,i × IN−1 + 1− b1,i − b2,i −L − bN−1,i( )× IN . 
Rearranging, 
  Ri = b1,i × I1 − IN( )+ b2,i × I2 − IN( )+K + bN−1,i × IN−1 − IN( )+ IN . 
This model does not suffer from the linear combination effect. In fact, if we used this 
model to perform a cross-sectional regression on all stocks for a given time period, with the b 
variables (from 1 to N – 1) as independent variables, we would obtain regression coefficients that 
generally represent the difference between a particular industry’s return and the Nth industry’s 
return, and a constant term that represented the Nth industry’s return. Deriving the actual industry 
returns from these coefficients is simply a matter of adding back the constant term to the 
regression coefficients corresponding to the independent variables. As described below, this 
technique is exactly how I derived the industry returns for each period of time. 
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Additionally, a key assumption of this study relates to the formation of the factor 
loadings for a particular company based on the factor loadings for a company. Specifically, I 
assume that the set of factor loadings for a portfolio of securities is equal to a set of weighted 
averages of factor loadings for the individual portfolio companies, weighted by their portfolio 
weights. Thus, if we consider a company as a portfolio of industry exposures, we should be able 
to calculate that company’s overall set of factor loadings as a weighted average of the factor 
loadings of its component industries. 
I chose the Fama-French factor model, a form of APT, as the main equilibrium model for 
this study. This model is specified as: 
Ri = a + bRM −RF Rm − Rf( )+ bSMB SMB( )+ bHML HML( )+ ε , where:10
• Rm – Rf, the excess return on the market, is the value-weighted return on all NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks (from CRSP) minus the one-month Treasury bill rate 
(from Ibbotson Associates). 
• SMB (Small Minus Big) is the average return on the three small portfolios minus the 
average return on the three big portfolios. 
• HML (High Minus Low) is the average return on the two value portfolios minus the 
average return on the two growth portfolios. 
The b variables in this APT model are factor loadings, and these are the main point of my 
study. As described below, I calculated two sets of factor loadings for each stock: one set using 
                                                 
10 From Kenneth French’s Data Library page: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/f-f_factors.html 
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the traditional regression method and the other set using another method that accounted for 
changing industry exposure. 
Finally, I chose to test the fit of the equilibrium model using the two different sets of 
factor loadings with another cross-sectional regression in a manner similar to Fama and 
MacBeth’s tests of the CAPM. As described above, this test uses a cross-sectional regression on 
a monthly basis to measure the strength of the fit of the model. In the original study, the goals 
were to test certain other claims of the CAPM and to see if any other risk factors were priced 
besides beta. In this study, I am interested only in the fit of the equilibrium model to the returns 
data, and so I used a modified cross sectional model to record the R2 statistics: 
Ri = a+ λRM −RFbiRM−RF + λSMBbiSMB + λHMLbiHML + ε , where for a given month over the period 
1995 – 2005: 
• Ri is the return on company i 
• a is an output of the regression: the average return on a stock with zero sensitivity to 
any of the factors 
• λk is an output of the regression: the market price of factor k 
• bik is the factor loading of factor k on company i 
III. Data Used 
I used the following data sources: 
Monthly returns data from CRSP:11
• PERMNO – Unique number for each security listed by CRSP 
                                                 
11 CRSP and Compustat data accessed through the WRDS system. 
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• DATE 
• TICKER 
• COMNAM – Company name 
• EXCHCD – Exchange on which the security trades 
• SHROUT – Number of shares outstanding 
• PRC – Stock price 
• RET – Monthly percentage return, dividend and split adjusted 
Yearly segment data from Compustat: 
• GVKEY – Unique number for each company listed by Compustat 
• NPERMNO – Identifier that corresponds with the CRSP PERMNO for this 
company 
• DNUM – Primary SIC code for the company 
• CONAME – Company name 
• SMBL – Ticker symbol 
• SRCYR – Year the data was reported (can be different from the fiscal year of the 
company in cases like restated filings) 
• SCRFYR – Month the data was reported 
• STYPE – Segment type (e.g. geographical or business – I used only business 
segments) 
• YEAR – Fiscal year of the data being reported 
• FYR – Month of the end of the company’s fiscal year for the data being reported 
• CYR – Calendar year of the data being reported 
• SALE – Segment sales for the year 
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• SNAME – Name of the segment 
• SNAICS1 – Primary NAICS code of the segment 
• SRCCYR – Calendar year of when the data was reported 
Fama-French factors 
• DATE – Month and year of the data 
• RMRF – Return on market minus the risk-free rate 
• SMB – Return on portfolio of small market cap stocks minus return on portfolio 
of large market cap stocks 
• HML – Return on portfolio of value stocks (high book value of equity / market 
value of equity) minus return on portfolio of growth stocks (low book value of 
equity / market value of equity) 
There were several issues I had with the data as it was obtained directly from the service 
providers. First, Compustat data for a given fiscal year is repeated if a company restates earnings. 
I fixed this by running a filter through the data to select only the latest source date for a given 
reporting period—thus I chose only the latest restated earnings. Second, Compustat segment data 
is reported only on a yearly basis. To match monthly CRSP returns, I split the yearly segment 
breakdown evenly across each month of the fiscal year reported. However, companies can 
change fiscal years, leaving overlapping and missing data. 
To fix this, I created a new, empty table of Compustat segment data, but using a monthly 
basis instead of a yearly basis. Then, for each company in the data set, for each reported year of 
the company’s segment data, starting at the earliest and ending with the latest year’s data, I 
computed the total sales for that company for that fiscal year. I did not include corporate 
segments that have negative sales. I computed each segment’s percentage of the total sales based 
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on this modified total sales number. Then, starting with the last month of that fiscal year and 
working back to the first month of the fiscal year, I copied the segment percentage data into the 
new data table for each month. Last, I iterated through all months of the new data table reported 
for the company in order, and if a month was missing, I copied the previous month’s data 
forward. 
This procedure had several effects. First, in the case of overlapping fiscal reporting 
periods, it ensures the newer data takes priority. Second, in the case of missing months, the latest 
data from previous months is copied forward to fill the gap. 
IV. Procedure 
I selected a set of companies to examine for which I had enough data: at least eleven 
years of both returns and segment data (or 132 monthly observations): that is, beginning on or 
before January 1995 and ending on December 2005. This resulted in a set of 1,994 companies. 
I then computed a set of factor loadings for each company over the time period studied, 
using the traditional regression technique. The model I used was the factor model described 
above as specified by Professors Fama and French. 
To do this, I exported each series of company returns into the statistical package R and 
ran the APT regression in order to determine each of the factor loadings (b’s). I exported the 
resulting factor loadings for each company back into my database. Since these factor loadings 
are estimated over the entire period I studied and do not change over the period, I will refer to 
them as the “static” factor loadings. 
I examined the industries reported by the companies in the set I had selected. I used the 
first two digits of the SNAICS1 field from the Compustat data to group industries. There were 26 
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of these industry groups, including a “00” group whose Compustat data were empty and a “99” 
group, which Compustat uses to indicate a non-operating or liquidating company. 
Then I created a set data matrices that could be used by my statistical package for 
performing the regression to derive returns series for each industry. I created one such matrix for 
each month in the period I studied. Each matrix contained a cross-sectional set of data for each 
company listed in Compustat and CRSP (in order to maximize the number of observations for 
calculating industry returns). The columns of the matrix contained the company identifier, the 
company’s return, and columns containing the company’s exposure to each industry, as shown in 
the example column headers below: 
PERMNO RET Industry 1 pct. Industry 2 pct. … Industry N-1 pct. 
 
I discarded industry percentage columns for which the sum of the squared values equaled 
zero (to eliminate industries that had no corresponding companies in that month), and dropped 
the column with the lowest sum of squared values. The second modification ensured that the data 
fit the statistical model described above. I then exported the corresponding data matrix into the 
statistical package R, and ran a cross-sectional regression to derive each industry’s average 
return in that month. 
The regression resulted in coefficients that represented the difference in returns between 
each industry and the industry whose column I dropped from the data matrix. To correct for this, 
I took the constant term to be the return on the industry I had dropped, and added that constant 
term to each coefficient term in order to derive each industry’s returns for that month. I exported 
these returns back into my database. I repeated this process for each month from January 1995 to 
December 2005. 
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Once I had derived returns for each industry for the entire time period, I computed a set 
of factor loadings for each industry using the derived industry return data. I used the same Fama-
French APT model and procedure as I had used in computing each company’s factor loadings, 
except instead of company returns, I used the derived industry returns. I exported the resulting 
factor loadings for each industry back into my database. 
Based on these industry factor loadings, I calculated an alternate set of factor loadings for 
each company for each month. As described above, I calculated the factor loadings on a portfolio 
of securities as weighted averages of the factor loadings on the individual securities in the 
portfolio, weighted by the portfolio weight of each security. Therefore, in each month, I 
calculated the factor loadings of a security by weighting the factor loadings of each industry by 
the company’s exposure to each industry (percentage of total sales), and adding them together. 
This procedure ensured that industry factor loadings do not change over time in this 
model. However, company factor loadings change when their reported industry exposure 
changes. I will refer to these factor loadings as the “dynamic” factor loadings, as opposed to the 
traditionally calculated “static” factor loadings calculated previously. 
Then I ran a series of cross-sectional regressions to test the strength of this method of 
calculating factor loadings. For each month in the period I studied, I created two tables, each 
containing cross-sectional data for every company in the sample. The first table contained each 
company’s return and factor loadings as calculated by a traditional regression technique. The 
second table contained each company’s return and factor loadings as calculated by the derived-
industry-returns technique. I exported these tables to R and performed the cross-sectional 
regression described earlier. I then saved all the regression statistics from R back into my 
database for later comparison. 
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Because of the results that are described below, I did further cross-sectional tests. These 
followed the same procedures as in the previous paragraph, but instead of including all 1,994 
stocks, I took sub-samples of the companies for each other test. I examined the subset of those 
1,994 stocks that had reported sales from more than one distinct industry over the entire time 
period, and another subset of stocks that had reported sales from more than two distinct 
industries to test whether the number of industries a company is exposed to influences these 
regressions. 
I also attempted to derive a measure of how much a company changes over time. For a 
given company and industry, I took the difference between the percentage of sales in a particular 
time period and the percentage of sales in the previous time period as a measure of how that 
company had changed in a particular industry in a particular month. I added the absolute value of 
this measures across all industries and across all time periods studied for each company. I took 
this as the overall measure of how much a company’s industry exposure changed: it has a bottom 
limit of zero if the company did not change at all and no practical upper limit. I divided the group 
of 1,994 companies into two equal-sized groups: those that had a low change measure and those 
with a high change measure. I ran the cross-sectional regression on these two last, expecting that 
the high-change group would show better results than the low-change group. 
V. Results 
Overall, the data show a complete lack of support for the original hypothesis. The R2 
measures of the regressions show that these factors explain very little of the variation in the stock 
returns. More importantly, the tests using the dynamic factor loadings that were the main point of 
the study had a significantly lower average R2 than the tests using the traditionally calculated, 
static factor loadings. Even the tests of subsets of the companies showed similar results. 
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The following charts show scatterplots for each of the three sets of factor loadings, of the 
static version versus the dynamic (or time-varying) version. The dynamic factor loadings in these 
charts are averages of each factor loading across all time periods for each company. When 
creating these charts, I did not expect to see any particular relationship between the two types of 
factor loadings: after all, I am trying to improve on the estimation of this measure. However, 
there are several interesting points to observe. First, there are several horizontal bands in each 
chart. I believe this represents companies who report the same industry, but have wildly different 
factor loadings. To extend Professor Damodaran’s “bottom-up beta” analogy, there may be 
factors other than a company’s industry exposure that influence that company’s exposure to a 
particular risk factor; this analysis does not capture them. Second, notice the scales of the three 
charts. The static factor loadings for the excess market return Rm – Rf range from around -0.01 to 
a little over 0.04; the corresponding dynamic factor loadings range from 0 to just above 0.02. 
The disparity between the scales of the two types of factor loadings is even greater for the other 
factor loadings. This seems to show that many of the companies in the sample have greater 
exposure to these risk factors than indicated by the weighted average of their component 
industries’ exposure to these factors. 
 83
 The following chart shows the actual results of the cross-sectional regression meant to 
test the strength of this industry-beta methodology. It depicts two time series of adjusted R2s, 
output from each of the monthly cross-sectional regressions I performed. Note that the actual R2s 
of these regressions were not materially different from the adjusted R2s. The solid black line 
represents the regressions using the traditionally calculated static factor loadings, while the gray 
line represents the regressions using the dynamic factor loadings. As shown in the chart, except 
for a few months, the R2s of the regressions using the static factor loadings was significantly 
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greater than those of the regressions using the dynamic factor loadings. There is no other 
conclusion to be drawn except that the dynamic factor loadings as I calculated them are poorer 
estimates of the “true” factor loadings than the static factor loadings, directly contradicting my 
hypothesis. 
 
In addition to this graph, I found an average of the R2s for the regressions using each set 
of factor loadings. For the 132 monthly regressions using static factor loadings, I found that the 
average R2 (not adjusted R2) from January 1995 to December 2005 was 8.6%. For the 
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corresponding regressions using dynamic factor loadings, the average R2 was 1.7%. For 
reference, Modern Portfolio Theory and Investment Analysis by Elton, Gruber, Brown, and 
Goetzmann list R2s for Fama and MacBeth’s cross-sectional tests of the CAPM equilibrium 
model. Their study used 20 beta-ranked portfolios of securities, rather than individual securities, 
to minimize the beta estimation error, so the R2s they report are not directly comparable to those 
I found. However, as a reference, they report an R2 of 29% for their basic CAPM test over the 
period 1935 – 1968.12
Faced with these disappointing results, I attempted to see whether there was any glimmer 
of hope for my hypothesis. Since this methodology was used successfully in the Japanese 
markets, perhaps it works better for companies that are in more than one line of business—
conglomerates. Alternatively, as explained above, the Japanese phenomenon may have been due 
more to the amount of change in industry structure rather than the number of cross holdings in 
each company. To examine this possibility, I ran the cross-sectional regressions again on subsets 
of the 1,994 companies. 
First, I examined subsets based on how many industries each company was in. I selected 
subsets of the companies that, at any point over the 132 months I examined, had reported sales 
from more than just one segment, narrowing the number of companies to 987. Next, I selected 
subsets of the companies that had reported sales from more than two segments, further narrowing 
the number of companies to 447. The corresponding adjusted-R2 plots of the resulting cross-
sectional regressions are given below. First, the companies with more than one segment: 
                                                 
12 Elton et al. “Chapter 15: Empirical Tests of Equilibrium Models.” Modern Portfolio Theory and Investment 
Analysis, Sixth Edition. John Wiley & Sons: 2003. p. 348. 
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 Next, the companies with more than two segments: 
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 As shown, these results are hardly different; they lead to the same conclusions as the 
regression over all 1,994 stocks. The average R2s were: 
Companies with: Dynamic factor loadings Static factor loadings 
> 1 segment 1.9% 8.1% 
> 2 segments 2.5% 8.4% 
 
These results show that the dynamic factor loadings are no better a representation of the 
factor loadings for companies with more than two segments than they are for companies with 
more than one segment. 
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What about the degree of change of exposure within a company? First, I needed to 
estimate this figure. I decided to estimate it by computing the change in percentage-of-sales for 
each company, for each industry, from one time period to the next. Since the sum of a company’s 
percentages of sales across each industry must sum to 100% for any given time period, the sum 
of the change in the company’s percentage of sales across all industries must also sum to 100% 
for a given time period: a company can shift its industry exposures from one industry to another, 
but the addition to one will be exactly offset by a decline in the other in percentage terms. 
Therefore, for each company, I added the absolute value of the computed change across all 
industries and across all the time periods I studied. This gave a numerical figure representing the 
degree to which a company changed its industry exposures, with a lower bound of zero for a 
company that did not change its industry exposure at all, and an upper bound limited by the 
number of periods I studied. The highest change score among the 1,994 stocks was 14.26, for US 
Energy Corp (ticker USEG), a company that has been involved in Mining, Minerals, Commercial 
Operations, Retail Sales, Oil & Gas, and Construction Operations over the course of its history as 
reported by Compustat. 
The histogram of this change variable is given below: 
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Measure Value 
High 14.26 
Low 0.00 
Mean 2.07 
Median 2.00 
Std Deviation 1.79 
Skewness 1.40 
Kurtosis 7.38 
  
 
I split the set of companies into two equal-sized groups ranked by the change measure 
and performed the cross-sectional tests on these two groups. The low-change group had an 
average change measure of 0.866; the high-change group had an average change measure of 
3.279. The corresponding plots of the adjusted R2s are given below. First, the low-change group: 
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 Next, the high-change group: 
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 These plots again show that the dynamic factor loadings are significantly worse than the 
static factor loadings. Even more troublesome, the R2s do not improve for the high-change group, 
either alone or in comparison to the low-change group. An average of the R2s for each test is 
shown below: 
Companies with: Dynamic factor loadings Static factor loadings 
Low change 2.2% 8.9% 
High change 1.9% 8.5% 
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Despite my hypothesis that the amount of change in industry composition will determine 
whether these dynamic factor loadings will make a difference, I found no evidence even of an 
improvement in fit for companies that exhibited a higher degree of change over those with a 
lower degree of change. 
VI. Conclusion 
Unfortunately, I found no evidence to support my hypothesis. While I predicted that the 
R2s of the cross-sectional regressions using the dynamic factor loadings would be significantly 
greater than those of the regressions using the static factor loadings, they were in fact 
significantly lower. 
There are several possible ways to explain the results I obtained. The first and foremost 
possibility is that I made one or more errors in my analysis. This could range from something as 
fundamental as a conceptual idea that I missed to procedural errors, mistyped commands, and 
data problems I did not address. Alternatively, my hypothesis could just be plain wrong. 
A second possibility is that the data are of insufficient quality to support my analysis. The 
Compustat segment data are reported on a yearly basis, while I am studying monthly returns, a 
mismatch that forces an estimation procedure in order to proceed with a monthly analysis. Also, 
the Compustat segment data are self-reported, causing many gaps in the data; potentially, 
changes in reported segmentation could be reported while the underlying industry exposure 
remains the same. 
Third, the time period I studied, 1995 to 2005, did not see much empire building or 
destroying activities. It may be interesting to repeat this analysis for periods of higher industry 
change, like the formation of conglomerates in the 1960s or the break-up of such companies in 
the 1980s. 
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Fourth, there was some indication of poor regression fit during the computation of 
industry returns. As mentioned above, I performed a series of cross-sectional regression of 
company returns against industry exposure for each month studied. While checking the 
regression statistics I noticed that the variance inflation factors (VIF) of the first month’s 
regression coefficients were extremely high, even after using the modified model, indicating that 
there was a high degree of multicollinearity between the independent variables. This means that 
the regression is unstable: if any of the independent b variables changed only slightly, the fitted 
regression coefficients would change dramatically, indicating that the industry returns derived 
from these regressions could have been estimated with significant error. 
Lastly, my analysis makes the assumption that company returns, on average, are 
composed of industry returns, weighted by a percentage-of-sales measure. However, this may be 
an inappropriate methodology for calculating returns, and may have caused errors throughout the 
analysis. 
There are several steps that could be performed to enhance this analysis and potentially 
obtain evidence in support of the hypothesis. First, the data should be cleaned up, with gaps in 
reported segmentation closed, dramatic changes in segmentation checked against regulatory 
filings, and any other data issues resolved. Of course, this would be a very difficult task given the 
amount of data I used, so a subset of the data may need to be used. Second, as mentioned earlier, 
tests of equilibrium models traditionally use portfolios of securities to minimize estimation error. 
Repeating the cross-sectional tests of this study using portfolios of securities may be a better 
formal test of the hypothesis. 
 94
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Common Stock PIPE Discounts and Long-Term Performance 
 
      
 
Andrew Verdasca 
 
 
 
The Leonard N. Stern School of Business 
Glucksman Institute for Research in Securities Markets 
Faculty Advisor: Yakov Amihud 
April 2, 2007 
 
 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 In recent years, the PIPE, or Private Investments in Public Equity, market has displayed 
robust growth and solidified its claim as a viable alternative for public companies seeking to 
raise equity capital.  While the market’s origins can be traced back more than two decades it 
truly emerged as a legitimate source of financing in the mid-1990s, when SEC Regulation S, and 
other amendments, allowed public firms to sell unregistered securities which could then be 
resold to the public market at a later date.  By the late-1990s the market had evolved and larger 
and more mature companies began issuing PIPEs, taking advantage of the securities issuance 
speed and ease.  Between 1995 and 2006 the total amount raised in the PIPE market grew at a 
32% compounded annual growth rate (see figure 1).  New PIPE offerings initially peaked in 
2000 at 1,106 transactions and $24.3 billion raised before falling off dramatically in step with the 
corrections in the major U.S. stock market indexes.  Since then, the PIPE market has rebounded 
strongly setting new issuance and capital raised records in 2006. 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 1 - Total PIPE Market
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 The largest segment of the PIPE market by number of transactions and amount issued is 
the common stock segment (see figure 2).  A common stock PIPE is a security with a fixed 
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number of shares that are issued to investors at a discount or premium to the market price.  These 
securities are restricted from being resold in the public markets until a resale registration 
statement is filed and declared effective.  Also, common stock PIPE issues sometimes include 
warrants as an added incentive for investors agreeing to participate in the PIPE transaction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – PIPE Security Mix, 2000 - 2006
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 This paper explores the discounts and abnormal returns found in common stock PIPEs 
and contrasts it with those found in more traditional private equity placements.  The motivation 
behind my research is to determine whether common stock PIPE issuer’s compensate investors 
with lower discounts and experience higher abnormal returns.  Should this be the case, we ought 
to see more companies turning to common stock PIPEs as a viable private equity financing 
alternative, especially when the firm’s management believes its stock to be undervalued1. 
 Academic researchers have examined many critical issues in the PIPE market; however 
there appears to be no formal evidence on the determinants of common stock PIPE discounts or 
the long-term performance of common stock PIPEs.  As examples, a study by Hillion (2002) 
focused on structured convertible securities (a.k.a. death spirals) and the negative performance of 
the issuer’s underlying public stock, while a study by Chaplinsky and Haushalter (2003) 
                                                 
1 For a full discussion of the information hypothesis and its implications on an undervalued firm’s financing 
decision, see Hertzel and Smith (1993). 
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examined the motivations and returns of firms issuing PIPEs.  A study conducted by Brophy, 
Ouimet, and Sialm (2005) examined the performance of traditional and structured PIPEs.  A 
second study by Brophy, Ouimet, and Sialm (2006) focused on hedge funds and their role in 
issuers’ negative performance.   
II.  PIPE DATA AND GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 
Using PlacementTracker.com I was able to identify 3,174 closed common stock PIPE 
transactions in the U.S. between January 3rd 2000 and January 30th, 2006.  After eliminating 
issuers where I could not find PERMNOs2 in the Center for Research in Scientific Prices (CRSP) 
database, I was left with 2,308 transactions.  In addition, I eliminated issuers with less than 26 
months of stock return data on CRSP prior to their PIPE issue which left me with 1,651 PIPE 
transactions.  Also, I eliminated issuers that issued warrants and had a closing market price less 
than two dollars at the time of the PIPE transaction.  PIPE issuers with warrants were removed to 
allow me to better measure liquidity’s impact on PIPE discounts.  Stocks priced less than two 
dollars were removed to avoid measurement problems in raw and abnormal returns related to 
microstructure factors (Ball, Kothari, and Shanken (1995)).  Therefore, my final data sample 
consisted of 711 PIPE transactions. 
For each of these 711 transactions I obtained data from PlacementTracker.com, CRSP, 
and Compustat.   Using PlacementTracker.com I obtained premiums/discounts, gross proceeds, 
market capitalization at closing, investors, and post-deal raw stock returns.  Using CRSP I 
obtained pre-deal raw stock returns and cap-weighted index returns.  Finally, balance sheet and 
income statement data were obtained from Compustat. 
                                                 
2 The PERMNO is the principal identifier of a stock in the CRSP database and provides a reliable way of tracking stocks over 
time. 
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In reviewing the data, several firm specific observations are readily apparent as displayed 
in Table I.  First, firms issuing common stock PIPEs tend to be smaller firms with mean 
(median) sales and market capitalization of $271.9 million ($29.1 million) and $393.6 million 
($150.1 million) respectively.  Second, these firms tend to have low profitability with mean 
(median) EBITDA and net income of $2.97 million (-$1.93 million) and -$31.55 million and (-
$8.24 million).  Third, issuing firms require immediate financing as signaled by the mean 
(median) cash burn rate of 8.45 quarters (1.84 quarters).  Fourth, issuing firms tend to have 
minimal debt in their capital structure with median debt-to-assets of 12.59% and debt-to-equity 
of 1.77%.  The presence of minimal debt amongst issuers is not surprising because only 37.5% 
of the firms sampled had positive EBITDA. 
Several noteworthy contract features are also summarized in Table I.  First, gross 
proceeds from common stock PIPE issues are highly variable and ranged from $1 million to 
$1,232 million. The mean (median) gross proceeds are $28.37 million ($12.69 million).  Second, 
size of offering as a percentage of the issuer’s market capitalization is also highly variable and 
ranged from 0.01% to 338%.  The mean (median) offering size is 12.01% (9.13%).  Third, the 
mean (median) participation of hedge funds in a PIPE offering is relatively small at 30.32% 
(12.75%).  Fourth, discounts/premiums are highly variable and ranged from a -78.2% discount to 
a 92.7% premium.  The mean (median) discounts are -9.70% and (-10.13%).     
III.  DISCOUNT AND PREMIUM ANALYSIS 
Several studies suggest discounts in restricted stocks are used to compensate investors for 
expected monitoring, services and expert advice (Wruck (1989)), lack of liquidity (Silber 
(1991)), and/or the costs of due diligence (Hertzel and Smith (1993)).  However, the presence of 
discounts to compensate PIPE investors for expected monitoring, services, expert advice and due 
diligence costs seems unlikely.  First, PIPE investors are generally passive and do not appear to 
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increase firm value through monitoring.  Second, in private placements, resale restrictions are 
onerous (two years or more) and provide a strong incentive for investors to employ their 
specialized management and operational skills to increase the issuer’s public stock price and 
incur expenses to assess the issuer’s future prospects.  In contrast, PIPE investors face much 
shorter resale restrictions (30 to 180 days) and typically do not have access to material non-
public information.  Third, PIPE issuers generally repay investors’ expenses in connection with 
the transaction and its subsequent registration.  Also, it is not uncommon for issuers to repay 
investors reasonable out-of-pocket expenses.  Therefore, the difference in these key attributes 
between private placements and common stock PIPE issues3 suggest common stock PIPE 
discounts may reflect compensation to the purchaser for reduced liquidity.   
The average common stock PIPE discount of -9.70% was less than the -33.75% average 
discount observed in the restricted stock study by Silber (1991).  Common Stock PIPE issues 
should exhibit smaller discounts than restricted stock issues due to significant differences in their 
resale provisions and hence liquidity.  The SEC restricts holders of restricted stock from selling 
their shares in the open market for a minimum of two-years.  In contrast, PIPE issuers negotiate 
shorter periods, generally between 30 to 180 days, to file and declare effective their resale and 
registration statement.  However, the observed PIPE and restricted stock discounts are not 
necessarily comparable because the Silber (1991) study analyzed price differences between 
securities that were identical in all respects except for resale provisions.  Thus, without 
reviewing each individual PIPE’s SPA I cannot make the same claim.  Instead, I reviewed a sub-
sample of 20 random common stock PIPE cases and summarized my finding in Appendix I.  In 
the sub-sample I identified several special provisions which may impact the variability in 
discounts.  As an example, in two cases investors were guaranteed a seat on the issuer’s board.  
                                                 
3 The common stock PIPE sample included only those without warrants.   
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Also, investors’ resale provisions varied between 35 and 180 days.  However, overall the 
common stock securities issued pursuant to the PIPE offerings did appear identical to the 
issuer’s public common stock. 
III.1 Determinants of Discount and Premium Variability 
The determinants behind the significant variability in common stock PIPE issuer’s 
discounts warrant a closer investigation.  In this section, I examine the discounts in common 
stock PIPEs and some of their likely predictor variables.  For the remainder of this paper I 
replaced “discounts” with “premiums” to allow for logarithmic transformation in my regression 
analysis.  Premium is defined as [(Purchase Price Per Share) / (Closing Stock Price)] x 100. As 
an example, a discount of -35% is equivalent to a premium of 65.  The predictor variables I 
expect will explain the majority of the variability in premiums includes the issuer’s (i) public 
stock illiquidity, (ii) interaction between stock return volatility and illiquidity, (iii) under/over 
valuation, (iv) cash reserves, (v) recent stock performance, and (vi) investors who are hedge 
funds. 
I expect the issuer’s public common stock illiquidity will be inversely related to the PIPE 
issue’s premium.  Once the resale registration statement is declared effective, the higher the 
common stock’s illiquidity the more difficult it will be for investors to dispose of their shares.  
However, a positive relationship between the issuer’s common stock illiquidity and the PIPE 
issue’s premium may also exist.  If the PIPE issuer’s public common stock is already illiquid, 
then an investor does not lose much by holding a PIPE with resale restrictions; hence, the greater 
the illiquidity the larger the premium.  In my analysis I used the Average Relative Bid-Ask 
Spread as my proxy for illiquidity.  The relative bid-ask spread is measured as the dealer’s 
closing bid-ask spread divided by the average of the closing bid-price and ask-price.  The 
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average is based on the last trading day of each of the immediate five months prior to the closing 
date of the transaction.   
I expect the interaction between the issuer’s stock return volatility and illiquidity to be 
inversely related to its PIPE issue premium.  The greater the stock return’s volatility the higher 
investors should value the stock’s liquidity.  The PIPE issue’s risk is magnified when a stock’s 
illiquidity is high because the investor will have difficulty disposing of their shares and/or 
hedging their position through selling the stock short.  Thus, in my analysis I use the variable 
Risk*Illiquidity to account for the interaction between an issuer’s stock return volatility and its 
illiquidity.  Risk*Illiquidity is defined as (Standard Deviation of Returns) x (Average Relative 
Bid-Ask Spread).  The Standard Deviation of Returns is calculated using the 60 monthly returns 
immediately prior to PIPE transaction’s closing date.  For stocks where 60 monthly returns were 
not available, I used available returns as long as they were greater than or equal to 26 months. 
I expect the issuer’s book-to-market ratio to be positively related to the issue’s premium.  
A previous study has suggested private placement discounts reflect informed investors’ 
appraisals of true (lower) firm value (Hertzel, Lemmon, Linck and Rees (2002), hereafter 
referred to as HLLR).  The evidence in the study is based on the three year post-announcement 
abnormal underperformance of restricted stocks.  If I use book value as a proxy for the firm’s 
true value, then the higher the firm’s book-to-market ratio the less overvalued the firm’s stock 
market price and the higher the premium investors should be willing to pay.  This hypothesis 
may not be as relevant to PIPEs because most PIPE investors want to maintain their trading 
flexibility and thus appraise the firm’s value with only public information.  In the event a PIPE 
investor receives material nonpublic information the investor may not conduct any transactions 
in the issuer’s securities until such information becomes public.  Therefore, the premium should 
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not reflect an investors’ appraisal of the firm’s true value because efficient market hypothesis 
asserts the price of the traded common stock should already reflect all public information.  
However, certain PIPE investors with longer-term investment horizons are willing to have their 
trading ability restricted; thus, this variable may still explain some of the variability in common 
stock PIPE premiums. 
I expect the cash-to-market ratio to be positively related to the issuer’s premium.  An 
issuer with a high ratio of cash to their market value of equity has the option to postpone a 
financing if it does not like the negotiated premium.  Alternatively, companies with a low ratio of 
cash to their market value of equity typically have fewer financing alternatives, less leverage in 
negotiating discount terms and may be forced to issue common stock PIPEs with a smaller 
premium. 
I expect an issuer’s six month stock price performance prior to its PIPE transaction to be 
positively related to the issuer’s premium.  Positive pre-issue stock price performance may signal 
the market expects improvements in the Company’s financial results.  Thus, investors may offer 
higher premiums to companies whose financial results are expected to improve. 
I expect the presence of hedge fund investors in a PIPE issue to be associated with 
smaller premiums.  Hedge funds investing in PIPEs use a myriad of trading strategies to hedge 
their risk.  As an example, a hedge fund can invest in a common stock PIPE issue, and after the 
PIPE transaction has been announced, can short the issuer’s public shares (assuming short selling 
is permitted within the SPA).  If the issuer’s common stock declines, the investor’s short-selling 
gains can be used to offset losses from its long position via the PIPE issue and vice versa.  The 
SEC’s investigations into insider-trading by hedge funds and the media’s attention on hedge 
funds roles in depressing issuers’ stock prices, may have contributed to PIPE issuers preferring 
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investors that are restricted from short selling, such as mutual funds.  Thus, the presence of 
hedge funds may signal the issuer has fewer interested investors and has to offer a smaller 
premium (larger discount) to entice investors to participate in the financing. 
I included closing stock price as an independent variable to determine whether removing 
stocks priced below two dollars could impact my results.  I do not expect an issuer’s closing 
stock price to have a relationship to the issuer’s premium.  
III.2 Regression Analysis and Results 
To gain a better understanding of the factors that best explain the premiums’ variability in 
common stock PIPE issues, I ran a regression analysis.  All else equal, I should expect higher 
premiums (smaller discounts) for issuers with low illiquidity, low Risk*Illiquidity, high book-to-
market ratios, high cash-to-asset ratios, good pre-issue stock price performance, and the absence 
of hedge fund investors participating in their PIPE offering.  Furthermore, I do not expect the 
relationship between stock prices and premiums to be statistically significant. 
Table II reports the results of my regression analysis.  To mitigate the effect of outliers, I 
trimmed (i.e., left out of the regression) the highest and lowest 1% issuer discounts and their 
associated independent variables.  My results show the overall significance of the regression is 
strong as indicated by an F-statistic of 21.4.  In addition, each of the independent variables, 
except for Risk*Illiquidity and Closing Stock Price, are statistically significant at the one percent 
level4.  Surprisingly, the pre-issue stock performance does not have the same sign as proposed by 
my hypothesis.  The issuer’s pre-issue stock performance appears inversely related to the issuer’s 
premium. Thus, holding all other variables constant, issuer’s whose stocks have performed better 
during the six months leading up to a PIPE transaction have smaller premiums.  This unexpected 
result may be due to the method of how premiums are measured in my analysis (see detailed 
                                                 
4 The Book-to-Market ratio is significant at the 5% level. 
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explanation in Appendix II).  Finally, the regression has a relatively low R2 (20.5%) which 
suggests there is considerable unexplained variability in the PIPE premiums not captured by my 
independent variables.  
IV.  Return Analysis 
Differences in abnormal returns following announcements of Seasoned Equity Offerings 
(SEOs), private placements and PIPEs have been widely documented.  Specifically, SEO 
announcements are followed by negative abnormal returns5.  In contrast, several empirical 
studies have found private equity issues are associated with positive abnormal returns during 10 
day event windows around the announcement date6.  However, companies issuing private 
placements see their performance reverse over a longer time period.  HLLR (2002) results show 
mean three-year abnormal returns following a private placement ranging from -45.2% to -23.8%.   
Abnormal returns of companies issuing traditional7 and unprotected8 PIPEs resemble 
private placements.  Brophy, Ouimet, and Sialm (2005) found traditional PIPE issuers 
experience positive average abnormal returns of 5.6% during a ten-day event window around the 
announcement date and -8.4% the year following the issue.  Chaplinsky and Haushalter (2003) 
found unprotected PIPEs also experience positive average abnormal returns of 3.34% during a 
two-day event window around the announcement date and -9.3% the year following the issue.  
Brophy, Ouimet, and Sialm (2005) suggest hedge fund investors may play a negative role in the 
PIPEs poor long term performance through their hedging activities (discussed earlier).  The study 
found the stocks of companies issuing traditional PIPEs where hedge funds are the major 
investors experienced significant negative mean abnormal one-year returns of -12.89%.  
                                                 
5 Smith (1986), Asquith and Mullin (1986), Masulis and Kowar (1986), Mikkelson and Partch (1986), Shyam-Sunder (1991), and 
Cornett and Tehranian (1994). 
6 Wruck (1989), and Brophy, Ouimet and Sialm (2004). 
7 Includes common stock and fixed convertible securities. 
8 Includes common stock and structured equity lines. 
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Evidence of a stock price reversal in traditional and unprotected PIPEs is surprising as market 
efficiency suggests a stock price correction due to the composition of investors would occur at 
the time of the announcement. 
In the following sections, I analyze the performance of common stocks issuing PIPEs.  I 
am interested in whether the post-issue long term abnormal returns of common stock PIPEs are 
negative, such as those found in private placements, traditional PIPEs, and unprotected PIPEs, as 
well as the determinants of common stock PIPEs long-term performance. 
IV.1 Return Observations 
Table III reports the raw and abnormal returns of companies issuing PIPEs one-month, 
three-months, six-months, and twelve-months after the close of their PIPE issue.  The 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is calculated as (raw return – market return * beta), where 
the market return is a portfolio of NASDAQ, AMEX or NYSE cap-based decile 10 firms (micro-
caps) according to the market of the issuer.  Surprisingly, common stock PIPEs display positive 
mean abnormal returns the year following the issue which is in contrast to the negative abnormal 
returns seen in traditional and unprotected PIPEs.  The t-statistic indicates that all of these 
abnormal returns are statistically significant at the one percent level.  The one-month and three-
month mean and (median) CAR for PIPE issuers were 8.07% (4.11%) and 8.92% (2.97%).  Over 
longer event windows, PIPE issuers still had positive abnormal returns.  The six-month and 
twelve-month CAR mean and (median) return for PIPE issuers were 10.08% (3.41%) and 
11.14% (0.11%).  Furthermore, the proportion of firms with positive abnormal returns in the one-
month, three-month, six-month, and twelve-month periods were 58.09%, 54.47%, 53.33% and 
50% respectively.  These results are statistically significant over all measurement periods, except 
for the 12-month window. 
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Panel A and B in Table IV reports the raw and abnormal returns of companies issuing 
common stock PIPEs with and without hedge fund investors.  The abnormal returns for 
companies with and without hedge funds as investors are positive.  The t-statistic indicates all of 
these abnormal returns are statistically significant at the one percent level9.  However, the 
abnormal returns in all event windows are higher for those PIPEs without hedge fund investors 
than those with hedge fund investors.  Panel C in Table IV reports the differences in abnormal 
returns for those PIPEs without hedge fund investors versus those PIPEs with hedge fund 
investors are statistically significant during the one-month, three-month, and twelve-month event 
windows.  These results are consistent with Brophy, Ouimet, and Sialm (2005) findings that 
long-term abnormal returns are lower for PIPE issuers with hedge funds as investors. 
IV.2 Determinants of Long Term Performance Variability 
In the previous section, I found evidence that common stock PIPEs with hedge funds as 
investors performed worse than PIPEs without hedge funds as investors.  In addition to hedge 
funds, I am interested in determining what other variables contribute to common stock 
performance.  In this section, I examine the likely determinants of common stock PIPEs’ 
performance which are then used in a series of regression models.  Each model examines a 
separate independent variable, specifically the one-month, three-month, six-month, and twelve-
month CAR.  The predictor variables are (i) premium, (ii) relative size of offering, (iii) presence 
of hedge fund investors, (iv) beta, (v) book-to-market ratio, (vi) pre-issue stock performance, 
(vii) Risk*Illiquidity, and (viii) closing stock price. 
Hertzel and Smith (1993) suggest private placement discounts and stock price 
performance reflect the resolution of asymmetric information about the issuer’s value.  The 
positive abnormal returns displayed in common stock PIPEs may then reflect the investors’ 
                                                 
9 Excluding the twelve month CAR for PIPEs with hedge fund investors, which is significant at the 5% level. 
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assessments of the issuer’s true (higher) firm value.  Thus, I would expect the PIPE premium to 
be positively related to the issuer’s returns. 
The information hypothesis developed by Myers and Majluf (1984) demonstrates the 
announcement of a public equity issue conveys management’s belief the firm is overvalued.  
Hertzel and Smith (1993) extend the information hypothesis by demonstrating that undervalued 
firms who decline to issue publicly and do not have financial slack, can still pursue their positive 
NPV projects through a private placement.  Thus, management’s private placement decision 
conveys their private information (i.e., the firm is undervalued) to the marketplace.  Also, the 
positive information effect should be higher where the potential degree of undervaluation is high.  
Hertzel and Smith’s (1993) evidence shows a higher information effect where the firm’s 
investment opportunities are large relative to their assets in place.  The subsequent positive stock 
performance reflects the resolution of asymmetric information.  I used the relative size of the 
offering as a proxy for investment opportunities relative to assets in place and expect it to be 
positively related to the issuer’s returns.   
I expect the presence of hedge fund investors in a PIPE offering to be inversely related 
with returns.  As discussed earlier, hedge fund investors trading strategies may have a negative 
affect on PIPEs long-term performance.  Furthermore, I expect the common stock’s beta to be 
positively related to the issuer’s returns.  According to the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), 
expected asset returns are determined by their systematic risk.   
There has been considerable research on the relationship between an issuer’s pre-issue 
stock performance and its post-issue performance10.  Results show that both SEOs and private 
placement issues are preceded by run-ups in the stock prices of the issuers.  In contrast to SEOs, 
                                                 
10 Asquith and Mullin (1986), Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald (1990), Loughran and Ritter (1997), Hertzel, Lemmon, Linck 
and Rees (2002). 
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private placement issues follow periods of relatively poor operating performance.  HLLR (2002) 
show evidence that investors are overly optimistic about the issuer’s potential to improve their 
operating performance.  Moreover, HLLR (2002) suggest low book-to-market ratios prior to 
private placement issues are consistent with this investor over-optimism.  Thus, the negative 
post-issue stock price performance reflects investor disappointment about the issuer’s failure to 
reverse their poor operating performance.  I expect a PIPE issuer’s pre-issue abnormal 
performance to be inversely related to its three, six, and twelve-month post-issue abnormal 
performance.  Also, I expect a PIPE issuer’s book-to-market ratio to be positively related to the 
issuer’s post-issue abnormal performance. 
I expect the Risk*Illiquidity variable to be positively related to the issuer’s common stock 
returns.  Where Risk*Illiquidity is defined as (Standard Deviation of Returns) x (Average 
Relative Bid Ask Spread).  Friend, Westerfield, and Granito (1978) found a positive relationship 
between an assets expected return and its residual risk due to imperfect diversification.  Amihud 
and Mendelson (1986) found a positive relationship between an assets expected return and its 
percentage bid-ask spread (i.e., illiquidity).   Stoll (1978) showed evidence that the interaction of 
risk and illiquidity is evident when market makers charge a higher spread on securities with 
higher volatility as compensation for the risk of their stock positions. 
Finally, I do not expect an issuer’s closing stock price level prior to its PIPE transaction 
to have a relationship to the issuer’s returns.  However, I included closing stock price as an 
independent variable to determine whether removing stocks priced below two dollars could 
impact my results. 
IV.3 Regression Results 
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Table V reports the results of my regression analysis.  My results suggest the issue 
premium and relative size of the offering are statistically significant and their signs are as 
predicted for all the event windows studied11.  Not surprisingly, companies with higher 
premiums (smaller discounts) perform better than companies with smaller premiums over all 
event windows.  In addition, companies with larger offerings relative to their market 
capitalization perform better than companies with smaller offerings over all event windows.   
The pre-issue CAR is also significantly related to the one-month and six-month CAR 
after the issue.  Consistent with my hypothesis, a PIPE issuer’s pre-issue abnormal performance 
is associated with a negative one-month CAR.  However, the statistically significant positive 
relationship in the six-month CAR post-issue is inconsistent with my hypothesis.  My hypothesis 
of an inverse relationship between an issuer’s pre and post-issue stock price performance implies 
expected improvements in the issuer’s operating performance fails to materialize.  However, this 
result may suggest the issuer’s operating performance actually exceeds investors’ expectations 
six-months after the issue.  Unfortunately, my research did not specifically look at operating 
performance trends post-issue and this alternative hypothesis can not be proven. 
The variable Risk*Illiquidity is statistically significant at the five percent level during the 
one-month event window.  Thus, riskier and less liquid issuers experience higher abnormal 
returns during the one-month window.  This result is consistent with my hypothesis that a 
security’s expected return must reflect its residual risk adjusted for its illiquidity. 
Finally, the closing stock price is statistically significant at the five percent level during 
the one and three-month event windows.  The inverse relationship suggests lower priced stocks 
outperform higher priced stocks during one and three-month event windows.  While this is an 
unexpected finding, if a positive relationship exists between closing stock price and firm value, 
                                                 
11Excluding the relative size of offering for three month CARs which is not significant. 
 110
the information hypothesis may be a plausible explanation.  Hertzel and Smith’s (1993) study 
show high information asymmetry is found in small firms.  Also, a study by Barth, Kasznik and 
McNichols (2001) found firm size was positively related with analyst coverage and thus 
information asymmetry.  Specifically, the process of managers communicating to investors 
during road shows and management presentations should resolve some of these asymmetric 
information issues and lead to positive abnormal returns.  As expected, a regression analysis 
confirms a statistically significant positive relationship at the one percent level between an 
issuer’s stock price and its market value during the one and three-month windows12. 
V.  Conclusion 
I found the impact of illiquidity on common stock PIPEs in my sample was -9.7%.  In 
addition, discounts tend to be larger for issuer’s with higher illiquidity, lower book-to-market 
ratios, lower cash reserves, higher pre-issue performance, and hedge funds as investors.  These 
results suggest common stock PIPE issuers may be able to reduce discounts and lower their cost 
of equity capital by offering shorter resale restrictions and attracting financing from non-hedge 
fund investors.  Also, the relatively modest discounts found in common stock PIPEs suggest 
firms contemplating a private placement may turn to common stock PIPEs as a viable financing 
alternative.  Furthermore, I found common stock PIPEs demonstrate positive abnormal returns 
over a one-year period, in contrast to the negative abnormal returns found in traditional and 
unprotected PIPEs.  The differences in abnormal returns are likely due to the presence of fewer 
hedge funds found in common stock PIPE offerings and confirm that hedge funds should be 
investors of last resort.  Also, the subsequent positive stock performance seems to reflect in large 
part the resolution of asymmetric information, thus confirming the benefits of adopting a strategy 
of increased transparency.
                                                 
12 For brevity, the regression analysis is not included in this paper. 
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Appendix I – Review of Security Purchase Agreements and Registration Rights Agreement 
 The following table provides a summary of my detailed review of 20 randomly selected 
common stock PIPE Security Purchase Agreements (SPA) and/or Registration Rights 
Agreements (RRA).  For each transaction I obtained the following items:  Hedge Fund % is 
defined as the percentage of the issuer’s offering funded by hedge fund investors.  Effective RRS 
are the number of days after the SPA is executed that the issuer agrees to have the registration 
rights statement declared effective.  Info Access is whether the issuer has agreed to provide 
material non-public information to their investor(s).  Hedging Restrictions is whether the 
investor is restricted from hedging securities sold in the PIPE offering.  Expenses Reimbursed is 
the expenses the issuer has agreed to repay the investor.  Reg. Fees are legal expenses repaid in 
connection with the subsequent registration.  OP≤$25K are out-of-pocket expenses no greater 
than $25,000 that the issuer has agreed to reimburse.  All issuers that repaid out-of-pocket 
expenses also repaid registration expenses.  Board Seat is whether the issuer guarantees the 
investor a seat on its board of directors.  To verify changes to the board’s composition, I also 
reviewed the issuer’s definitive 14A proxy’s one-year prior and one-year after the transaction. 
 
Ticker 
Symbol Closing Date
Discount/
Premium
Hedge 
Fund %
Effective 
RRS Info Access
Hedging 
Restrictions
Expenses 
Reimbursed
Board 
Seat
PRFT 2/4/2000 -35.63% 7.50% 83 N/A N/A N/A No
SFO 2/8/2000 -19.92% 7.00% 180 N/A No N/A No
CYRO 4/20/2000 7.26% 43.18% N/A N/A N/A N/A No
CERS 8/25/2000 -8.99% 0.00% 90 N/A No Reg. Fees No
ISCO 10/20/2000 10.00% 100.00% N/A N/A N/A N/A No
EPIQ 12/29/2000 -9.09% 0.00% 180 No No Reg. Fees No
UAG 2/27/2001 10.82% 0.00% N/A N/A N/A N/A 1
AMLN 5/11/2001 1.01% 74.47% 70 N/A No Reg. Fees No
SANG 6/20/2001 -16.98% 69.69% 120 Yes No OP ≤ $25K No
DAVE 11/12/2001 -21.77% 43.55% N/A N/A N/A N/A No
LESR 12/13/2001 -11.31% 0.00% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
WLSN 1/10/2002 -13.73% 95.02% 120 No No OP ≤ $25K No
EPAY 1/15/2002 -17.00% 0.00% 60 Yes 1yr restriction Reg. Fees 1
ULTI 5/12/2004 -9.09% 0.00% 90 No No Reg. Fees No
MLR 5/26/2004 5.51% 0.00% 35 No No Reg. Fees No
COBH 9/29/2004 -0.73% 0.00% N/A N/A N/A Reg. Fees No
ETC 2/11/2005 -0.93% 0.00% N/A Yes N/A N/A No
CNVR 7/1/2005 -7.98% 0.00% N/A N/A N/A N/A No
PPX 8/8/2005 -10.87% 0.93% 180 N/A No OP ≤ $25K No
ENG 9/29/2005 -13.15% 100.00% 90 N/A N/A N/A No
 
Summary of Findings: The effective registration rights timing varied, ranging between 35 to 
180 days.  Also, in the seven SPA’s where information disclosure was mentioned four SPA’s 
included a covenant that the issuer would not provide the investor with material non-public 
information.  Moreover, in one SPA investors were restricted from hedging transactions for a 
one-year period.  Also, in the ten SPA’s where expense reimbursement was mentioned all ten 
issuers agreed to pay for subsequent registration, whereas only three issuers agreed to pay for the 
investors out-of-pocket expenses no greater than $25,000.  In addition, two issuers granted one 
board seat to their PIPE investors.  In the UAG transaction the investor was a corporate investor, 
whereas in the EPAY transaction the investor was a private equity firm.  Finally, the only non-
standard provisions observed included the LESR transaction where the investor was entitled to 
designate a replacement CEO, and the PPX transaction where the investors had a 180 day lock-
up period during which the investors could not sell their shares. 
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Appendix II – Premium Calculation and its Relationship to Pre-Issue Returns 
 
 This appendix outlines my hypothesis on the inverse relationship between a stock’s pre-
issue performance and its post-issue performance.  The first paragraph outlines several important 
definitions and the second paragraph outlines the hypothesis and provides an example. 
 The PIPE Premium is defined as (Purchase Price Per Share) / (Closing Stock Price).  The 
Purchase Price Per Share is the amount of money the investor pays for each share of common 
stock.  In a common stock PIPE transaction the Purchase Price Per Share is a negotiated 
discount to the Market Price.  The Market Price is the closing bid price or volume weighted 
average price from one to 20 days prior to executing the purchase agreement.  The Closing Stock 
Price is the closing price of the common stock of the Company on the trading day immediately 
prior to the Closing Date of the transaction.  The Closing Date was obtained from 
PlacementTracker.com and can either be the date that the purchase agreement for the private 
placement transaction was signed by both parties (Closing Date #1) and/or the date that the 
actual funding of the private placement took place (Closing Date #2), depending on what 
information was provided by the Company in its public filings (see a typical PIPE transaction 
time-line in figure 3).   
 The potential inconsistency in recorded closing dates affects the relationship between a 
PIPE issuer’s pre-issue and post-issue performance.  Specifically, for issuers within my sample 
with Closing Date #2 in their premium’s denominator, I would expect the pre-issue stock 
performance to be inversely related to the issuer’s premium.  As an example, the purchase price 
(i.e., the numerator) is set on Day 0 and if the issuer’s stock price (i.e., the denominator) 
subsequently appreciates leading up to Closing Date #2 (i.e., the actual funding date) then the 
denominator will have increased while the numerator remains fixed, thus decreasing the 
premium.  
 
Day 0 
Issuer files Resale 
Registration 
Statement 
Day 10 - 60
Resale Registration 
Statement is 
declared effective 
Day 30 - 180 
PIPE Shares 
Tradable 
(2+ years) 
SEC Review 
(20 to 110 days) 
Closing Date #1: Purchase 
Agreement Signed 
“Market Price” 
Calculated 
(1 to 20 days) 
Purchase Price 
Calculated 
Figure 3 – PIPE Transaction Time-Line
Closing Date #2: 
Actual Funding 
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Table I - Sample Characteristics 
Premium is defined as [(Purchase Price Per Share) / (Closing Stock Price) – 1] x 100%.  
Standard Deviation of Returns is calculated using the 60 monthly returns immediately prior to 
PIPE transaction’s Closing Date13.  For stocks where 60 monthly returns were not available, I 
used available returns as long as they were greater than or equal to 26 months.  Illiquidity is 
defined as the average relative bid-ask spread.  The bid-ask spread is measured as the dealer’s 
closing bid-ask spread divided by the average of the closing bid-price and ask-price.  The 
average is based on the last trading day of each of the immediate five months prior to the closing 
date of the transaction.  Gross Proceeds is the dollar amount of the PIPE offering.  Market 
Capitalization at Closing is defined as (number of shares outstanding that is reported by the 
Company in the 10-K or 10-Q most recently filed prior to the Closing Date) x (the Company’s 
stock price on the trading day immediately prior to the Closing Date of the transaction).  Relative 
Size of Offering is defined as (Gross Proceeds) / (Market Capitalization at Closing).  Hedge Fund 
% is defined as the percentage of the issuer’s offering funded by hedge fund investors.  Book-to-
Market Ratio is defined as (most recent quarter’s book value of equity) / (Market Capitalization 
at Closing).  Cash-to-Assets Ratio is defined as (most recent quarter’s cash and marketable 
securities) / (most recent quarter’s total assets).  Cash Burn Rate is defined as (most recent 
quarter’s cash and marketable securities) / (most recent quarter’s EBITDA).  The Cash Burn 
Rate was only measured for firms with negative EBITDA.  Debt-to-Assets is defined as (most 
recent quarter’s book value of long-term debt) / (most recent quarter’s total assets).  Debt-to-
Equity is defined as (most recent quarter’s book value of long-term debt) / (Market Capitalization 
at Closing). 
 
 N Mean Median SD Max Min 
Premium 711 -9.70% -10.13% 18.06% 92.73% -78.18%
Standard Deviation of Returns 711 26.11% 24.21% 12.47% 94.51% 4.36%
Illiquidity 711 2.23% 1.48% 2.38% 15.16% 0.00%
Gross Proceeds ($MM) 711 28.37 12.69 76.04 1,232.25 1.00
Market Cap at Closing ($MM) 711 393.6 150.1 1,102.3 19,907.2 6.1
Size of Offering 711 12.01% 9.13% 18.55% 338.08% 0.01%
Hedge Fund % 711 30.32% 12.75% 35.75% 100.00% 0.00%
Sales TTM ($MM)  652 271.9 29.1 1,278.9 14,784.8 0.0
EBITDA TTM ($MM) 652 2.97 -1.93 77.26 1,423.27 -372.07
Net Income TTM ($MM) 652 -31.55 -8.24 199.21 788.60 -3,752.21
Book-to-Market Ratio 652 40.13% 21.48% 68.68% 948.54% -1.41
Cash-to-Assets Ratio 640 31.25% 20.58% 29.45% 98.97% 0.00%
Cash Burn Rate (Quarters) 404 8.45 1.84 48.44 857.65 0.00
Debt-to-Assets 624 21.50% 12.59% 25.56% 200.00% 0.00%
Debt-to-Equity 648 29.57% 1.77% 85.49% 858.63% 0.00%
 
                                                 
13 The Closing Date was provided by PlacementTracker.com and can either be the date that the Purchase Agreement 
for the private placement transaction was signed by both parties and/or the date that the actual funding of the private 
placement took place, depending on what information was provided by the Company in its public filings. 
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Table II – Regression Analysis of PIPE Premiums 
The dependent variable, Premium, is defined as [(Purchase Price Per Share) / (Closing Stock 
Price)] x 100.  The independent variables include: Illiquidity is defined as the average “relative 
bid-ask spread”.  The bid-ask spread is measured as the dealer’s closing bid-ask spread divided 
by the average of the closing bid-price and ask-price.  The average is based on the last trading 
day of each of the immediate five months prior to the closing date of the transaction.  
Risk*Illiquidity is defined as (Standard Deviation of Returns) x (Relative Bid Ask Spread).  
Book-to-Market Ratio is defined as (most recent quarter’s book value of equity) / (Market 
Capitalization at Closing).  Cash-to-Market is defined as (most recent quarter’s cash and 
marketable securities) / (Market Capitalization at Closing).  6 Month Pre-Issue Raw Return is a 
raw return and measures the 6 month period prior to the PIPE transaction’s Closing Date.  Hedge 
Fund is a dummy variable and is a 0 for PIPE issues without a hedge fund investor and a 1 for 
PIPE issues with a hedge fund investor.  Closing Stock Price is the closing price of the common 
stock of the Company on the trading day immediately prior to the Closing Date of the 
transaction.  In regression b, I trimmed the highest and lowest 1% issuer discounts and their 
associated independent variables.  ‘*’, ‘**’, and ‘***’ denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively.   
 
Dependent Variable: Premium LN 
  
  
a) Original  
Regression 
b) Trimmed at 
±1% Level 
Independent Variable 
Expected 
Sign Coefficient T-Stat Coefficient T-Stat 
Intercept  4.499 4.367 
Illiquidity LN (--) or (+) -0.027** -2.59 -0.035*** -3.99
Risk*Illiquidity LN (--) -3.734** -2.26 0.060 0.04
Book-to-Market LN (+) or NA 0.002 0.33 0.012** 2.03
Cash-to-Market LN (+) 0.013** 2.38 0.013*** 3.00
6 Month Pre-Issue Raw Return (+) -0.020*** -3.40 -0.010*** -3.75
Hedge Fund (Dummy) (--) -0.095*** -6.20 -0.091*** -7.27
Closing Stock Price LN NA -0.037* -1.94 -0.010 -1.26
  
R2 17.1%  20.5%
Adjusted R2 16.1%  19.6%
F 17.40  21.42
N 599  588
 
Note: LN refers to the variables natural logarithm. 
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Table III – Returns to Common Stocks of Companies issuing PIPEs 
 
The Cumulative Abnormal Return CAR is calculated as (raw return – market return * beta), 
where the market return is a portfolio of NASDAQ, AMEX or NYSE cap-based decile 10 firms 
(micro-caps) according to the market of the issuer.   The -6 Month CAR measures the 6 month 
period prior to the PIPE transaction’s closing date.  The +1, +3, +6, +12 Month CAR’s measures 
the period immediately after the PIPE transactions closing date to the end of the specified period, 
or until the firm is acquired.  The mean, median, standard deviation, % Pos±, Max and Min are 
expressed in percentage terms.  ‘*’, ‘**’, and ‘***’ denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively. 
 
All Investors 
 N Mean Median SD T-Stat % Pos± T-Stat Max Min 
-6 Month CAR 697 60.34 22.38 132.99 11.98*** 70.88 11.02*** 1,155.63 -124.25 
-6 Month Raw Return 697 65.49 19.05 150.05 11.52*** 67.86 -5.72*** 1,388.32 -93.64 
          
+1 Month CAR 701 8.07 4.11 27.43 7.79*** 58.09 -10.84*** 170.29 -99.31 
+1 Month Raw Return 707 7.03 2.54 29.68 6.30** 55.73 1.54* 171.84 -91.74 
          
+3 Month CAR 694 8.92 2.97 44.14 5.32*** 54.47 2.32** 449.77 -120.19 
+3 Month Raw Return 707 3.52 -2.92 46.61 2.01** 46.54 -1.84** 445.40 -94.35 
          
+6 Month CAR 675 10.08 3.41 52.19 5.02*** 53.33 1.73** 337.08 -118.54 
+6 Month Raw Return 706 2.25 -4.97 56.00 1.07 45.75 -2.26** 321.59 -99.96 
          
+12 Month CAR 642 11.14 0.11 71.06 3.97*** 50.00 0.00 589.00 -194.65 
+12 Month Raw Return 694 -3.17 -15.28 74.79 -1.12 39.05 -5.77*** 660.00 -100.00 
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Table IV – Returns to Common Stocks of Companies issuing PIPEs 
The Cumulative Abnormal Return CAR is calculated as (raw return – market return * beta), 
where the market return is a portfolio of NASDAQ, AMEX or NYSE cap-based decile 10 firms 
(micro-caps) according to the market of the issuer.   The -6 Month CAR measures the 6 month 
period prior to the PIPE transaction’s closing date.  The +1, +3, +6, +12 Month CAR’s measures 
the period immediately after the PIPE transactions closing date to the end of the specified period, 
or until the firm is acquired.  The mean, median, standard deviation, % Pos±, Max and Min are 
expressed in percentage terms.  ‘*’, ‘**’, and ‘***’ denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: PIPEs without Hedge Fund Investors 
 N Mean Median SD T-Stat % Pos T-Stat Max Min 
-6 Month CAR 304 35.44 14.05 100.86 6.13*** 65.46 5.39*** 900.47 -124.25 
-6 Month Raw Return 304 37.03 9.66 115.89 5.57*** 58.88 3.10*** 970.41 -85.34 
          
+1 Month CAR 303 10.74 4.76 32.34 5.78*** 63.94 4.88*** 170.29 -99.31 
+1 Month Raw Return 306 10.36 4.49 33.54 5.40*** 58.82 3.09*** 171.84 -91.74 
          
+3 Month CAR 299 12.85 3.75 53.14 4.18*** 55.18 1.79** 449.77 -120.19 
+3 Month Raw Return 306 7.81 -1.08 54.87 2.49*** 48.69 -0.46 445.40 -94.35 
          
+6 Month CAR 295 12.69 4.05 56.26 3.87*** 55.59 1.92** 337.08 -118.54 
+6 Month Raw Return 306 5.38 -1.04 58.90 1.60* 48.69 -0.46 321.59 -99.96 
          
+12 Month CAR 284 15.29 5.26 70.48 3.66*** 55.28 1.78** 589.00 194.65 
+12 Month Raw Return 302 0.32 -11.44 76.05 0.07 42.05 -2.76*** 660.00 -100.00 
 
Panel B: PIPE’s with Hedge Fund Investors 
 N Mean Median SD T-Stat % Pos T-Stat Max Min 
-6 Month CAR 393 79.60 32.27 150.62 10.48*** 75.06 9.94*** 1,155.63 -83.43 
-6 Month Raw Return 393 87.50 34.18 168.76 10.28*** 74.81 9.84*** 1,388.32 -93.64 
          
+1 Month CAR 398 6.05 3.72 22.84 5.28*** 57.54 3.01*** 117.76 -63.05 
+1 Month Raw Return 401 4.48 1.47 26.12 3.43*** 53.37 1.35* 125.52 -72.59 
          
+3 Month CAR 395 5.95 2.51 35.64 3.32*** 53.92 1.56* 192.26 -71.07 
+3 Month Raw Return 401 0.25 -4.76 38.92 0.13 44.89 -2.05** 224.05 -82.99 
          
+6 Month CAR 380 8.04 1.51 48.78 3.21*** 51.58 0.62 216.45 -100.20 
+6 Month Raw Return 400 -0.15 -6.52 53.63 -5.59*** 43.50 -2.60*** 213.97 -90.67 
          
+12 Month CAR 358 7.85 -3.47 71.44 2.08** 45.81 -1.59* 504.67 -115.40 
+12 Month Raw Return 392 -5.85 -18.05 73.80 -1.57* 36.74 -5.25*** 580.20 -97.69 
 
Panel C: Abnormal Returns 
 -6 Month CAR +1 Month CAR +3 Month CAR +6 Month CAR +12 Month CAR 
No Hedge Funds 35.44 10.74 12.85 12.69 15.29 
- Hedge Funds 79.60 6.05 5.95 8.04 7.85 
      
Abnormal Returns -44.16 4.69 6.90 4.65 7.44 
T-Statistic -4.484*** 2.283** 2.085** 1.151 1.318* 
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Table V – Regression Analysis of PIPE Returns 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the PIPE’s CAR.  The independent variables include: Premium is defined as 
[(Purchase Price Per Share) / (Closing Stock Price)] x 100.  Relative Size of Offering is defined as (Gross Proceeds) / (Market 
Capitalization at Closing).  Hedge Fund is a dummy variable and is a 0 for PIPE issues without a hedge fund investor and a 1 for PIPE 
issues with a hedge fund investor.  Beta is calculated using the 60 monthly stock returns immediately prior to PIPE transaction.  For 
stocks where 60 monthly returns were not available, I used available returns as long as they were greater than or equal to 26 months.  
The Beta’s benchmark is a portfolio of NASDAQ, AMEX or NYSE cap-based decile 10 firms (micro-caps) matched to the market of 
the issuer.  -6 Month CAR measures the 6 month period prior to the PIPE transaction’s closing date.  Book-to-Market is defined as 
(most recent quarter’s book value of equity) / (Market Capitalization at Closing).  Closing Stock Price is the closing price of the 
common stock of the Company on the trading day immediately prior to the Closing Date of the transaction.  Risk*Illiquidity is defined 
as (Standard Deviation of Returns) x (Relative Bid Ask Spread).  ‘*’, ‘**’, and ‘***’ denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% confidence levels, respectively. 
 
  One-Month Three-Month Six-Month Twelve-Month 
Independent Variable 
Expected 
Sign Coefficient T-Stat Coefficient T-Stat Coefficient T-Stat Coefficient T-Stat 
Intercept  -0.857  -0.960  -2.061  -3.462  
Premium LN (+) 0.221*** 3.63 0.268** 2.56 0.456*** 3.78 0.746*** 4.42 
Size of Offering LN (+) 0.024* 1.89 0.034 1.52 0.063** 2.44 0.075** 2.05 
Hedge Fund (Dummy) (--) -0.017 -0.70 -0.057 -1.34 -0.004 -0.08 -0.014 -0.19 
Beta LN (+) 0.008 0.70 0.018 0.88 0.014 0.57 -0.003 -0.08 
-6 Month CAR (--) -0.018* -1.90 0.025 1.44 0.034* 1.75 0.032 1.16 
Book –to-Market LN (+) -0.007 -0.67 -0.007 -0.36 0.012 0.58 0.013 0.42 
Risk*Illiquidity LN (+) 4.262** 2.19 -0.839 -0.25 0.302 0.08 7.242 1.30 
Closing Stock Price LN NA -0.037** -2.42 -0.072*** -2.67 -0.027 -0.85 -0.005 -0.10 
          
R2  8.2%  4.2%  4.5%  5.1%  
Adjusted R2  6.9%  2.8%  3.1%  3.6%  
N  565  559  541  513  
 
Note: LN refers to the variables natural logarithm 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On July 28, 2003, the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 
unveiled its Policy Analysis Market (PAM).  PAM would have created a place for individuals 
to trade futures contracts linked to political events in the Middle East.  Within a day, the 
project, which would have included contracts for terrorist attacks and assassinations, was 
cancelled under extreme political pressure.  However, despite this setback, prediction markets 
have continued to grow over time.  Some markets, such as Tradesports.com, offer contracts 
based on political events in both the U.S. and the Middle East.  For example, prior to and 
during the war in Iraq, Tradesports offered contracts linked to the capture of Saddam Hussein.  
Many of these contracts take the form of “all-or-nothing” options that pay a set amount if and 
only if the stated event occurs before expiration. 
While prediction markets have become more popular, their trading volume is low 
compared with that of major exchanges.  However, according to Wolfers and Zitzewitz 
(2006), “some envision prediction markets as the first step toward markets where participants 
could hedge their exposure to political and economic events.”  For instance, contracts similar 
to those intended for the failed DARPA project could be used to hedge against terrorism and 
other political events.  In order to gauge the potential viability of such contracts, this study 
seeks to determine the risk exposure of two industries, airlines and defense firms, to terrorist 
attacks and other related events.  Specifically, the hypothesis to be tested is that airline stocks 
are subject to abnormal negative returns on the date of such events, while defense firms 
experience abnormal positive returns. 
II. PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, several studies have explored the effects of 
terrorism on financial markets.  The previous work has focused primarily on terrorist 
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incidents which meet the criteria, defined by Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 
2656f(d), as “premeditated, politically-motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant 
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an 
audience.” 
Karolyi and Martell (2006) performed an event study consisting of 75 separate attacks 
targeting publicly traded companies.  They found that even when September 11 is excluded, 
the target firms experienced an abnormal return of -0.83% on the day of the attack (or 
subsequent trading day).  In addition to examining companies that were targeted by the attack, 
they also studied peer firms in the same industry and found no significant abnormal returns, 
leading them to conclude that either “investors do not believe that growth opportunities lost 
by targeted firms…are captured by competitors within the same industry” or benefits to 
competitors (positive effect) are offset by a perception of higher terror risk within the 
industry (negative effect). 
Berrebi and Klor (2006) focused specifically on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its 
effect on Israeli companies.  Their results show no significant effect on the overall stock 
market as a result of terrorist attacks.  However, they looked beyond this result and analyzed 
the effects of terrorism on different industries.  They found that the second Palestinian 
uprising accounted for abnormal returns of +7% for defense firms and -5% for all other 
companies between September 29, 2000 and September 10, 2001. 
While our study analyzes the same themes and uses similar techniques as previous 
work, it is unique in two ways.  First, like Berrebi and Klor, we attempt to determine the 
effects of terrorism on specific industries, but the focus is on U.S. companies.  Second, our 
research expands beyond perpetrated attacks and studies the impact of other exogenous 
terror-related events, specifically changes in the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) 
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National Threat Advisory System and taped messages released by al-Qaida leader Osama bin 
Laden. 
Such events are of interest because they may contain information about potential 
attacks and therefore may impact financial markets.  Their inclusion in the study is consistent 
with Karolyi and Martell’s assertion that a company’s stock price might react to attacks due 
to “the fact that costs incurred by the firm in the continuation of its normal activities differ 
from those before the attack(s).”  One might expect that official warnings or threats from 
terrorist groups could have similar consequences.  For instance, an elevation in the threat 
level may result in more extensive and costly security procedures or lower revenues from 
decreased passenger traffic.   
The inclusion of non-attack events is also consistent with the decision to study entire 
industries rather than specific firms.  While a specific company may be targeted in an attack, 
this is often not the case with terror threats and warnings.  Therefore, it is more appropriate to 
study the impact of such occurrences on entire industries. 
III. INDUSTRY SELECTION 
This study focuses on the stock price reactions to terror-related events for firms in the 
airline and defense sectors.  These particular industries have been chosen because they are 
perceived to have a significant exposure to such events.1   
Airlines 
The airline industry, in particular, has been a focus of numerous terrorist attacks and 
related events.  While the September 11 attacks are the most notable example, commercial 
airliners have been targets in past attacks, and the industry has continued to be the focus of 
                                            
1 Though this study focuses on just two industries, a number of sectors may be disproportionately affected by 
terrorism, including hotels, travel, and tourism. 
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terrorist threats and DHS warnings in recent years.  Most recently, a plot to attack ten 
transatlantic flights to the U.S. was uncovered in London in August 2006. 
With each incident analysts have speculated about the impact on the airline industry.  
For example, a Salomon Smith Barney Industry Note following the “unprecedented” attacks 
of September 11 warned of a potential year-long effect on revenues and more permanent 
changes to airlines’ cost structures due to increased security precautions.  The note also 
speculated that the magnitude and nature of the attacks would result in a more widespread 
geographic impact than previous events, such as the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 and the 
first Gulf War, which primarily affected transatlantic travel.  However, this report also noted 
that the impact of terrorism is often overshadowed by other factors, as was the case when 
airlines outperformed the S&P 500 in the twelve months following the 1988 Pan Am 
bombing on the strength of record revenues and earnings.   
A 2006 report from Cathay Financial posits that attacks since September 11 have had 
an increasingly smaller effect on airline traffic over time.  After repeatedly viewing images of 
terrorism and war, travellers may become desensitized to threats, helping to explain the 
limited effects of terrorism on air traffic. 
Finally, an equity research report from Credit Suisse downplays the long-term affects 
of non-attack events, such as elevations in the DHS threat level.  According to the report, on 
average, airline stock prices were down only 1% on the day of such announcements and 
recovered quickly thereafter.  The report concludes that factors such as fuel prices and the 
overall economic outlook have a bigger effect on the sector than do fears about terrorism.  
Like Cathay Financial, this report also notes a possible desensitization to terror warnings over 
time, as exhibited by smaller negative reactions with each successive warning. 
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Defense 
While airlines may face increased risk from terrorism, the defense industry has been 
identified as a sector that may benefit from such events.  This was the finding of Berrebi and 
Klor (2006) when examining Israeli defense stocks.  Analysts have also considered the 
potential impact on this sector.  Following the foiled London-based airline plot in 2006, 
reports from Jefferies & Company and Prudential Equity Group noted the potential effect on 
defense firms.  The Prudential report speculated that the plot, which involved the use of 
explosive agents hidden in liquid carry-on containers, exposed a potential gap in current 
detection technology and therefore could lead to increased spending on upgraded equipment.  
However, the Jefferies report cautions that such an impact could be minimal, as increased 
security spending had been in the pipeline for some time before the plot was discovered. 
IV. DATA 
Events 
For this study, a total of 34 events were selected and classified in the following three 
categories.  See Table A-1 in the appendix for a list of events in each category. 
1) Major terror attacks or plots targeting American interests, either within the U.S. or 
abroad.  These events were selected from The World Almanac and Book of Facts list 
of Notable Terrorist Incidents beginning with the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 in 
1988.  This category also includes other significant airline-related events, including 
thwarted attacks and crashes that were initially perceived to be related to terrorism. 
(twelve events) 
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2) Elevations in the DHS National Threat Advisory System, including elevations 
targeting specific geographic regions or transportation sectors.2  Official warnings 
that did not result in a threat elevation were also included.  The list was compiled 
from official press releases issued by the DHS or The White House. (ten events) 
3) Releases of taped messages by al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden.  A timeline of these 
recordings, along with a summary of the message, was taken from the English-
language website of the Al Jazeera network. (twelve events) 
Securities 
Security prices for U.S.-based commercial air travel and defense firms that were 
publicly traded at any point during 1988-2006 (the timeline encompassing all of the selected 
events) were obtained from the CRSP database.  Air travel companies with a SIC code 
classification of 4510, 4511, 4512, or 4520 were selected.  No distinction was made between 
domestic-only carriers and those with international routes.  This seemed appropriate given 
that the September 11 attacks targeted domestic routes within the U.S., demonstrating that all 
airlines are exposed to terror-related risk.  The list of defense firms was compiled from those 
highlighted in the Jefferies and Prudential analyst reports.  A full list of companies included 
in the study is found in Table A-2 in the appendix. 
V. METHODOLOGY 
In an attempt to determine the precise impact of the selected events on airline and 
defense firms, we have performed a series of event studies.  The goal of an event study is to 
measure abnormal returns for one or more stocks as a result of a particular event.   
                                            
2 While this study considers only threat elevations, one might expect that reductions in the DHS threat level 
would have the opposite effect of increasing returns for airlines and decreasing them for defense firms.  
However, this effect could be mitigated by the fact that the perception of the general threat level may have 
diminished even before the official reduction, which would then be a formality. 
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Market Model Estimation 
The first step is to estimate expected returns based on stock price data during a 
window of time prior to the event.  Returns during this estimation window are regressed 
 
 
against the overall market to obtain the following equation:
here Rit and Rmt are the returns on security i and the market, respectively, in period t.  αi and 
 0.  
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βt are the parameters of the market model.  εit is the zero mean disturbance term.  Dates 
during the event window are indexed using the symbol τ, with the event date itself at τ =
The abnormal return for security i on a given day τ during the event window is denoted by 
ARiτ, which takes the place of the disturbance term in the previous equation.  Solving for AR
we have: 
τττ βα miiii RRAR ˆˆ −−=  
above the market model parameters indicate that they are approximated from the estimation
window observations using ordinary least squares (OLS).  Under the null hypothesis the 
expected value for ARiτ is zero.  For more information regarding event study methodology
see MacKinlay (1997) or Karolyi and Martell (2006).   
The Eventus
 perform the studies described in this paper.  An estimation window of 255 days, 
ending 21 days prior to the event, was used to obtain the market model parameters, with t
S&P 500 serving as the benchmark index.  If an event occurred after the markets closed in th
U.S. or on a non-trading day, the subsequent trading day was used as the event date.  For each 
event date, Eventus analyzed only those firms with a sufficient amount of stock return data 
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over the estimation and event windows.  For example, JetBlue was not included in the 
analysis of the Pan Am flight 103 bombing, while Pan Am was excluded when looking
more recent changes in the DHS threat level. 
 at the 
Test Statistics 
ential for cross-sectional correlation of the returns was of concern in 
interpre nd event 
c 
h 
n 
VI. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
o stages.  In the first, the events were aggregated in single 
studies
r a 
The pot
ting the results.  A benefit of observations with non-overlapping estimation a
windows is that idiosyncratic stock price movements that occur during the estimation and 
event windows are “washed out,” leaving “abnormal returns that truly capture the economi
impact of the event on stock prices” (Karolyi and Martell, 2006).  However, in this study the 
effect of a particular event on all firms in a single industry is considered.  As a result, all 
observations for the event have coinciding estimation and event windows, leading to a hig
correlation of returns between firms.  Collins and Dent (1984) show that ignoring this effect 
produces results in which the computed test statistic is larger than it would have been if the 
returns are independent. This may result in a bias towards rejection of the null hypothesis.  
This issue was addressed within the constraints of the WRDS Eventus software by relying o
the Crude Dependence Adjustment (CDA) test statistic, which, according to the software 
manual, “avoids the potential problem of cross-sectional correlation of security returns.” 
The studies were done in tw
 for each of the three categories.  The goal was to determine if these types of events 
have a statistically significant impact on returns.  In the second stage, a separate study was 
done for the each individual event.  The purpose of looking at each event on its own was to 
judge if abnormal returns are related to the precise nature of an individual event or threat.  
Factors that may influence the magnitude of abnormal returns are the severity of an event o
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specific focus on air travel or the U.S. homeland.  One may expect that events of this nature 
would have a bigger impact, particularly on airline stocks.  This approach may also determin
if the abnormal returns are diminishing over time as Americans become desensitized to 
terrorism. 
Due
e 
 to the magnitude of the September 11 attacks, they were not included in the study 
of succ
 
1, 
nd 
Figure VI-1: Effects of September 11, 2001 Attacks on Airline and Defense Stocks 
essful terrorist attacks (Category 1).  Instead, a separate study was done to determine 
the abnormal returns associated with this event.  The results are in line with the hypothesis 
that a terrorist attack would cause abnormal negative returns for airlines stocks and positive
returns for defense stocks.  On the first trading day following the attacks, September 17, 200
airline stocks posted an abnormal return of -33.0%, while defense stocks had an abnormal 
return of +15.5%.  Both numbers are significant at the 0.1% level.  The following graph 
depicts the cumulative abnormal returns over an event period beginning ten days before a
extending ten days after the event date. 
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 Category-Level Results 
The following table summarizes the mean abnormal returns for each industry on the 
event date for each event category.  Boldface type indicates abnormal returns that are 
significant at at least a 5% level and have the expected sign (negative for airlines; positive for 
defense).  The results indicate statistically significant abnormal returns on the event date in 
certain categories. 
 
Table VI-1: Event Date Abnormal Returns for Aggregated Event Categories 
-0.15% -0.263   -0.45% -1.62$  
Airlines Defense
The symbols $,*,@, and # denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, 
respecti
Category
Mean Abnormal 
Return (τ = 0)
Portfolio Time-
Series (CDA) t
Mean Abnormal 
Return (τ = 0)
Portfolio Time-
Series (CDA) t
(1) Terrorist Attacks -0.73% -1.692*  0.11% 0.318   
(2) Threat Elevations -1.03% -1.652*  0.12% 0.395   
(3) al-Qaida Warnings
vely, using a 1-tail test.  
 
As expected, on the dates of terrorist attacks and threat elevations, firms in the airline 
industry earned negative abnormal returns that were significant at the 5% level.  The results 
also show abnormal returns for defense stocks on dates when taped al-Qaida warning 
messages were released.  However, these returns were negative rather than positive.  Further, 
als significant 
abnormal returns on days other than the event date.  For example, airline stocks exhibit an 
abnormal return of +1.86% on the eleventh day (τ = +11) following the release of messages 
by al-Qaida while defense stocks had an abnormal return of -1.14% fourteen days (τ = -14) 
prior to terrorist attacks.  Both results are significant at the 0.1% level.  (See Table A-3 in the 
appendix for a complete listing of abnormal returns and t statistics for each day in the event 
an examination of all days in the event windows for the categories reve
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window.)  Because the timing of these returns relative to the event date is arbitrary and 
because
l 
Event-Level Results 
In order to determine the source of unexpected returns within the category-level 
results, a separate study was done for each individual event.  This will also provide 
information regarding the pattern of abnormal returns for specific events rather than just 
categories of events.  Such an approach may be more appropriate when dealing with 
terrorism because each event is unique.  For instance, terrorist attacks may differ in location, 
target, and scale.  Elevated threat levels and al-Qaida warning messages may also differ in 
their subject and tone.  As a result, it may be problematic to combine all events in a particular 
category into a single study.  Considering each separately may allow us to make 
determinations regarding the impact of different events based on content and across time.   
Attacks and Other Significant Events 
the September 11 attacks, eleven major terrorist attacks or airline 
crashes
1 is also 
 
5% 
 each category contains a small number of events, it is possible that a single abnormal 
return for one of the events influenced the results of the entire category.  The next section wil
further discuss abnormal returns for each individual event observation.   
In addition to 
 were studied.  The crashes were included because their causes were initially 
suspicious.  The thwarted shoe bombing of a Paris-to-Miami flight in December 200
included in this set of events.  The following table shows abnormal returns for each event
date.  Again, boldface type indicates observations that are statistically significant at a 
level and have the expected sign. 
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Table VI-2: Event Date Abnormal Returns for Individual Terror Attacks 
Portfolio Time- Mean Abnormal Portfolio Time-
12/22/1988 -0.41% -0.450   -0.53% -0.528   
4/19/1995 2.16% 1.756*  -0.32% -0.361   
2.011*  1.47% 2.023*  
-0.232   -1.71% -1.717*  
10/12/2000 -1.95% -1.569$  0.80% 0.588   
11/12/2001 -5.67% -2.168*  -0.61% -0.422   
12/24/2001 -2.68% -0.965   0.82% 0.555   
The symbols $,*,@, and # denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 
levels, respectively, using a 1-tail test.
1If the event occurred while the U.S. financial markets were closed, the subsequent trading day 
was used as the event date.
Event Date1 Return (τ = 0) Series (CDA) t Return (τ = 0) Series (CDA) t
2/26/1993 0.91% 0.677   0.38% 0.371   
11/13/1995 -0.06% -0.045   -0.36% -0.462   
6/25/1996 -1.58% -1.362$  0.44% 0.644   
7/18/1996 -1.30% -1.165   0.57% 0.845   
8/7/1998 2.23%
11/1/1999 -0.37%
Airlines Defense
Mean Abnormal 
 
 
For airlines, the only significant negative abnormal return occurred following the 
crash of American flight 587 on November 12, 2001.  This crash occurred shortly following 
September 11, and terrorism was initially considered as a possible cause.  Airline stocks 
rebounded in the following days when the probable cause was determined to be structural.   
Four of the events in this group are specifically associated with air travel: the 
bombing of Pan Am flight 103 on December 21, 1988, the crash of TWA flight 800 on July 
17, 1996, the crash of American flight 587, and the attempted shoe bombing on December 22, 
2001.  All four resulted in negative abnormal returns for airlines, though only the American 
crash was statistically significant. 
Among defense stocks, only the simultaneous bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya 
and Tanzania on August 7, 1998 resulted in significant positive abnormal returns. 
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Overall, this group of events does not support the hypothesis that terrorist attacks 
result in abnormal returns that are negative for airlines and positive for defense firms.  Only 
two out of 22 total observations exhibit such returns.   
DHS Threat Elevations and Warnings 
Since unveiling the DHS Threat Advisory System on March 12, 2002, the government 
has raised the threat level from Elevated to High several times and has also issued official 
warnings on other occasions.  Ten such events were analyzed for both airlines and defense 
stocks.  The following table summarizes the results. 
 
Table VI-3: Event Date Abnormal Returns for Individual Threat Elevations 
2/7
8/2/2004 -2.35% -1.527$  0.77% 0.995   
7/7
8/10/2006 0.83% 0.566   0.76% 1.218   
Airlines Defense
levels, respectively, using a 1-tail test.
was used as the event date.
Event Date1
Mean Abnormal 
Return (τ = 0)
Portfolio Time-
Series (CDA) t
Mean Abnormal 
Return (τ = 0)
Portfolio Time-
Series (CDA) t
9/10/2002 -1.28% -0.461   -1.21% -0.806   
/2003 -1.15% -0.550   0.05% 0.041   
3/17/2003 0.08% 0.038   1.56% 1.318$  
5/20/2003 -1.36% -0.591   -0.97% -0.828   
12/22/2003 -1.58% -0.755   -0.62% -0.728   
5/26/2004 0.20% 0.118   0.18% 0.241   
7/8/2004 -2.47% -1.544$  0.52% 0.683   
/2005 -0.90% -0.592   0.22% 0.277   
The symbols $,*,@, and # denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 
1If the event occurred while the U.S. financial markets were closed, the subsequent trading day 
 
 
None of these events resulted in abnormal returns that are significant at the 5% level 
for either airlines or defense firms.  However, two of the threat elevations resulted in negative 
returns for airlines that were significant at the 10% level.  Further, airlines had negative 
returns for seven of the events, which may explain why the category-level study for DHS 
warnings resulted in significant negative abnormal returns. 
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These results were mixed regarding the impact of threat elevations that specifically
mention air transportation as a potential target.  Of the four such events (December 22, 2003,
May 26, 2004, July 8, 2004, and August 10, 2006) two
 
 
 had positive abnormal returns, while 
ter 
ince the attacks of September 11, al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden has released 
ollowing the release of 
twelve such messages is shown in the table below. 
 
Table VI-4: Event Date Abnormal Returns for Individual al-Qaida Messages 
1If the event occurred while the U.S. financial markets were closed, the subsequent trading day 
Airlines Defense
The symbols $,*,@, and # denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 
two were negative.  
These observations also do not reveal a clear pattern of abnormal returns over time.  
The largest abnormal returns for airlines came in the summer of 2004, nearly three years af
September 11.  
Taped Messages from al-Qaida 
S
several video and audio recordings.  A summary of abnormal returns f
Event Date1
Mean Abnormal 
Return (τ = 0)
Portfolio Time-
Series (CDA) t
Mean Abnormal 
Return (τ = 0)
Portfolio Time-
Series (CDA) t
12/13/2001 0.74% 0.269   0.28% 0.187   
10/7/2002 -1.25% -0.433   -0.58% -0.381   
2/12/2003 1.12% 0.541   -0.32% -0.269   
4/7/2003 5.84% 2.880@ -0.25% -0.212   
9/10/2003 -0.28% -0.116   -0.82% -0.760   
1/5/2004 -2.18% -1.050   -0.13% -0.158   
4/15/2004 -1.32% -0.658   -0.06% -0.077   
5/6/2004 -1.20% -0.651   -0.76% -0.999   
10/29/2004 -3.34% -2.221*  -1.30% -1.763*  
12/16/2004 -0.28% -0.174   -0.52% -0.700   
12/27/2004 1.66% 1.033   -1.02% -1.379$  
1/19/2006 -0.62% -0.479   0.09% 0.127   
was used as the event date.
levels, respectively, using a 1-tail test.
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These results reveal only one observation that supports our hypothesis, an abnormal 
return of -3.34% for airline stocks following a taped message on October 29, 2004 that is 
significant at the 5% level.  This particular message referenced the September 11 attacks but 
made no specific threats against air travel.  On this same date, defense stocks also have a 
signific
er a positive abnormal return that was significant at the 1% level after bin 
ing attacks against U.S. and British interests.   
In many of the event-level studies, the results are further complicated by large 
 date.  For example, in 
the case of the October 29, 2004 message from Osama bin Laden, airline stocks had an 
abnormal return of -3.34% on the event date (τ = 0) and an abnormal positive return of 5.52% 
eleven days (τ = +11) after the tape was released.  While the former return is significant at the 
5% level, the latter is significant at the 0.1% level.  This observation was largely responsible 
for the previously mentioned significant abnormal return of +1.86% on day eleven for the 
category-level study of al-Qaida messages.  (See Tables A-4 – A-9 in the appendix for a 
listing of daily abnormal returns and test statistics for each individual event.)  The eleventh 
trading day following October 29, 2004 was November 15, 2004.  On that day, when the S&P 
500 was down -0.03%, airline stocks rose sharply as crude-oil prices fell to their lowest level 
in two months.  Even the cause of the abnormal return on the event date of October 29 is 
ebatable.  While a message from bin Laden was released on that day, the days preceding 
October 29 had been marked by increases in airline stocks that resulted from falling crude oil 
ant abnormal return of -1.30%, which does not support our hypothesis. 
No other observations exhibit abnormal returns with the expected sign, though airline 
stocks did regist
Laden’s April 7, 2003 message urg
Once again, these event studies do not show any patterns that would indicate a 
diminishing impact of terrorism over time. 
 
abnormal returns that occur several days either before or after the event
d
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prices a
. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
ent in 
favor o el 
tive abnormal returns on the event date for 
Category 1 (attacks and other significant events) and Category 2 (DHS threat elevations.)  
Howev at 
ingle 
act 
s 
 
 of 
nd Delta Air Lines’ efforts to avoid bankruptcy.  The negative returns on the event 
date may have been more a reversal of previous gains than a reaction to the taped message
Impact of Terror-Related Events on Stock Returns 
Given the results of the studies performed both at the category-level and event-level it 
is not possible to reject the null hypothesis that terrorist attacks or threats do not lead to 
abnormal returns in the airline and defense industries.  The most compelling argum
f rejecting the null hypothesis for the airline industry is the fact that category-lev
studies showed statistically significant nega
er, further analysis at the event-level does not support the alternate hypothesis th
terrorism has a consistent and significant impact on returns in the airline and defense sectors. 
The relatively small number of events in each category makes it possible that a s
event could influence the overall results.  For example, in the case of the results for Category 
1, a large negative return for airlines on November 12, 2001, the day of the first major 
incident following September 11, seems to have skewed the results for the entire category.  
Thus, the insufficient number of observations makes it difficult to measure the generic imp
of terrorist attacks, DHS threat elevations, or messages from al-Qaida. 
The case of the October 29, 2004 al-Qaida message demonstrates the impact of event
unrelated to terrorism on the study.  Here, a separate factor, the price of crude-oil, impacted 
the returns for airlines within the event window.  This shows the pitfalls of studying a single 
event.  Because all observations are centered on a single calendar date, idiosyncratic price
movements are not “washed out” as Karolyi and Martell suggest.  While this is a limitation
the study, in may help to disprove the theory that terrorism-related events result in abnormal 
 137
stock returns.  If the presence of large abnormal returns on random days in the event window
indicates that airline prices are sensitive to exogenous factors, such as the price of oil, then 
 
the lack of significant abnormal returns on nearly all of the actual event days seems to 
suggest that terrorism is not such a factor. 
Implications for Terror-Linked Futures Contracts 
Our results indicate that futures contracts linked to terrorism would not be viable as 
widely-traded hedging instruments.  According to Black (1986), several factors are necessary 
to make a commodity futures contract successful.  These same characteristics can be applied 
here. First, there must be large variations in the price of the asset of being hedged, in this case, 
airline and defense stocks.  Otherwise, there would be little need to insure against price 
changes.  Second, the cash market for these assets must be large enough to attract an adequate 
number of participants.  Finally, use of the contract must provide an efficient “cross hedge” 
that reduces risk exposure enough to compensate for liquidity costs. 
While publicly traded airline and defense stocks are likely to meet the first two 
criteria of price volatility and cash market size, we have shown that contracts linked to broad 
categories of terror-related events likely would not provide a significant hedge against risk 
for these sectors.  In addition, these events are heterogeneous, with each attack, threat 
elevation, or warning message having different characteristics.  This makes it difficult to 
design a standardized contract that captures the relationship between terrorism and stock 
returns.  On the other hand, contracts that are tailored to industries, locations, or types of 
terrorism may provide a better hedge against specific types of risk but would be less liquid. 
There are several other obstacles for futures contracts linked to terrorism.  First, it is 
difficult to measure the costs of terror or to determine if an event has even occurred in the 
first place.  Must an attack pass a certain threshold of human or property loss in order for the 
event to be triggered?  Should an official warning from the Department of Homeland Security 
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trigger an event, even if the threat level is not elevated?  When an event does occur, it may be 
difficult for firms to determine their exposure.  For example, airlines must consider not only
property loss, but also decreased revenues and increased security costs resulting from a
attack or threat elevation.  However, such c
 
n 
osts are entirely dependent on the nature of the 
event.  These unknowns would make it difficult to price the contracts or determine how many 
contracts were needed to hedge an exposure.  An interesting counter-example is that of 
weather derivatives, which have become widely traded on major exchanges such as the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME).  Like terrorism, weather poses a risk to many different 
sectors of the economy.  However, in the case of weather derivatives, it has been possible to 
base contracts on an easily measurable statistic: the deviation of actual temperatures from a 
predetermined average.  Further, companies are able to measure the effect of abnormal 
temperatures on their business. 
Second, as the failure of DARPA’s Policy Analysis Market shows, the moral dilemma 
associated with terror-linked contracts cannot be ignored.  Should such contracts become 
widely traded as hedging instruments, it is likely that others would use them to speculate on 
the occurrence of terrorism.  In fact, according to Black, speculators help to provide the 
liquidity necessary for successful contracts.  However, she also notes that both hedgers and 
speculators are reluctant to participate in a market that is easily manipulated.  There is a 
concern here insofar as widely traded terror contracts could be used by the terrorists 
themselves to profit from their actions. 
While the ability of prediction markets and terror-related contracts to foresee future 
events remains a popular topic, the lack of a clear link between terrorism and stock returns 
and the challenges involved in contract design make it unlikely that these contracts would be 
successful on major derivatives exchanges.
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Date Event Date1 Description Air Travel2 Homeland3 
8/1/2004 8/2/2004 Raised in response to a reported plot against financial institutions in NY, NJ, and DC with 
 truck bombs 
No Yes 
car or
7/7/2005 7/7/2005 Raised for mass transit systems only following London Tube bombings though there was no 
"specific, credible information suggestin ttack" 
No Yes 
006 Raised to High for all domestic and intern hts to or from U.S  elevated threat level 
remains in effect as of Apri
aida Leader Osama bin Laden6 
g imminent a
ational flig8/10/2 8/10/2006 .;
l 2007 
Yes Yes 
(3) Taped Messages from al-Q
1 1 hanistan in November 2/13/2001 2/13/2001 The U.S. defense department releases a video of bin Laden in Afg
2001 in which he says that the destruction of the 11 September attacks exceeded even his 
"optimistic" calculations 
No Yes 
10/6/2002 10/7/2002 Al Jazeera broadcasts an audio tape in which a voice attributed to bin Laden says the "youths No Yes 
s Muslims 
s are agents of 
g 
 September and mentions 
five hijackers by name  threatens more 
the occupation of Arab Gulf states for their oil. He calls on Muslims to keep 
4/15/2004 4/15/2004 fers a truce to European countries that do not attack Muslims. He vows revenge No No 
r the 
1 1
ps threatening the security of Muslims 
1 12 or 
il to the West 
of God" are planning more attacks against the U.S.  
2/11/2003 2/12/2003 Bin Laden calls on Iraqis to carry out bombing attacks against Americans and defend 
themselves against a U.S. attack in a tape broadcast on Al Jazeera 
No No 
4/7/2003 4/7/2003 In an audio tape obtained by The Associated Press in Pakistan, bin Laden exhort
to rise up against Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other governments he say
America, and calls for bombers to attack U.S. and British interests 
No No 
9/10/2003 9/10/2003 Two taped messages and an accompanying video were released. In one, a voice purportin
to be bin Laden's praises the "great damage to the enemy" on 11
. In the other, a voice said to be that of al-Zawahiri
attacks 
No Yes 
1/4/2004 1/5/2004 Bin Laden says on an audio tape broadcast on Al Jazeera that the U.S.-led war in Iraq is the 
beginning of 
fighting in the Middle East 
Bin Laden of
No No 
against the United States for the Israeli assassination of Hamas founder Shaikh Ahmed 
Yassin 
5/6/2004 5/6/2004 In an online audio tape released on Islamic forums, bin Laden offers rewards of gold fo
killing of U.S. and U.N. officials  
No No 
0/29/2004 0/29/2004 Al Jazeera broadcasts a video of bin Laden saying the U.S. can avoid another attack like 
those of 11 September 2001, if it sto
No Yes 
2/16/2004 /16/2004 In an audio tape posted on an website, bin Laden exonerates fighters of responsibility f
violence in Saudi Arabia and calls on them to stop the flow of o
No No 
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Date Event Date1 Description Air Travel2 Homeland3 
1 12 d 2/27/2004 /27/2004 In an audio tape, the al-Qaida leader calls on Iraqis to boycott the January 2005 elections an
names as his Iraq deputy Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian blamed for major anti-U.S. 
attacks in Iraq 
No Yes 
1/19/2006 1/19/2006 In excerpts of an audio tape aired by Al Jazeera, bin Laden says al-Qaida is making 
preparations for attacks in the United States and offers a truce on "fair" but undefined 
conditions 
occurred while the U.S. financial 
  
1If the event vent date. markets were closed, the subsequent trading day was used as the e
2The Air Tra
3The Homel
ve i
a i d. 
4Source: The World Almana
5 kipe r
6 Jaz n
 
l column ind
nd column ind
cates whether the attack, threat level, or warning message was directed at air travel. 
cates whether the attack, threat level, or warning message was directed at the U.S. homelan
c and Book of Facts, 2007, Notable Terrorist Incidents 
Source: Wi
Source: Al 
dia entry fo
eera, http://e
 Homeland Security Advisory System, Department of Homeland Security, The White House 
glish.aljazeera.net/English/archive/archive?ArchiveId=18162 
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Table A-2: Firms Included In the Study 
Air Travel Defense 
Air LA Mesa Air Group Alliant Techsystems 
Air Wisconsin Metro Airlines Armor Holdings 
AirTran Midway Airlines Ceradyne, Inc 
Alaska Air Midwest Air Curtiss Wright 
meri st Northwest Airlines Curtiss Wright 
American Airlines Pan Am Diagnostic Retrieval Systems, Inc 
ASA Holdings Pinnacle Airlines DRS Technologies 
ATA Airlines Presidential Airways FLIR Systems, Inc 
Braniff Priceline.com General Dynamics 
 Air, Inc Reno Air Goodrich Corp. 
om p c Airways Holdings Harris Corp. 
n in SkyWest L-3 Communications 
el thwest Airlines Lockheed Martin 
p Airlines Northrop Grumman 
F W li Tower Air Orbital Sciences 
Y TWA Raytheon 
ie e nited Airlines Raytheon 
G k at USAir Rockwell Collins 
A ard Airlines Taser International 
ia ne ir Holdings  
et acific Airlines  
 H s dCorp, Inc  
No  t e mpany listed were included in the study. 
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Table A-3: Daily Abnormal Returns by Industry and Event Category 
Date 
(τ)
Mean 
Abnormal 
Return
CDA t-
statistic
Mean 
Abnormal 
Retur
CDA
statistic
 t-
Mean 
Abnormal 
Return
CDA 
statistic
t-
Mean 
Abnormal 
Retur
CDA t-
statistic
A
Re
Mean 
bnormal 
turn
CDA t-
statistic
Abnorm
Retur
Mean 
al 
nn n
CDA t-
statistic
-20 0.1   -0.93% -1.49 0.18% 0.540   -0.10 -0.019   
-19 0 -0.16% -0.25 -0.31% -0.914   -0.2 % 0.208   
-18 - -0.73% -1.173   7   -0.30% -0.906   -0.6 % 1.582$  
-17 -0.26% -0.4 -0.08% -0.250   -0.4 % 0.731   
-16 78% 1.2 0.04% 0.11    
-15 .99% -1.580$  007   -0.15% -0.
-14 0.41% -0.65 -1.14% -3.394   
-13 -0.12% -0.1 -0.23% -0.669   - 0.745   
-12 0.22% 0. 0.68% 2.017*  - -1.575$  
-11 -0.60% -0.9 -0.13% -0.375   -0 0.167   
-10 0.7   0.39% 0.621      -0.21% -0.617   0 0.647   
-9 -0.78% -1.254   759   -0.13% -0.384   -0.0 -0.052   
-8 -0.44% -1.290$  -0.0 0.574   
-7 -0.4    -0.10% 0.663   0.15% 5% -0.529   
-6 1.325$  588   0.09% 0.281   0.464   
-5 0.3 -0.25% -0.729   0.340   
-4 -0 -0.95% -1.5 -0.28% -0.845   0.2 -0.645   
-3 - -0.66% -1. -0.65% -1.921*  -2.520@ 
-2 0.0 -0.04% -0.115   -0.040   
-1 1% -0.662   37$  0.35% 1.042   -0.1 -1.365$  
0 -0.  -1.03% -1.652*  - -0.263   0.11% 0.318   0.12% 0.45% -1.620$  
1 -0.57% -0.913    -0.30% -0.900   -0.08% 0.11% -0.378   
2 0.37% 0.597   -0.44% -1.316$  0.17% 0.53% -1.893*  
3 8% -0.923     -0.05% -0.143   -0 -0.651   
4 % 1.118   0.229   0.08% 0.240   -0 1.202   
5 0. -0.34% -0.5 0.58% 1.736*  - 0.573   
6 .38% -0.6 0.36% 1.077   -0 -0.762   
7 09% 0.13 -0.18% -0.531   -0.13% -0.42    0.23% 0.837   
8 -0.2    0.01% .13% 0.380   -0.08% -0.27    -0.19% -0.672   
9 -0.47% .43% 1.285$  -0.07% -0.22    -0.01% -0.018   
10 0.16% 0.252 0.13% 0.377   -0.04% -0.14    0.26% 0.926   
52   -0.43% -1.528$  
56   -0.19% -0.688   
3 -0.91% -2.118*  -0.88% -1.399$  -0.11% -0.197   0.02% 0.058   0.03% 0.112   0.49% 1.757*  
4 -0.28% -0.640   0.47% 0.755   0.06% 0.110   -0.19% -0.565   -0.01% -0.032   -0.35% -1.243   
15 0.71% 1.660*  0.91% 1.455$  -0.30% -0.539   0.22% 0.662   0.42% 1.356$  -0.24% -0.848   
16 -0.87% -2.028*  -0.23% -0.361   -0.38% -0.668   0.06% 0.185   0.10% 0.323   0.11% 0.382   
17 0.54% 1.262   0.19% 0.300   0.26% 0.459   -0.41% -1.229   0.09% 0.300   -0.29% -1.045   
18 -0.01% -0.027   -0.88% -1.403$  0.73% 1.299$  0.08% 0.252   -0.21% -0.699   0.18% 0.658   
19 -0.15% -0.348   -0.19% -0.308   -0.57% -1.015   -0.32% -0.938   -0.06% -0.210   -0.23% -0.811   
20 -0.42% -0.987   0.61% 0.978   0.12% 0.215   0.16% 0.461   -0.39% -1.260   -0.11% -0.382   
   (1) Terrorist Attack events
   (2) Department of Homeland Security Threat Elevation events
   (3) al-Qaida Warning events
over the period December 22, 1988 to August 10, 2006
(3) al-Qaida Warnings(2(1) Terrorist Attacks ) al-Qaida Warnings
The symbols $,*,@, and # denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, using a 1-tail test.
Note: The table above shows average daily abnormal returns aggregated for:
De
(1) Terrorist Attacks (2) Threat
6% 0.370 3$  -0.16% -0.285   
2   3   
% -0.319   -0.01%
.16% 0.368   
0.52% -1.219   
-0.18% -0.31
-0.12% -0.21
5% -0.826   0.06
3% -2.072*  0.44
-0.53% -1.242   
0.06% 0.136   
15   0.26% 0.452   
42   0.24% 0.433   
2% -1.386$  0.20
% 1.538$  0.050.
-0.58% -1.338$  -0
-
8   0.47 % 0.188
446   0.07% 0.213   0.00% 0.013   
# - -1.431$
0.00% 0.
0.30% 0.687   
0.52% 1.213   
2   0.29% 0.508   
9   0.27% 0.484   
0.07% -0.214   -0.40%
0.23% -0.760   0.21%9
348   0.28% 0.496   
54      
-0.20% -0.465   
0.0    
0.14% -0.463   -0.44%
3% 0.078
5% 1.751*
0.53% 0.934
-0.02% -0.028
.37% -1.220   0.05%
.26% 0.842   0.18%
0.01% 0.017   
-0.6 $  
-0.43% -0. 7% -0.236   -0.01%
9% 6%2% -1.438
9% -1.140
-0.705   -0.89% -1.578$  -0.43%
-0.162   -0.40% -0.704   0.22%
-0.286   0.1
0.495   -0.1
-0.18% -0.408   0.83%
0.30%  0.22%
-0.33% -0. 0.10% 0.338   0.13%
-0.40.692  
.21% -0.498   
54   0.75% 1.326$  
19$  0.43% 0.759   
0% -1.306$  0.09%
1% 0.700   -0.18%
0.47% -1.097   
0.28% -0.662   
049   0.33% 0.586   
02   0.11% 0.190   
0.19% 0.614   -0.70%
0.13% 0.425   -0.01%- 0.00%
0.55% 1.269   -0.4 0.76% 1.3 9% -0.608   -0.38%
73% -1.692* 
24% -0.557   
0.15%
0.81%
0.395   -
-0.259   --0.
-0.09% -0.214   
- -1.428$ 
  -0.24% -0.416 
0.542 
0.549   -
0.24% 0.566   -0.5
0.60% 1.407$  0.70
-0.31% -
0.13%
.22% -0.717   -0.18%
.40% -1.310$  0.34%
87% 2.019*  51   0.02% 0.038   0.44% -1.434$  0.16%
.09% -0.28    -0.21%0.23% 0.539   -0
0.75% 1.756*  0.
14   0.10% 0.185   
9   -0.39% -0.684   
3
5
8% -0.651
8% 0.416
0.014   0.71% 1.256   0
-0.749   0.25% 0.448   0
7
10.1    
-0.44% -1.014     -0.11% -0.190   6
11 -0.25% -0.588   -0.42% -0.672   1.86% 3.294# 0.16% 0.485   -0.02% -0.0
2 0.15% 0.340   1.10% 1.754*  0.39% 0.695   -0.01% -0.016   -0.02% -0.0
Airlines
) Threat Elevations (3
fense
 Elevations
1
1
1
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Table A-4: Daily Abnorma Airline Stocks and Terror Attacks 
-20 0.89% 0.976   -0.95% -0.700   0.00% -0.001   1.15% 0.919   0.20% 0.175   0.06% 0.057   -1.49% -1.340$  1.08% 0.682   0.47% 0.375   -0.49% -0.362   0.26% 0.099   -0.33% -0.1
-19 -0.82% -0.905   2.81% 2.084*  -0.18% -0.144   -0.72% -0.575   0.83% 0.712   -1.11% -0.992   0.52% 0.469   1.19% 0.749   0.51% 0.412   -0.83% -0.612   0.01% 0.005   -0.24% -0.0
-18 -0.11% -0.120   2.06% 1.524$  -0.83% -0.678   -1.09% -0.873   -1.38% -1.184   0.45% 0.405   1.20% 1.077   0.35% 0.219   -1.45% -1.163   -0.70% -0.521   -2.50% -0.955   -2.30% -0.8
-17 -0.46% -0.502   -0.69% -0.510   1.72% 1.396$  -2.33% -1.863*  -0.67% -0.577   0.64% 0.576   -1.94% -1.743*  2.23% 1.410$  -1.13% -0.905   -0.27% -0.198   -4.27% -1.630$  0.59% 0.2
-16 -0.37% -0.404   -0.23% -0.169   3.61% 2.936@ 0.32% 0.252   0.42% 0.358   -1.51% -1.358$  -2.13% -1.914*  0.02% 0.010   -0.70% -0.565   -0.49% -0.366   -0.62% -0.238   2.32% 0.8
-15 -0.02% -0.022   1.96% 1.451$  -2.57% -2.087*  -0.27% -0.219   0.44% 0.379   -0.58% -0.520   -1.16% -1.047   -1.31% -0.826   -1.21% -0.970   -0.84% -0.621   -0.20% -0.076   -0.45% -0.1
-14 -0.18% -0.200   0.35% 0.262   3.55% 2.887@ -0.25% -0.199   0.02% 0.013   -1.96% -1.763*  0.22% 0.200   -0.50% -0.315   -0.35% -0.281   -1.15% -0.850   2.49% 0.950   0.57% 0.2
-13 0.77% 0.844   -0.19% -0.140   2.72% 2.215*  0.06% 0.046   0.48% 0.417   1.57% 1.405$  -0.31% -0.281   0.75% 0.475   0.35% 0.285   -0.43% -0.318   1.10% 0.419   -2.39% -0.8
-12 -0.71% -0.778   0.12% 0.086   -0.03% -0.024   -0.49% -0.391   -1.14% -0.984   -0.20% -0.180   0.25% 0.226   0.06% 0.039   -0.32% -0.260   -2.47% -1.826*  0.03% 0.013   0.65% 0.2
-11 -0.02% -0.024   0.03% 0.019   -2.22% -1.803*  -0.26% -0.209   0.46% 0.392   -0.23% -0.209   -0.80% -0.720   -0.35% -0.224   -0.57% -0.460   0.80% 0.590   0.36% 0.137   5.05% 1.8
-10 -0.40% -0.442   -0.15% -0.110   5.42% 4.406# 0.98% 0.784   0.66% 0.564   -0.44% -0.396   -1.89% -1.698*  0.73% 0.459   0.46% 0.370   -0.99% -0.733   1.11% 0.423   2.11% 0.7
-9 0.30% 0.327   1.07% 0.795   -1.28% -1.039   0.60% 0.479   0.28% 0.244   0.56% 0.504   -1.32% -1.190   -0.19% -0.122   0.74% 0.597   0.45% 0.336   -1.07% -0.410   0.85% 0.3
-8 -1.10% -1.208   -1.52% -1.124   1.35% 1.096   -0.41% -0.331   -1.43% -1.232   -1.06% -0.951   -0.52% -0.472   -1.90% -1.199   -2.10% -1.691*  -0.67% -0.495   1.35% 0.514   0.82% 0.2
-7 -0.59% -0.651   -2.05% -1.520$  -0.51% -0.411   1.45% 1.158   -1.09% -0.938   -0.30% -0.272   -1.44% -1.295$  -0.55% -0.350   -0.16% -0.132   -0.43% -0.319   -1.31% -0.500   0.74% 0.2
-6 2.19% 2.404@ -1.32% -0.979   -1.27% -1.032   0.16% 0.131   -0.29% -0.254   -2.92% -2.620@ 2.36% 2.126*  0.11% 0.070   0.65% 0.522   -1.88% -1.391$  -1.12% -0.429   -1.07% -0.3
-5 1.38% 1.520$  -0.82% -0.607   4.41% 3.587# 1.79% 1.430$  -1.76% -1.514$  -1.01% -0.907   -1.38% -1.244   0.40% 0.255   -0.79% -0.637   0.52% 0.389   3.47% 1.324$  -2.53% -0.9
-4 1.01% 1.106   -0.48% -0.356   0.59% 0.481   -1.08% -0.863   -0.01% -0.005   -0.92% -0.828   -0.94% -0.846   0.25% 0.157   1.49% 1.199   -1.21% -0.899   -2.75% -1.052   0.39% 0.1
-3 0.18% 0.199   0.26% 0.195   0.80% 0.647   0.66% 0.527   -1.17% -1.010   -2.41% -2.165*  -2.08% -1.876*  0.65% 0.410   -0.85% -0.682   0.77% 0.572   0.68% 0.260   -1.22% -0.4
-2 1.37% 1.498$  -0.23% -0.167   -1.44% -1.168   -0.88% -0.701   0.41% 0.350   -0.90% -0.810   -0.41% -0.368   -1.02% -0.646   1.09% 0.876   -0.46% -0.339   0.87% 0.333   -1.99% -0.7
-1 0.24% 0.265   2.61% 1.931*  -0.29% -0.233   1.66% 1.327$  0.58% 0.501   2.26% 2.024*  -0.90% -0.807   -0.43% -0.273   -2.01% -1.611$  -1.09% -0.810   0.40% 0.154   2.78% 1.0
0 -0.41% -0.450   0.91% 0.677   2.16% 1.756*  -0.06% -0.045   -1.58% -1.362$  -1.30% -1.165   2.23% 2.011*  -0.37% -0.232   -1.95% -1.569$  -33.03% -24.455# -5.67% -2.168*  -2.68% -0.9
1 -0.15% -0.159   0.48% 0.353   -1.27% -1.034   -2.45% -1.958*  -0.67% -0.577   -0.82% -0.738   0.45% 0.406   0.46% 0.288   -1.13% -0.912   0.37% 0.270   2.38% 0.908   1.17% 0.4
2 -0.86% -0.940   2.01% 1.489$  2.36% 1.920*  -1.66% -1.329$  -2.01% -1.729*  -0.69% -0.620   -2.78% -2.506@ 1.11% 0.701   -0.16% -0.128   -3.58% -2.654@ 3.62% 1.381$  0.11% 0.0
3 -0.98% -1.074   -0.15% -0.109   -1.75% -1.426$  -0.29% -0.232   1.51% 1.295$  1.43% 1.284$  1.39% 1.248   -1.13% -0.715   -0.51% -0.413   -10.83% -8.020# 3.64% 1.392$  -0.70% -0.2
4 -0.61% -0.672   0.42% 0.312   4.45% 3.618# -0.08% -0.064   -0.24% -0.208   -2.28% -2.049*  -2.06% -1.856*  0.89% 0.561   -1.80% -1.444$  4.90% 3.626# 3.84% 1.467$  6.18% 2.2
5 -1.33% -1.457$  -0.91% -0.676   2.46% 2.001*  0.96% 0.772   -0.31% -0.271   -0.51% -0.454   -0.11% -0.097   1.48% 0.933   1.30% 1.044   4.76% 3.526# 6.73% 2.570@ 0.31% 0.1
6 1.65% 1.816*  -0.62% -0.459   2.04% 1.661*  -0.93% -0.745   -0.52% -0.444   0.43% 0.387   -0.42% -0.378   -0.74% -0.467   -0.19% -0.156   -1.91% -1.414$  -0.96% -0.366   2.94% 1.0
7 0.41% 0.453   1.37% 1.016   0.63% 0.512   2.31% 1.849*  0.41% 0.354   -0.72% -0.644   1.64% 1.474$  -0.78% -0.493   0.56% 0.449   -0.72% -0.534   0.40% 0.153   2.72% 0.9
8 0.66% 0.729   0.01% 0.007   0.75% 0.607   0.00% 0.003   -1.16% -0.993   -0.84% -0.752   -3.03% -2.729@ -0.64% -0.407   0.51% 0.407   -1.58% -1.173   1.71% 0.655   -0.15% -0.054
9 0.97% 1.069   0.53% 0.396   -0.83% -0.672   0.31% 0.247   -0.36% -0.310   1.00% 0.897   -1.25% -1.130   0.73% 0.459   0.01% 0.007   4.10% 3.033@ -0.36% -0.138   1.63% 0.587   
10 -0.56% -0.611   -0.53% -0.392   2.50% 2.035*  -1.65% -1.318$  -2.98% -2.563@ 0.08% 0.069   -2.61% -2.354@ -0.44% -0.280   2.70% 2.166*  1.27% 0.941   -0.15% -0.056   -0.42% -0.151   
11 -0.25% -0.271   0.59% 0.440   0.13% 0.104   0.07% 0.056   -1.14% -0.978   0.12% 0.104   -1.04% -0.940   -0.39% -0.246   2.20% 1.764*  5.64% 4.173# -2.32% -0.887   -0.46% -0.164   
12 -0.07% -0.077   -1.46% -1.083   -1.06% -0.861   0.84% 0.668   -0.99% -0.850   0.66% 0.589   1.02% 0.920   -0.90% -0.570   3.61% 2.896@ 3.98% 2.948@ 0.67% 0.255   -1.35% -0.488   
13 -0.14% -0.155   1.55% 1.146   -1.45% -1.178   -0.76% -0.605   -2.57% -2.213*  -0.97% -0.875   -3.17% -2.858@ -2.29% -1.451$  1.43% 1.148   -3.15% -2.334@ 2.22% 0.850   -2.04% -0.737   
14 -0.12% -0.131   0.44% 0.326   -0.53% -0.434   -0.91% -0.731   -0.98% -0.842   0.59% 0.532   -2.19% -1.975*  -0.67% -0.425   0.29% 0.233   -2.65% -1.963*  -0.48% -0.183   2.56% 0.922   
15 0.15% 0.164   1.15% 0.852   0.33% 0.267   0.39% 0.309   2.22% 1.907*  0.47% 0.419   1.22% 1.097   -1.08% -0.681   0.85% 0.686   -1.51% -1.121   0.67% 0.257   1.65% 0.595   
16 0.97% 1.070   -1.56% -1.157   1.35% 1.094   -0.59% -0.476   -1.31% -1.129   -0.91% -0.813   -1.73% -1.558$  1.24% 0.782   -2.43% -1.953*  -1.61% -1.192   -2.07% -0.793   -3.43% -1.237   
17 0.93% 1.025   5.20% 3.850# 1.34% 1.090   -0.64% -0.510   -0.92% -0.790   -0.80% -0.717   0.94% 0.846   -1.28% -0.808   0.86% 0.689   5.44% 4.026# 0.61% 0.234   2.37% 0.854   
18 -0.15% -0.169   0.23% 0.168   -0.52% -0.421   0.63% 0.502   -0.79% -0.677   -0.66% -0.590   -1.89% -1.701*  0.24% 0.152   -0.89% -0.712   3.74% 2.771@ 4.76% 1.821*  -0.04% -0.013   
19 -0.16% -0.179   0.02% 0.016   0.36% 0.296   -0.53% -0.422   1.32% 1.136   -0.60% -0.539   -5.11% -4.600# 0.25% 0.161   1.49% 1.195   -4.14% -3.064@ 1.77% 0.678   0.47% 0.170   
20 -0.91% -1.002   1.55% 1.147   -1.67% -1.358$  0.62% 0.497   -2.35% -2.024*  -1.31% -1.174   -0.64% -0.572   0.79% 0.501   -1.00% -0.804   0.13% 0.097   0.85% 0.325   0.94% 0.338   
12/24/200Date 
(τ)
The symbols $,*,@, and # denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, using a 1-tail test.
Note: This table shows daily abnormal returns (column a) and test statistics (column b) beginning 20 days before and extending 20 days after the event date, which is centered at τ = 0
11/1/1999 10/12/2000 9/17/2001 11/12/200111/13/1995 6/25/1996 7/18/1996 8/7/199812/22/1988 2/26/1993 4/19/1995
l Returns for 
(a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b)
18   
87   
28   
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62   
06   
62   
34   
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60   
07   
95   
66   
85   
13   
39   
41   
18   
01   
65   
21   
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54   
30*  
13   
58   
79   
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Table A-5: Daily Abnormal Returns for Airline Stocks and Threat Elevations 
(a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b)
-20 -6.19% -2.227*  -1.12% -0.536   -0.39% -0.185   -2.44% -1.062   2.54% 1.214   0.24% 0.139   1.75% 1.090   -0.50% -0.328   -0.24% -0.157   -3.43% -2.341@ 
-19 0.06% 0.023   -0.92% -0.440   0.45% 0.216   3.29% 1.431$  0.90% 0.430   -1.10% -0.638   0.01% 0.008   -0.73% -0.474   -1.44% -0.952   -2.17% -1.479$  
-18 -5.70% -2.051*  1.51% 0.727   -0.59% -0.282   1.32% 0.575   0.91% 0.432   -1.41% -0.818   -3.47% -2.170*  -1.44% -0.937   1.62% 1.068   0.44% 0.301   
-17 -2.12% -0.765   0.69% 0.333   0.29% 0.140   1.16% 0.505   -0.64% -0.307   0.08% 0.049   1.00% 0.624   -2.37% -1.542$  -0.90% -0.595   0.41% 0.282   
-16 4.42% 1.591$  1.08% 0.518   -0.90% -0.428   1.89% 0.823   1.49% 0.712   -0.81% -0.471   0.54% 0.339   -0.98% -0.634   -0.45% -0.299   1.84% 1.254   
-15 -2.45% -0.882   -0.59% -0.285   0.30% 0.142   -1.05% -0.456   -1.46% -0.696   -0.37% -0.213   -0.54% -0.339   -0.31% -0.203   -1.73% -1.137   -1.91% -1.305$  
-14 1.89% 0.681   -0.37% -0.178   -1.42% -0.675   3.02% 1.314$  -2.47% -1.176   -1.15% -0.666   -0.06% -0.035   -2.63% -1.710*  0.17% 0.115   -1.01% -0.690   
-13 6.22% 2.239*  -1.45% -0.699   0.31% 0.149   1.88% 0.817   -2.63% -1.256   -1.52% -0.881   0.33% 0.209   -2.10% -1.366$  -2.80% -1.844*  0.69% 0.470   
-12 3.75% 1.350$  -4.80% -2.304*  -1.99% -0.947   9.13% 3.968# -3.03% -1.447$  -1.07% -0.621   0.34% 0.214   0.34% 0.221   0.15% 0.098   -0.47% -0.323   
-11 -0.65% -0.234   1.51% 0.727   -1.66% -0.792   1.67% 0.724   -3.68% -1.755*  0.15% 0.088   -0.96% -0.599   -2.23% -1.447$  0.75% 0.491   -0.85% -0.579   
-10 -0.74% -0.265   0.18% 0.085   4.76% 2.265*  0.95% 0.414   -0.39% -0.188   -0.25% -0.146   -0.15% -0.096   0.02% 0.013   -0.04% -0.026   -0.55% -0.375   
-9 -0.02% -0.007   -1.04% -0.502   -1.79% -0.853   -3.16% -1.373$  -2.12% -1.013   0.10% 0.060   -0.56% -0.350   0.90% 0.586   -1.01% -0.665   0.81% 0.552   
-8 -1.09% -0.393   1.41% 0.675   0.65% 0.309   -0.46% -0.200   -1.51% -0.720   -1.20% -0.698   1.96% 1.224   -1.35% -0.877   -0.90% -0.595   -2.32% -1.582$  
-7 0.66% 0.236   -1.14% -0.545   0.34% 0.163   0.47% 0.205   2.91% 1.390$  0.17% 0.100   0.80% 0.499   -1.11% -0.722   -2.45% -1.614$  -1.73% -1.180   
-6 -0.11% -0.038   -0.46% -0.219   1.40% 0.665   0.18% 0.078   2.10% 1.000   1.73% 1.005   0.15% 0.095   0.43% 0.281   2.98% 1.963*  -0.17% -0.119   
-5 3.15% 1.134   -2.21% -1.061   -0.63% -0.300   0.21% 0.091   -1.29% -0.618   0.15% 0.089   -0.50% -0.313   -0.23% -0.146   0.79% 0.522   3.20% 2.182*  
-4 0.75% 0.269   -2.98% -1.433$  -4.96% -2.359@ -0.43% -0.186   0.44% 0.208   1.29% 0.747   0.04% 0.027   -2.06% -1.336$  -0.84% -0.551   -0.61% -0.417   
-3 -2.91% -1.047   0.63% 0.304   -1.13% -0.540   -1.24% -0.539   -0.81% -0.389   1.09% 0.634   -0.60% -0.376   -0.23% -0.147   0.00% -0.002   -1.56% -1.063   
-2 0.11% 0.041   2.75% 1.323$  -1.98% -0.940   -0.48% -0.209   -0.18% -0.086   -0.17% -0.101   -0.83% -0.517   2.76% 1.791*  -2.09% -1.379$  -0.02% -0.011   
-1 -2.02% -0.729   1.46% 0.699   2.57% 1.224   -1.28% -0.556   -1.05% -0.500   -0.06% -0.037   -1.54% -0.962   -1.09% -0.711   0.94% 0.618   -2.33% -1.591$  
0 -1.28% -0.461   -1.15% -0.550   0.08% 0.038   -1.36% -0.591   -1.58% -0.755   0.20% 0.118   -2.47% -1.544$  -2.35% -1.527$  -0.90% -0.592   0.83% 0.566   
1 0.30% 0.107   -0.19% -0.093   0.72% 0.342   -1.19% -0.519   1.72% 0.820   -1.38% -0.801   -1.08% -0.672   -1.92% -1.245   1.02% 0.672   -4.06% -2.764@ 
2 0.98% 0.352   0.05% 0.024   0.25% 0.118   2.13% 0.926   -0.86% -0.411   -1.13% -0.657   -0.41% -0.257   1.43% 0.930   0.54% 0.357   0.85% 0.576   
3 -2.50% -0.901   1.11% 0.533   -0.75% -0.357   2.31% 1.002   0.07% 0.033   -1.48% -0.861   -2.73% -1.706*  0.21% 0.135   -1.81% -1.194   0.17% 0.115   
4 -2.28% -0.822   -5.09% -2.447@ 11.00% 5.238# 0.30% 0.129   -0.99% -0.473   2.55% 1.479$  -2.20% -1.375$  0.09% 0.056   2.11% 1.391$  1.75% 1.194   
5 0.84% 0.302   -0.44% -0.210   -2.65% -1.262   -1.51% -0.657   -0.18% -0.085   -1.48% -0.862   0.24% 0.151   -1.60% -1.038   3.16% 2.085*  0.10% 0.070   
6 -3.33% -1.197   0.40% 0.194   2.90% 1.380$  1.14% 0.494   -1.13% -0.540   0.64% 0.369   -2.33% -1.452$  0.18% 0.115   -0.90% -0.592   -1.28% -0.870   
7 0.86% 0.309   -0.67% -0.323   -0.57% -0.273   -1.74% -0.758   1.49% 0.710   -1.10% -0.636   -0.08% -0.049   2.48% 1.614$  1.33% 0.878   -1.54% -1.050   
8 -2.70% -0.971   0.21% 0.101   -3.57% -1.700*  2.92% 1.270   -2.42% -1.155   1.96% 1.136   0.80% 0.501   0.55% 0.355   1.50% 0.987   0.72% 0.489   
9 -3.28% -1.181   -0.96% -0.460   -1.55% -0.736   -0.34% -0.150   2.58% 1.232   -0.02% -0.014   -1.45% -0.904   -1.90% -1.238   1.70% 1.117   0.98% 0.667   
10 -2.37% -0.854   0.20% 0.098   3.50% 1.665*  3.92% 1.704*  1.19% 0.568   -3.68% -2.138*  -1.21% -0.756   2.16% 1.402$  -0.61% -0.399   -1.38% -0.938   
11 -2.06% -0.741   -1.48% -0.712   2.52% 1.200   2.52% 1.093   -4.50% -2.147*  1.06% 0.618   0.33% 0.208   -0.24% -0.153   -1.79% -1.179   -0.56% -0.381   
12 4.15% 1.493$  0.22% 0.108   3.65% 1.735*  -0.04% -0.016   -1.72% -0.821   0.65% 0.379   -0.32% -0.202   2.25% 1.460$  0.18% 0.118   2.05% 1.399$  
13 -2.42% -0.871   -2.05% -0.984   1.83% 0.871   -1.48% -0.642   -1.34% -0.640   -0.65% -0.378   -2.16% -1.346$  -2.16% -1.401$  1.03% 0.677   1.31% 0.891   
14 2.66% 0.959   -1.73% -0.832   2.32% 1.103   -0.07% -0.031   -0.07% -0.035   -0.03% -0.019   -0.32% -0.203   1.25% 0.814   -0.54% -0.353   1.55% 1.059   
15 -3.06% -1.101   4.68% 2.247*  5.81% 2.768@ -1.60% -0.697   -0.18% -0.086   0.17% 0.100   2.66% 1.660*  1.30% 0.843   -0.49% -0.325   -0.12% -0.083   
16 2.98% 1.071   -1.88% -0.903   -4.04% -1.924*  0.02% 0.010   -1.10% -0.527   0.39% 0.225   -1.19% -0.745   1.53% 0.997   1.72% 1.136   -1.30% -0.885   
17 0.69% 0.250   0.59% 0.282   1.69% 0.807   1.22% 0.530   0.13% 0.063   -1.08% -0.628   -2.45% -1.529$  -0.31% -0.205   0.74% 0.490   1.15% 0.785   
18 -0.22% -0.080   0.26% 0.124   -2.72% -1.295$  -0.25% -0.108   -0.17% -0.079   -0.04% -0.022   -2.01% -1.258   0.48% 0.313   -2.23% -1.469$  -2.22% -1.510$  
19 -1.21% -0.435   1.33% 0.640   -1.22% -0.582   1.73% 0.754   1.54% 0.734   -0.65% -0.376   1.33% 0.832   -3.27% -2.122*  -1.12% -0.737   -0.26% -0.175   
20 -2.40% -0.863   -0.73% -0.351   0.53% 0.255   4.00% 1.740*  3.61% 1.723*  2.15% 1.250   0.11% 0.069   0.93% 0.606   -0.84% -0.556   -1.21% -0.822   
Note: This table shows daily abnormal returns (column a) and test statistics (column b) beginning 20 days before and extending 20 days after the event date, which is centered at τ = 0
The symbols $,*,@, and # denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, using a 1-tail test.
8/2/2004 7/7/2005 8/10/20065/20/2003 12/22/2003 5/26/2004 7/8/2004Date 
(τ)
9/10/2002 2/7/2003 3/17/2003
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Table A-6: Daily Abnormal Returns for Airline Stocks and al-Qaida Messages 
(a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b)
-20 3.71% 1.357$  -2.00% -0.694   0.71% 0.344   -0.64% -0.316   -1.20% -0.502   -2.94% -1.421$  0.81% 0.405   0.51% 0.279   0.52% 0.348   -1.31% -0.813   -0.32% -0.197   0.09% 0.068   
-19 3.87% 1.416$  -1.26% -0.438   1.09% 0.525   -5.16% -2.541@ 1.86% 0.773   -3.52% -1.700*  -1.07% -0.535   -0.89% -0.484   1.78% 1.183   0.36% 0.221   1.32% 0.821   -0.72% -0.554   
-18 4.47% 1.635$  0.30% 0.103   -0.58% -0.277   -0.82% -0.402   0.48% 0.201   -0.49% -0.234   0.72% 0.358   -2.53% -1.374$  -2.74% -1.817*  -1.27% -0.789   0.89% 0.552   0.32% 0.247   
-17 6.12% 2.239*  0.92% 0.320   -0.36% -0.172   -1.62% -0.797   -0.65% -0.273   -1.92% -0.925   -1.32% -0.660   -0.05% -0.028   0.67% 0.448   -0.99% -0.611   1.44% 0.893   0.67% 0.519   
-16 -0.47% -0.172   -2.50% -0.865   -1.44% -0.695   2.92% 1.439$  0.57% 0.237   -1.49% -0.717   0.77% 0.384   1.10% 0.598   -1.85% -1.228   1.56% 0.968   2.95% 1.835*  1.23% 0.945   
-15 0.12% 0.043   -2.28% -0.791   -4.78% -2.303*  0.32% 0.157   1.42% 0.591   2.79% 1.347$  -0.43% -0.214   -1.31% -0.709   1.06% 0.706   1.21% 0.751   0.01% 0.007   2.37% 1.827*  
-14 2.15% 0.785   0.80% 0.276   1.54% 0.741   0.93% 0.459   0.39% 0.164   2.17% 1.048   1.55% 0.775   -1.77% -0.963   -0.85% -0.563   -0.31% -0.193   -2.35% -1.459$  -0.88% -0.678   
-13 -0.23% -0.085   -3.34% -1.156   0.18% 0.088   0.35% 0.172   1.63% 0.679   -1.24% -0.600   2.51% 1.253   -1.51% -0.820   1.57% 1.041   1.32% 0.821   1.03% 0.640   1.15% 0.889   
-12 -0.21% -0.075   0.79% 0.275   -1.03% -0.497   -0.50% -0.248   -0.05% -0.023   0.40% 0.194   -0.49% -0.243   2.13% 1.155   2.43% 1.617$  0.89% 0.553   -1.07% -0.663   -0.17% -0.128   
-11 -2.31% -0.845   -2.69% -0.933   1.43% 0.689   11.45% 5.644# -1.63% -0.681   -0.82% -0.396   -1.89% -0.944   2.42% 1.313$  3.83% 2.543@ 1.45% 0.897   -1.63% -1.014   -3.62% -2.790@ 
-10 0.71% 0.258   -3.31% -1.147   -1.11% -0.536   -2.95% -1.453$  0.78% 0.325   -0.12% -0.057   2.15% 1.076   0.15% 0.080   -2.25% -1.494$  2.96% 1.831*  1.21% 0.751   1.72% 1.324$  
-9 2.39% 0.873   -2.41% -0.835   -0.45% -0.215   3.05% 1.501$  0.00% 0.000   -0.91% -0.437   -0.01% -0.006   -2.10% -1.140   -2.51% -1.666*  0.02% 0.010   -1.85% -1.153   0.21% 0.160   
-8 -0.42% -0.153   -2.00% -0.695   -2.18% -1.052   -0.57% -0.280   0.63% 0.261   -1.65% -0.799   1.43% 0.716   -0.34% -0.184   -2.30% -1.526$  -2.34% -1.450$  0.14% 0.085   -0.91% -0.704   
-7 0.70% 0.255   4.19% 1.451$  -2.96% -1.426$  -3.76% -1.855*  0.49% 0.205   1.80% 0.871   -0.74% -0.368   -0.53% -0.288   -3.87% -2.569@ 1.03% 0.638   -0.50% -0.314   -0.80% -0.618   
-6 -2.23% -0.815   -2.49% -0.863   0.65% 0.311   -1.73% -0.852   1.21% 0.506   -0.81% -0.390   0.69% 0.347   0.19% 0.105   2.46% 1.633$  -1.06% -0.656   -0.29% -0.178   -0.88% -0.680   
-5 0.70% 0.257   2.63% 0.912   2.77% 1.334$  3.63% 1.787*  2.87% 1.197   0.04% 0.019   0.53% 0.265   -1.15% -0.625   1.64% 1.088   -1.62% -1.006   0.53% 0.328   -3.92% -3.017@ 
-4 5.08% 1.860*  -2.97% -1.030   1.47% 0.708   3.11% 1.534$  -0.45% -0.188   -1.00% -0.481   -0.90% -0.449   -1.46% -0.794   2.81% 1.867*  1.21% 0.751   -0.95% -0.591   -0.91% -0.699   
-3 2.10% 0.770   2.92% 1.014   -1.13% -0.545   4.30% 2.118*  1.81% 0.753   -0.16% -0.076   -2.56% -1.280   0.02% 0.012   -1.01% -0.669   -1.84% -1.143   0.66% 0.408   -0.76% -0.587   
-2 0.91% 0.332   0.67% 0.232   -0.17% -0.083   1.86% 0.918   0.11% 0.047   -1.05% -0.506   -0.01% -0.005   -0.87% -0.472   2.01% 1.336$  0.14% 0.089   1.96% 1.220   -4.96% -3.820#
-1 0.89% 0.324   -0.27% -0.094   0.07% 0.031   2.35% 1.157   -1.17% -0.489   1.35% 0.650   1.10% 0.549   -0.43% -0.231   3.18% 2.111*  -0.50% -0.309   -0.59% -0.370   3.46% 2.661@ 
0 0.74% 0.269   -1.25% -0.433   1.12% 0.541   5.84% 2.880@ -0.28% -0.116   -2.18% -1.050   -1.32% -0.658   -1.20% -0.651   -3.34% -2.221*  -0.28% -0.174   1.66% 1.033   -0.62% -0.479   
1 -0.99% -0.361   -2.36% -0.818   -5.08% -2.444@ -4.01% -1.977*  1.47% 0.613   2.43% 1.173   -1.80% -0.901   -1.57% -0.850   2.19% 1.455$  0.53% 0.329   -0.24% -0.152   -0.59% -0.452   
2 -2.42% -0.886   -5.15% -1.784*  -0.41% -0.196   1.73% 0.853   1.16% 0.482   1.02% 0.491   -1.52% -0.762   -1.12% -0.607   3.89% 2.586@ -0.95% -0.586   0.22% 0.140   0.95% 0.733   
3 0.49% 0.178   -2.29% -0.795   0.43% 0.208   -2.69% -1.327$  1.59% 0.661   -4.61% -2.226*  2.17% 1.088   0.09% 0.048   -2.97% -1.970*  0.67% 0.412   0.77% 0.480   3.19% 2.457@ 
4 -1.13% -0.413   0.92% 0.319   -0.66% -0.316   -1.19% -0.587   -0.52% -0.215   -1.51% -0.728   2.39% 1.196   -0.31% -0.168   1.24% 0.826   1.97% 1.219   -0.44% -0.274   0.56% 0.430   
5 -1.96% -0.716   -0.66% -0.230   0.23% 0.108   0.56% 0.274   1.03% 0.428   -1.36% -0.657   0.09% 0.043   0.05% 0.025   0.97% 0.642   -0.59% -0.365   3.25% 2.021*  -1.45% -1.116   
6 2.86% 1.047   4.57% 1.584$  -0.93% -0.448   2.42% 1.191   -1.33% -0.553   -0.03% -0.013   -2.11% -1.056   -1.26% -0.683   0.50% 0.330   1.66% 1.031   -3.07% -1.910*  -2.22% -1.706*  
7 -2.61% -0.955   -1.84% -0.638   0.22% 0.104   2.52% 1.241   -0.97% -0.406   0.12% 0.058   -0.33% -0.166   0.12% 0.067   1.31% 0.872   -0.24% -0.146   -3.74% -2.324*  1.32% 1.015   
8 1.25% 0.459   4.87% 1.688*  -1.46% -0.703   7.33% 3.615# 0.32% 0.133   -0.97% -0.467   -0.55% -0.274   1.67% 0.906   -3.59% -2.387@ 0.23% 0.143   -1.75% -1.090   1.61% 1.236   
9 0.20% 0.074   0.41% 0.143   0.24% 0.115   -0.12% -0.060   1.28% 0.532   0.09% 0.044   0.23% 0.118   0.10% 0.054   1.46% 0.971   0.78% 0.482   -0.04% -0.026   -1.88% -1.448$  
10 -0.62% -0.227   4.43% 1.536$  -2.02% -0.975   -2.18% -1.073   0.36% 0.150   -0.17% -0.082   -1.13% -0.566   1.23% 0.668   -1.67% -1.108   -0.43% -0.270   -1.76% -1.097   3.08% 2.372@ 
11 6.20% 2.269*  4.05% 1.402$  -1.71% -0.824   3.46% 1.707*  -2.22% -0.925   1.64% 0.791   -1.45% -0.725   1.03% 0.561   5.52% 3.668# 3.25% 2.015*  2.08% 1.295$  0.10% 0.077   
12 0.41% 0.149   3.78% 1.310$  4.69% 2.260*  1.37% 0.677   -3.15% -1.311$  3.50% 1.689*  -0.02% -0.011   -0.23% -0.125   0.11% 0.074   -3.07% -1.903*  -1.71% -1.063   -1.37% -1.052   
13 3.04% 1.114   2.42% 0.838   -1.87% -0.900   1.17% 0.577   -1.01% -0.420   0.68% 0.328   -0.88% -0.443   -0.13% -0.072   -1.24% -0.825   -3.73% -2.313*  -0.16% -0.097   0.48% 0.371   
14 2.81% 1.028   -0.87% -0.303   0.61% 0.294   2.13% 1.051   0.44% 0.182   -3.29% -1.589$  -0.44% -0.220   0.15% 0.079   0.43% 0.287   -1.75% -1.082   -0.21% -0.129   1.00% 0.770   
15 -0.11% -0.040   -0.17% -0.059   0.27% 0.132   -0.92% -0.451   -1.37% -0.572   2.02% 0.973   -1.18% -0.592   -1.44% -0.782   -1.18% -0.782   -0.04% -0.023   -0.09% -0.054   0.60% 0.458   
16 1.68% 0.615   -1.03% -0.359   1.36% 0.653   3.13% 1.541$  0.62% 0.259   -2.50% -1.208   -1.52% -0.762   -1.19% -0.645   -0.92% -0.609   -1.76% -1.089   -1.20% -0.744   -1.08% -0.830   
17 -0.37% -0.136   0.25% 0.087   -0.72% -0.349   1.98% 0.978   1.55% 0.644   -0.04% -0.020   -1.09% -0.544   -1.54% -0.836   1.64% 1.090   2.09% 1.292$  -0.43% -0.265   -0.10% -0.079   
18 -0.38% -0.140   1.78% 0.619   -5.02% -2.418@ 9.35% 4.607# 2.49% 1.037   -2.68% -1.293$  0.05% 0.026   2.49% 1.352$  1.28% 0.853   -1.70% -1.054   -1.04% -0.645   3.05% 2.349@ 
19 -1.33% -0.486   0.55% 0.191   -1.18% -0.569   1.75% 0.861   0.14% 0.059   -3.10% -1.495$  -0.32% -0.162   -1.54% -0.833   -0.23% -0.155   -0.15% -0.096   -2.34% -1.458$  1.31% 1.008   
20 -2.01% -0.734   3.73% 1.294$  -1.97% -0.951   1.12% 0.553   0.03% 0.012   -2.41% -1.164   0.04% 0.020   0.57% 0.312   1.41% 0.936   -0.20% -0.123   2.60% 1.614$  -1.68% -1.296$  
12/27/2004 1/19/2006
The symbols $,*,@, and # denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, using a 1-tail test.
Note: This table shows daily abnormal returns (column a) and test statistics (column b) beginning 20 days before and extending 20 days after the event date, which is centered at τ = 0
4/15/2004 5/6/2004 10/29/2004 12/16/2004Date 
(τ)
12/13/2001 10/7/2002 2/12/2003 4/7/2003 9/10/2003 1/5/2004
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Table A-7: Daily Abnormal Returns for Defense Stocks and Terror Attacks 
(a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b)
-20 -0.71% -0.705   -1.45% -1.404$  -0.05% -0.056   0.47% 0.606   1.04% 1.538$  -0.89% -1.307$  -0.40% -0.556   0.41% 0.408   1.28% 0.945   -0.43% -0.420   1.76% 1.223   -0.16% -0.107   
-19 -0.73% -0.721   0.08% 0.078   -0.58% -0.661   0.57% 0.739   0.92% 1.359$  -1.03% -1.509$  -0.38% -0.525   -1.07% -1.075   -0.82% -0.606   -0.51% -0.493   0.11% 0.080   -0.40% -0.267   
-18 -0.15% -0.149   -0.16% -0.151   0.17% 0.191   -0.50% -0.644   0.69% 1.021   -0.14% -0.207   -0.51% -0.699   -0.67% -0.669   0.27% 0.202   -0.59% -0.575   -2.53% -1.762*  0.48% 0.325   
-17 -0.85% -0.841   1.29% 1.250   -0.22% -0.252   -0.52% -0.667   0.91% 1.342$  0.02% 0.032   0.39% 0.535   0.31% 0.315   -1.28% -0.944   0.60% 0.586   -0.76% -0.526   -0.09% -0.058   
-16 0.47% 0.461   -0.93% -0.896   -0.66% -0.749   1.33% 1.714*  -1.04% -1.533$  0.41% 0.598   -0.65% -0.900   -1.15% -1.156   -0.10% -0.075   -0.06% -0.057   1.86% 1.297$  0.63% 0.424   
-15 -0.17% -0.170   0.78% 0.751   0.62% 0.706   -0.38% -0.483   0.61% 0.903   -0.42% -0.624   -1.06% -1.456$  0.05% 0.049   0.65% 0.476   -0.34% -0.333   -1.74% -1.210   -0.16% -0.110   
-14 -0.50% -0.492   -0.80% -0.770   0.51% 0.583   -0.52% -0.672   1.09% 1.605$  -1.82% -2.681@ 0.15% 0.208   -8.23% -8.272# 0.19% 0.139   0.31% 0.305   -2.25% -1.567$  0.29% 0.198   
-13 0.66% 0.657   -0.89% -0.863   1.02% 1.168   -1.81% -2.324*  -1.00% -1.481$  1.02% 1.497$  -0.08% -0.113   -2.16% -2.173*  0.29% 0.217   -1.04% -1.007   0.90% 0.629   -0.32% -0.215   
-12 -0.31% -0.303   2.26% 2.187*  2.72% 3.112# 0.27% 0.346   0.11% 0.165   -0.43% -0.626   -0.53% -0.726   1.07% 1.076   0.89% 0.656   0.78% 0.760   2.08% 1.445$  -0.61% -0.414   
-11 -0.58% -0.571   -0.83% -0.803   -0.30% -0.346   -1.08% -1.394$  -0.34% -0.501   2.17% 3.187# -1.52% -2.101*  -0.35% -0.349   0.67% 0.496   -0.21% -0.207   0.86% 0.598   -0.30% -0.200   
-10 -0.98% -0.971   -0.19% -0.187   -2.91% -3.330# -0.32% -0.410   0.10% 0.146   0.72% 1.053   -0.52% -0.719   0.99% 0.994   0.96% 0.707   0.88% 0.859   0.15% 0.105   -0.70% -0.472   
-9 -0.69% -0.687   0.09% 0.084   -0.07% -0.074   0.73% 0.943   -0.02% -0.023   -1.11% -1.638$  -1.75% -2.418@ -1.57% -1.583$  3.47% 2.555@ -0.27% -0.264   -1.21% -0.839   0.55% 0.372   
-8 -0.34% -0.339   -1.08% -1.044   1.19% 1.362$  -0.82% -1.055   0.38% 0.556   -1.06% -1.553$  -1.12% -1.550$  -1.15% -1.154   -2.79% -2.050*  0.37% 0.358   1.25% 0.870   0.60% 0.408   
-7 -0.39% -0.381   -0.47% -0.450   0.49% 0.562   -0.18% -0.238   0.57% 0.837   0.28% 0.414   -0.47% -0.654   0.33% 0.333   2.16% 1.591$  -0.78% -0.758   -0.29% -0.204   0.16% 0.110   
-6 -0.17% -0.164   -2.24% -2.167*  0.06% 0.063   1.10% 1.420$  -0.22% -0.328   -1.30% -1.915*  0.27% 0.369   0.14% 0.143   0.13% 0.096   0.33% 0.317   1.99% 1.384$  0.46% 0.310   
-5 0.67% 0.659   0.28% 0.268   0.75% 0.859   0.18% 0.227   -0.95% -1.404$  -1.58% -2.321*  0.29% 0.405   -0.57% -0.568   -0.93% -0.682   0.72% 0.696   0.13% 0.093   -0.63% -0.423   
-4 -0.97% -0.965   -0.34% -0.326   -0.42% -0.478   -0.44% -0.563   -0.86% -1.272   -0.62% -0.908   -0.69% -0.948   1.84% 1.854*  -0.92% -0.675   -0.95% -0.923   -0.49% -0.341   0.30% 0.204   
-3 -1.58% -1.560$  -0.03% -0.028   -0.47% -0.542   -0.17% -0.223   -1.00% -1.476$  -0.93% -1.367$  -0.57% -0.788   -0.31% -0.311   0.22% 0.164   -0.93% -0.898   -1.03% -0.718   -1.31% -0.887   
-2 0.14% 0.135   0.60% 0.581   1.91% 2.184*  -0.13% -0.171   -0.11% -0.169   -1.29% -1.899*  -0.69% -0.951   0.20% 0.199   0.72% 0.531   -0.67% -0.651   -0.80% -0.555   -0.59% -0.397   
-1 -0.02% -0.023   1.58% 1.529$  -1.27% -1.451$  -0.16% -0.210   0.05% 0.074   2.52% 3.702# -0.42% -0.577   -1.64% -1.649*  1.16% 0.856   -1.29% -1.249   1.51% 1.052   0.53% 0.360   
0 -0.53% -0.528   0.38% 0.371   -0.32% -0.361   -0.36% -0.462   0.44% 0.644   0.57% 0.845   1.47% 2.023*  -1.71% -1.717*  0.80% 0.588   15.55% 15.087# -0.61% -0.422   0.82% 0.555   
1 1.67% 1.655*  0.16% 0.156   -1.47% -1.684*  -0.01% -0.012   -0.39% -0.584   -0.31% -0.456   -0.98% -1.354$  1.56% 1.569$  1.52% 1.121   -1.52% -1.473$  -4.08% -2.839@ -0.15% -0.101   
2 -0.20% -0.202   1.18% 1.140   -0.22% -0.247   -0.80% -1.036   -1.80% -2.657@ -0.21% -0.315   -1.00% -1.378$  -1.05% -1.052   -0.77% -0.570   -2.37% -2.300*  -0.75% -0.522   0.84% 0.567   
3 -0.19% -0.186   -0.91% -0.877   0.29% 0.332   0.69% 0.885   1.05% 1.547$  -1.70% -2.503@ 1.35% 1.866*  -0.72% -0.724   -1.66% -1.221   0.09% 0.083   -0.17% -0.120   1.14% 0.771   
4 0.52% 0.515   -0.25% -0.241   0.45% 0.514   0.15% 0.197   -0.40% -0.590   -1.11% -1.634$  -1.01% -1.392$  -0.23% -0.232   -0.29% -0.217   1.09% 1.058   1.55% 1.080   1.18% 0.797   
5 1.50% 1.481$  1.42% 1.372$  0.78% 0.889   -0.68% -0.878   2.20% 3.249# 0.46% 0.677   0.48% 0.662   -0.23% -0.229   0.79% 0.584   -0.19% -0.187   1.91% 1.329$  -1.48% -1.001   
6 0.81% 0.800   -0.92% -0.892   -0.39% -0.446   0.24% 0.311   0.75% 1.102   0.01% 0.021   -0.68% -0.931   0.70% 0.707   0.79% 0.584   -1.03% -1.000   0.74% 0.518   1.53% 1.030   
7 0.53% 0.528   -0.30% -0.287   -0.16% -0.184   -0.79% -1.016   -1.08% -1.598$  -0.09% -0.131   0.30% 0.416   -0.03% -0.030   1.50% 1.104   -0.33% -0.321   -0.93% -0.647   -0.77% -0.520   
8 0.04% 0.042   0.48% 0.462   0.20% 0.226   0.46% 0.587   -1.03% -1.518$  0.12% 0.182   0.34% 0.468   0.66% 0.662   -0.10% -0.073   1.25% 1.209   0.18% 0.127   0.01% 0.004   
9 0.12% 0.120   0.97% 0.934   -0.47% -0.538   -0.51% -0.661   0.31% 0.458   0.60% 0.887   0.76% 1.055   1.07% 1.074   1.34% 0.985   0.28% 0.269   -0.26% -0.182   0.62% 0.418   
10 0.16% 0.161   -0.82% -0.795   -0.04% -0.041   1.08% 1.392$  -1.27% -1.885*  -0.34% -0.504   -1.18% -1.629$  2.18% 2.190*  0.70% 0.515   -0.26% -0.256   -0.49% -0.340   1.02% 0.690   
11 -0.06% -0.061   0.37% 0.357   -0.14% -0.158   1.12% 1.447$  -1.55% -2.288*  1.21% 1.775*  -0.45% -0.618   0.16% 0.159   -0.09% -0.063   1.29% 1.255   0.77% 0.536   0.35% 0.235   
12 -0.73% -0.720   -0.73% -0.707   0.31% 0.357   0.86% 1.109   -0.59% -0.871   0.29% 0.427   -0.01% -0.017   1.67% 1.676*  0.07% 0.055   2.57% 2.498@ -0.02% -0.015   -1.28% -0.865   
13 -0.28% -0.277   0.10% 0.092   1.90% 2.169*  -0.91% -1.175   -0.90% -1.325$  0.85% 1.247   -2.22% -3.062@ 0.81% 0.816   1.21% 0.887   -0.50% -0.489   0.76% 0.529   -0.98% -0.662   
14 0.91% 0.904   0.77% 0.746   -0.27% -0.314   -0.48% -0.616   -1.26% -1.868*  0.10% 0.148   -2.70% -3.728# 1.68% 1.690*  -0.66% -0.489   0.44% 0.430   -0.12% -0.082   0.28% 0.190   
15 0.07% 0.066   -1.43% -1.384$  0.12% 0.134   -0.16% -0.210   2.54% 3.764# 0.97% 1.429$  0.68% 0.937   -0.40% -0.403   0.39% 0.285   2.79% 2.708@ 0.18% 0.128   -0.45% -0.304   
16 1.92% 1.901*  -0.23% -0.219   -0.45% -0.519   -0.86% -1.103   0.60% 0.887   -0.78% -1.143   0.04% 0.061   0.79% 0.792   -0.92% -0.679   -0.43% -0.414   -0.43% -0.298   1.21% 0.816   
17 -1.81% -1.796*  0.23% 0.220   -0.50% -0.566   0.15% 0.194   -0.28% -0.414   -0.30% -0.437   -1.22% -1.677*  -1.39% -1.394$  0.45% 0.333   -1.78% -1.728*  -0.65% -0.455   0.42% 0.287   
18 0.23% 0.232   1.11% 1.073   0.86% 0.983   0.15% 0.190   -0.18% -0.272   0.04% 0.065   0.83% 1.148   -0.09% -0.090   -2.04% -1.500$  -2.15% -2.082*  -0.32% -0.225   0.62% 0.419   
19 -0.24% -0.242   0.87% 0.839   0.66% 0.757   -1.89% -2.431@ -1.67% -2.473@ -0.07% -0.104   -0.62% -0.856   -0.72% -0.728   0.28% 0.206   -0.46% -0.445   -0.77% -0.533   0.64% 0.430   
20 -1.23% -1.220   -0.91% -0.882   0.50% 0.577   0.05% 0.065   -1.08% -1.602$  -0.09% -0.138   -1.10% -1.512$  0.11% 0.106   0.35% 0.254   1.83% 1.773*  0.40% 0.275   3.43% 2.316*  
7/18/1996 8/7/199812/22/1988 2/26/1993 4/19/1995 12/24/2001Date 
(τ)
The symbols $,*,@, and # denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, using a 1-tail test.
Note: This table shows daily abnormal returns (column a) and test statistics (column b) beginning 20 days before and extending 20 days after the event date, which is centered at τ = 0
11/1/1999 10/12/2000 9/17/2001 11/12/200111/13/1995 6/25/1996
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Table A-8: Daily Abnormal Returns for Defense Stocks and Threat Elevations 
(a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b)
-20 -0.54% -0.363   -0.52% -0.438   -1.45% -1.224   1.67% 1.429$  0.31% 0.366   -0.23% -0.294   0.58% 0.763   -0.22% -0.280   -0.57% -0.717   -0.05% -0.087   
-19 -2.75% -1.836*  1.16% 0.970   -1.77% -1.501$  0.34% 0.287   0.61% 0.715   0.28% 0.366   -0.13% -0.170   0.01% 0.018   0.24% 0.307   -0.51% -0.819   
-18 -1.60% -1.071   -1.70% -1.426$  0.22% 0.189   -0.33% -0.278   0.19% 0.219   -1.81% -2.357@ -0.56% -0.741   -0.61% -0.795   0.77% 0.979   -0.84% -1.357$  
-17 -1.61% -1.078   -0.45% -0.374   -0.65% -0.552   -0.12% -0.104   0.05% 0.064   -1.13% -1.468$  -0.41% -0.535   0.50% 0.653   0.06% 0.070   -0.46% -0.748   
-16 0.71% 0.475   1.31% 1.102   0.03% 0.021   1.30% 1.112   0.22% 0.257   0.23% 0.298   0.51% 0.673   0.60% 0.777   -0.20% -0.254   -0.08% -0.128   
-15 -0.03% -0.019   0.10% 0.082   -1.06% -0.898   0.90% 0.766   0.76% 0.888   -0.05% -0.070   0.34% 0.452   -0.30% -0.388   0.13% 0.169   -0.15% -0.244   
-14 -0.81% -0.542   -0.41% -0.343   0.09% 0.078   1.91% 1.630$  0.15% 0.171   -0.73% -0.954   -0.57% -0.741   0.06% 0.076   -0.47% -0.592   0.11% 0.174   
-13 0.42% 0.278   -0.48% -0.406   -0.15% -0.131   -0.62% -0.533   -0.99% -1.151   -0.29% -0.376   1.12% 1.471$  -1.15% -1.490$  -0.47% -0.590   0.31% 0.497   
-12 -0.89% -0.597   -2.01% -1.685*  -0.19% -0.160   0.77% 0.656   1.69% 1.971*  -1.72% -2.244*  0.64% 0.834   -0.12% -0.155   -0.38% -0.477   0.84% 1.360$  
-11 -1.27% -0.846   -0.96% -0.809   -0.47% -0.397   0.08% 0.064   -0.31% -0.364   0.40% 0.524   -0.11% -0.144   0.35% 0.447   0.20% 0.256   -1.68% -2.708@ 
-10 -1.08% -0.722   0.98% 0.818   -0.18% -0.151   0.13% 0.108   1.25% 1.454$  0.47% 0.614   1.08% 1.422$  -0.81% -1.050   0.24% 0.303   0.52% 0.839   
-9 -0.26% -0.174   -0.96% -0.804   0.94% 0.798   0.63% 0.539   0.33% 0.382   0.55% 0.713   0.55% 0.719   -1.44% -1.860*  -0.27% -0.341   -0.85% -1.370$  
-8 0.00% 0.002   1.48% 1.243   -1.74% -1.476$  -0.45% -0.388   -1.08% -1.262   -0.08% -0.103   1.72% 2.262*  -0.02% -0.023   -0.61% -0.766   -0.14% -0.225   
-7 0.78% 0.520   -0.60% -0.505   0.51% 0.436   1.65% 1.405$  1.99% 2.322*  -0.85% -1.105   -0.51% -0.664   -0.77% -0.997   -0.19% -0.245   -0.56% -0.900   
-6 0.05% 0.031   -0.37% -0.314   -0.70% -0.590   0.60% 0.510   -0.21% -0.242   -0.30% -0.390   0.33% 0.437   -0.10% -0.126   1.66% 2.096*  0.17% 0.278   
-5 -1.36% -0.910   0.81% 0.682   -1.15% -0.975   0.67% 0.574   -1.78% -2.078*  0.60% 0.788   0.55% 0.723   -1.67% -2.164*  0.75% 0.944   -1.41% -2.280*  
-4 1.55% 1.038   -1.71% -1.435$  -0.53% -0.451   0.63% 0.536   0.13% 0.151   -0.51% -0.665   1.57% 2.059*  0.87% 1.123   0.47% 0.599   -0.34% -0.549   
-3 0.74% 0.496   1.47% 1.233   -0.54% -0.460   0.28% 0.237   0.49% 0.574   -0.24% -0.308   -0.20% -0.263   -0.01% -0.009   0.28% 0.357   -0.43% -0.694   
-2 1.39% 0.927   -0.56% -0.472   0.98% 0.832   -0.75% -0.639   0.66% 0.775   0.06% 0.081   0.03% 0.041   0.47% 0.609   -0.45% -0.574   -0.61% -0.981   
-1 0.62% 0.413   -0.59% -0.492   1.48% 1.254   -0.97% -0.824   -0.70% -0.815   0.30% 0.387   -0.60% -0.786   -0.05% -0.064   -0.33% -0.413   -1.09% -1.759*  
0 -1.21% -0.806   0.05% 0.041   1.56% 1.318$  -0.97% -0.828   -0.62% -0.728   0.18% 0.241   0.52% 0.683   0.77% 0.995   0.22% 0.277   0.76% 1.218   
1 -0.40% -0.265   0.15% 0.126   0.51% 0.430   0.44% 0.378   -0.06% -0.074   -0.38% -0.489   0.61% 0.805   -1.25% -1.619$  -0.28% -0.349   -0.16% -0.265   
2 0.80% 0.534   0.54% 0.451   0.67% 0.571   -0.14% -0.119   0.54% 0.625   -0.05% -0.062   -0.29% -0.374   -0.22% -0.289   -0.47% -0.597   0.27% 0.437   
3 -0.75% -0.503   -0.33% -0.274   -1.43% -1.214   0.43% 0.368   0.05% 0.053   0.25% 0.328   0.07% 0.095   -0.44% -0.572   -0.32% -0.401   0.30% 0.485   
4 0.72% 0.479   -0.52% -0.436   -2.56% -2.172*  0.05% 0.041   0.65% 0.762   -0.34% -0.447   -1.13% -1.487$  -1.44% -1.860*  -0.35% -0.443   1.01% 1.621$  
5 -2.76% -1.847*  -1.53% -1.280   1.86% 1.574$  0.08% 0.064   -0.93% -1.081   -0.45% -0.586   -0.10% -0.136   -0.68% -0.883   -0.24% -0.306   0.43% 0.699   
6 0.35% 0.232   -1.85% -1.552$  -0.53% -0.445   1.21% 1.028   -1.11% -1.292$  0.46% 0.601   0.36% 0.474   0.42% 0.541   0.00% 0.005   -0.18% -0.291   
7 0.49% 0.328   0.17% 0.144   -0.22% -0.190   0.69% 0.585   -0.19% -0.217   -0.30% -0.393   -0.80% -1.044   -0.51% -0.658   -0.25% -0.319   -0.40% -0.650   
8 0.93% 0.619   -0.70% -0.588   1.30% 1.103   -0.04% -0.030   -0.10% -0.121   0.57% 0.746   -1.42% -1.867*  -0.93% -1.200   -0.35% -0.446   -0.12% -0.200   
9 -0.02% -0.015   -0.05% -0.039   0.81% 0.682   -0.92% -0.786   0.35% 0.408   -0.18% -0.233   0.00% 0.001   -0.82% -1.067   0.63% 0.797   -0.45% -0.724   
10 0.07% 0.044   -1.10% -0.922   0.20% 0.171   0.57% 0.486   0.70% 0.820   -0.56% -0.734   -0.76% -0.992   -0.07% -0.086   1.20% 1.517$  -0.66% -1.069   
11 -0.48% -0.323   0.03% 0.022   1.12% 0.952   0.91% 0.779   -0.37% -0.433   -0.46% -0.598   -0.08% -0.104   -0.17% -0.220   -0.43% -0.539   -0.27% -0.439   
12 0.60% 0.402   -0.20% -0.167   -1.35% -1.143   0.61% 0.518   0.94% 1.102   0.52% 0.677   -1.66% -2.171*  -0.59% -0.767   0.56% 0.706   0.45% 0.733   
13 -1.01% -0.673   -0.26% -0.217   -0.44% -0.374   -0.33% -0.283   0.52% 0.611   0.33% 0.436   0.88% 1.151   0.19% 0.247   0.43% 0.549   0.05% 0.074   
14 -0.43% -0.287   -0.53% -0.446   -1.39% -1.180   0.88% 0.748   0.32% 0.372   -0.58% -0.762   0.01% 0.010   1.59% 2.066*  -0.15% -0.190   0.20% 0.317   
15 -1.64% -1.094   -0.23% -0.193   -0.31% -0.260   1.20% 1.022   2.17% 2.528@ 1.12% 1.455$  0.48% 0.634   -0.01% -0.008   0.91% 1.151   0.49% 0.789   
16 -1.81% -1.211   0.90% 0.755   0.03% 0.025   1.39% 1.185   -0.49% -0.570   0.61% 0.789   -0.04% -0.046   -0.46% -0.593   0.95% 1.204   -0.05% -0.081   
17 0.54% 0.358   -1.81% -1.519$  0.50% 0.422   -1.01% -0.862   0.32% 0.379   -0.11% -0.145   0.78% 1.025   0.22% 0.288   0.63% 0.801   0.94% 1.511$  
18 -2.16% -1.442$  0.47% 0.390   -0.64% -0.543   0.88% 0.747   0.98% 1.142   1.10% 1.434$  -1.23% -1.617$  -0.96% -1.246   -0.63% -0.803   0.06% 0.096   
19 -0.65% -0.435   -0.76% -0.641   0.06% 0.052   0.94% 0.806   0.06% 0.064   0.52% 0.681   -0.21% -0.273   0.01% 0.008   -0.58% -0.733   -0.06% -0.099   
20 -4.41% -2.946@ -1.18% -0.993   0.12% 0.104   1.50% 1.281   -0.74% -0.865   1.69% 2.202*  -0.42% -0.553   -0.01% -0.015   -0.14% -0.173   -0.24% -0.395   
Date 
(τ)
9/10/2002 2/7/2003 3/17/2003 5/20/2003 12/22/2003 5/26/2004 7/8/2004 8/2/2004 7/7/2005 8/10/2006
Note: This table shows daily abnormal returns (column a) and test statistics (column b) beginning 20 days before and extending 20 days after the event date, which is centered at τ = 0
The symbols $,*,@, and # denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, using a 1-tail test.
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Table A-9: Daily Abnormal Returns for Defense Stocks and al-Qaida Messages 
(a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b)
-20 -0.62% -0.416   0.63% 0.413   -0.44% -0.368   -1.13% -0.964   1.05% 0.972   1.67% 1.985*  0.42% 0.508   1.25% 1.642$  -0.47% -0.633   -0.91% -1.236   -0.70% -0.952   -0.87% -1.262   
-19 -0.04% -0.025   -1.19% -0.782   1.32% 1.101   -0.49% -0.416   -0.14% -0.134   -0.30% -0.359   -0.09% -0.110   -0.76% -0.991   0.35% 0.476   -0.03% -0.046   1.65% 2.238*  0.44% 0.634   
-18 1.60% 1.081   -0.36% -0.240   0.10% 0.085   -0.48% -0.410   1.14% 1.058   1.23% 1.453$  0.68% 0.828   0.05% 0.063   -0.26% -0.353   -0.44% -0.596   0.96% 1.295$  1.13% 1.642$  
-17 1.92% 1.298$  0.88% 0.579   -0.40% -0.337   1.09% 0.927   0.26% 0.240   0.34% 0.400   0.17% 0.205   -0.57% -0.748   -1.01% -1.364$  -0.26% -0.350   -0.76% -1.028   0.83% 1.206   
-16 0.79% 0.535   -0.73% -0.479   -0.48% -0.400   1.54% 1.314$  0.46% 0.425   -1.09% -1.287$  -0.06% -0.070   -0.38% -0.502   -0.49% -0.666   0.71% 0.955   -0.33% -0.441   0.73% 1.050   
-15 -0.82% -0.558   0.75% 0.490   -2.00% -1.673*  1.66% 1.418$  0.15% 0.137   1.96% 2.325*  -0.03% -0.033   -0.08% -0.109   -1.02% -1.379$  -0.34% -0.456   -0.34% -0.462   0.17% 0.248   
-14 0.30% 0.204   -2.69% -1.770*  -0.96% -0.801   0.57% 0.487   -0.35% -0.328   -0.22% -0.259   -0.14% -0.170   0.37% 0.486   -0.14% -0.187   -0.71% -0.965   -0.84% -1.131   0.03% 0.050   
-13 -0.09% -0.059   0.39% 0.256   0.98% 0.819   0.74% 0.634   0.41% 0.381   -1.78% -2.105*  0.85% 1.029   0.42% 0.556   0.30% 0.402   1.64% 2.222*  -1.15% -1.555$  -0.25% -0.365   
-12 -0.30% -0.203   0.58% 0.384   -0.95% -0.796   -1.37% -1.172   -0.58% -0.533   0.11% 0.131   0.97% 1.171   -2.28% -2.997@ -0.81% -1.095   0.95% 1.279   -1.44% -1.955*  -0.13% -0.191   
-11 0.60% 0.405   0.95% 0.627   1.49% 1.241   -2.48% -2.111*  -0.14% -0.129   0.48% 0.573   0.82% 0.998   1.04% 1.362$  0.15% 0.204   -0.77% -1.036   -0.24% -0.322   -1.45% -2.093*  
-10 -0.02% -0.016   0.04% 0.025   -0.60% -0.499   1.87% 1.593$  -0.85% -0.785   0.64% 0.754   -0.17% -0.204   0.64% 0.844   -0.27% -0.366   -0.34% -0.455   0.44% 0.596   0.83% 1.206   
-9 0.71% 0.481   0.13% 0.088   -0.37% -0.308   -0.45% -0.385   0.82% 0.756   -0.70% -0.833   0.99% 1.195   0.45% 0.585   -1.45% -1.958*  -0.35% -0.475   0.37% 0.505   -0.34% -0.492   
-8 -0.06% -0.043   -0.50% -0.331   0.82% 0.683   -0.17% -0.149   0.36% 0.334   -0.64% -0.756   0.53% 0.644   0.80% 1.056   1.25% 1.686*  -0.85% -1.145   -0.03% -0.041   0.44% 0.632   
-7 0.35% 0.236   0.60% 0.392   -1.71% -1.425$  1.36% 1.158   0.47% 0.436   -0.07% -0.089   0.31% 0.375   -0.66% -0.865   -1.50% -2.034*  -1.16% -1.572$  -0.63% -0.850   0.94% 1.353$  
-6 -0.28% -0.189   -0.91% -0.598   1.47% 1.232   0.85% 0.729   0.12% 0.110   0.53% 0.632   0.72% 0.871   -0.28% -0.374   0.63% 0.857   -1.45% -1.966*  -0.51% -0.686   0.69% 0.995   
-5 -0.52% -0.355   -0.37% -0.242   -0.56% -0.466   0.23% 0.200   0.31% 0.289   0.04% 0.043   1.19% 1.440$  0.25% 0.326   0.09% 0.120   -0.25% -0.334   0.71% 0.965   0.01% 0.011   
-4 -0.20% -0.134   -1.69% -1.109   -0.58% -0.486   1.20% 1.022   -0.13% -0.123   0.62% 0.739   -0.75% -0.914   -1.83% -2.408@ 0.20% 0.277   0.43% 0.582   0.46% 0.627   0.13% 0.184   
-3 -0.59% -0.395   -1.73% -1.139   0.05% 0.045   -1.26% -1.072   -0.79% -0.732   -0.93% -1.106   0.12% 0.143   -1.09% -1.428$  -1.06% -1.440$  0.37% 0.494   -1.42% -1.923*  -0.08% -0.119   
-2 0.64% 0.431   0.59% 0.387   0.16% 0.130   -0.39% -0.333   0.32% 0.292   -1.12% -1.324$  -0.71% -0.862   0.24% 0.309   -0.52% -0.702   -0.04% -0.053   1.22% 1.657*  -0.54% -0.788   
-1 0.69% 0.463   -2.08% -1.368$  0.54% 0.453   -1.33% -1.136   -0.46% -0.426   -0.19% -0.220   -0.38% -0.464   -0.05% -0.061   -0.59% -0.805   -0.64% -0.862   -0.13% -0.176   0.07% 0.105   
0 0.28% 0.187   -0.58% -0.381   -0.32% -0.269   -0.25% -0.212   -0.82% -0.760   -0.13% -0.158   -0.06% -0.077   -0.76% -0.999   -1.30% -1.763*  -0.52% -0.700   -1.02% -1.379$  0.09% 0.127   
1 0.53% 0.361   -4.41% -2.900@ -0.52% -0.430   0.08% 0.072   -0.04% -0.037   0.34% 0.405   0.44% 0.533   -0.35% -0.456   0.65% 0.877   0.70% 0.948   0.43% 0.588   0.92% 1.337$  
2 -0.56% -0.381   -2.25% -1.481$  -1.52% -1.270   0.54% 0.457   0.02% 0.020   0.69% 0.820   0.45% 0.543   -1.77% -2.320*  -1.20% -1.625$  0.45% 0.613   -0.75% -1.014   -0.44% -0.638   
3 0.37% 0.250   0.16% 0.105   -1.85% -1.541$  -0.57% -0.490   0.09% 0.081   -0.39% -0.459   -2.45% -2.961@ 0.43% 0.569   2.15% 2.905@ -1.43% -1.932*  -0.08% -0.105   1.47% 2.133*  
4 -1.24% -0.839   0.68% 0.450   0.18% 0.148   0.11% 0.096   0.51% 0.467   0.96% 1.133   1.11% 1.344$  0.48% 0.627   0.10% 0.139   1.21% 1.644$  -0.34% -0.463   0.27% 0.396   
5 -0.49% -0.330   -0.66% -0.432   -0.70% -0.581   0.21% 0.176   1.57% 1.453$  0.51% 0.603   0.81% 0.985   0.54% 0.712   0.13% 0.177   -0.14% -0.190   -1.81% -2.455@ 2.05% 2.970@ 
6 0.61% 0.410   -0.92% -0.605   -0.04% -0.035   0.87% 0.743   0.27% 0.247   0.32% 0.383   0.46% 0.563   -0.08% -0.108   0.74% 1.000   -1.03% -1.393$  -2.53% -3.423# -1.29% -1.865*  
7 0.90% 0.611   -1.02% -0.669   -1.09% -0.914   1.13% 0.963   -0.12% -0.110   2.14% 2.542@ 0.77% 0.929   -0.89% -1.173   0.32% 0.434   0.43% 0.577   0.40% 0.536   -0.18% -0.258   
8 -0.07% -0.050   -1.38% -0.909   0.03% 0.026   1.23% 1.049   -0.37% -0.341   -0.50% -0.589   -0.62% -0.752   -0.27% -0.356   0.81% 1.101   -0.76% -1.027   -1.03% -1.389$  0.72% 1.049   
9 0.91% 0.614   -1.14% -0.752   -0.19% -0.162   0.94% 0.806   -1.42% -1.314$  0.31% 0.362   -0.43% -0.517   0.59% 0.778   0.51% 0.685   -0.09% -0.118   -1.36% -1.838*  1.39% 2.017*  
10 1.22% 0.823   2.34% 1.537$  -0.25% -0.212   1.65% 1.406$  -0.56% -0.521   0.97% 1.155   0.18% 0.212   -0.51% -0.668   -0.60% -0.808   -0.35% -0.477   -0.71% -0.966   -0.29% -0.420   
11 1.28% 0.868   0.22% 0.145   -0.53% -0.440   0.32% 0.274   -1.46% -1.347$  0.03% 0.041   -1.89% -2.287*  -0.22% -0.289   -0.15% -0.196   -1.83% -2.471@ -2.17% -2.939@ 1.35% 1.957*  
12 -1.41% -0.953   2.36% 1.551$  -0.22% -0.188   -0.33% -0.279   -0.80% -0.743   -0.74% -0.879   -0.97% -1.178   0.07% 0.090   0.50% 0.671   -2.54% -3.439# 1.08% 1.469$  0.76% 1.104   
13 1.59% 1.074   -0.09% -0.059   0.90% 0.756   -0.12% -0.102   0.92% 0.851   -0.02% -0.029   0.27% 0.325   0.36% 0.478   -0.93% -1.256   0.38% 0.521   1.87% 2.527@ 0.77% 1.121   
14 -0.70% -0.472   -1.88% -1.234   -1.81% -1.508$  1.28% 1.092   0.29% 0.265   1.70% 2.012*  -0.01% -0.018   0.19% 0.251   -0.06% -0.080   -1.03% -1.400$  -0.84% -1.133   -1.36% -1.964*  
15 0.10% 0.068   -1.44% -0.947   0.47% 0.393   0.89% 0.756   0.19% 0.174   -0.47% -0.553   -0.82% -0.998   -0.35% -0.462   -0.49% -0.669   -1.37% -1.851*  -0.08% -0.105   0.58% 0.839   
16 0.71% 0.478   2.11% 1.387$  -0.76% -0.634   1.90% 1.624$  0.19% 0.179   -0.89% -1.051   -0.49% -0.592   -0.05% -0.067   -0.27% -0.369   -0.72% -0.978   -0.95% -1.284$  0.52% 0.753   
17 1.11% 0.753   0.77% 0.505   -1.18% -0.984   -0.63% -0.540   0.16% 0.150   -1.31% -1.558$  -1.87% -2.268*  0.25% 0.332   0.68% 0.916   -2.18% -2.953@ -0.10% -0.131   0.87% 1.254   
18 0.43% 0.289   0.14% 0.091   -0.58% -0.483   0.75% 0.638   0.80% 0.736   -0.52% -0.614   0.53% 0.644   -0.33% -0.432   -0.36% -0.481   1.08% 1.456$  -0.09% -0.119   0.37% 0.535   
19 -1.18% -0.797   -0.80% -0.524   -0.60% -0.502   0.07% 0.059   -0.22% -0.204   0.26% 0.308   0.51% 0.616   -0.48% -0.632   -0.74% -1.000   1.85% 2.508@ -1.33% -1.806*  -0.05% -0.070   
20 -0.89% -0.598   -3.78% -2.487@ 0.89% 0.746   0.11% 0.094   1.03% 0.952   -0.32% -0.380   0.55% 0.662   0.48% 0.633   1.61% 2.173*  -0.85% -1.144   0.14% 0.195   -0.27% -0.391   
Date 
(τ)
12/13/2001 10/7/2002 2/12/2003 4/7/2003 9/10/2003 1/5/2004 12/27/2004 1/19/2006
The symbols $,*,@, and # denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, using a 1-tail test.
Note: This table shows daily abnormal returns (column a) and test statistics (column b) beginning 20 days before and extending 20 days after the event date, which is centered at τ = 0
4/15/2004 5/6/2004 10/29/2004 12/16/2004
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